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Abstract
This work contributes to the field of unlinkability. Unlinkability describes a
situation where attackers are unable to correctly cluster items of interest. The
focus of this work is on modelling and measuring unlinkability. Additionally a
protocol for provision of unlinkable certificates, tailored to the requirements
of vehicular communication is introduced. The vehicular scenario is used
throughout this work as a motivating example.
In this work, a linkability graph is developed and used to illustrate the
tight relation between unlinkability and anonymity in certification schemes.
The main distinction between anonymity and unlinkability problems is cap-
tured by the notion of inner structure, which is developed in this work.
Inner structure describes the inherent difference between hypotheses of un-
linkability problems. This difference is expressed by metrics that reflect the
attackers’ objectives and world-view. Inner structure motivates consistency
of an attacker’s world-view as criterion for assessment of attacker quality.
Previous entropy-based global unlinkability measures do not reflect the
consistency of attacker probability mass assignments. In this work, these
shortcomings are analysed, and criteria for unlinkability measures are de-
veloped. These criteria are then discussed for a new unlinkability measure
introduced herein. This expected distance unlinkability measure is defined
using the inner structure of a space of hypotheses. It thus reflects the con-
sistency of an attacker’s assignment and not only the attacker’s certainty as
done by entropy-based measures.
This work also contributes a certification protocol that provides revocable-
anonymous protocols that are not linkable to each other or the authenticated
requester by the issuing certification authority or others. Revocation of an-
onymity is possible only by a quorum of independent revocation authorities.
The objective is to reduce the trust that has to be put into single authorities
to reduce the risk of misuse. The protocol is based on a previously known
cut-and-choose blind signature protocol, but made more flexible to suit ve-
hicular communication scenarios. An extensive security analysis of newly
introduced protocol-parameters is provided.
Concluding, this work provides a contribution to the ongoing discussion
on unlinkability, unlinkability measures and analysis. It draws motivation
from a communication scenario that is intensively researched at the moment
and contributes to the protocol development there.
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Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird die quantitative Analyse von Unverkettbarkeit1 be-
handelt. Unter Unverkettbarkeit versteht man die Unmo¨glichkeit, dass ein
Angreifer den Zusammenhang zwischen Datenobjekten herausfinden kann.
Das bedeutet insbesondere, dass kein Angreifer in der Lage ist anonyme
Nachrichten miteinander zu verketten.
Wir konkretisieren zuna¨chst die Unterscheidung zwischen Anonymita¨t
und Unverkettbarkeit indem wir formal Anonymita¨ts- und Verkettbarkeit-
sprobleme definieren. Der Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Problemklassen,
insbesondere, dass Anonymita¨tsprobleme spezielle Verkettbarkeitsprobleme
darstellen wird im Anschluss gezeigt. Der Zusammenhang wird dann in
einem Analysemodell weiter konkretisiert und auf ein konkretes Szenario, die
Zertifikatsstruktur in Fahrzeugkommunikation, angewendet. Das in dieser
Arbeit verwendete Beispiel der Fahrzeugkommunikation ist besonders geeignet
weil dabei zum einen hohe Anforderungen an die Privatheit gestellt wer-
den, andererseits aber sehr genaue und umfangreiche Positionsdaten ver-
wendet werden und zusa¨tzlich besondere Dringlichkeit der Informationszu-
verla¨ssigkeit besteht.
In unserer und anderen Arbeiten zu Unverkettbarkeitsmaßen wird an-
genommen, dass der Angreifer eine Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung u¨ber den
gesamten Hypothesenraum eines Verkettbarkeitsproblems liefert. Der Hy-
pothesenraum umfasst dabei alle Partitionierungen der Menge der betra-
chteten Objekte (Items of Interest (IOI)). In dieser Arbeit entwickeln wir die
Unterscheidung zwischen dieser outer structure und der inner structure des
Hypothesenraums. Die a¨ußere Struktur beschreibt die durch den Angreifer
induzierte Bewertung des Hypothesenraums. Die innere Struktur wird durch
Definition einer Metrik2 der a¨hnlichkeit von Hypothesen aufgebaut.
Bisher bekannte Verkettbarkeits-Maße verwenden ausschließlich die a¨ußere
Struktur und ignorieren die innere Struktur des Hypothesenraums. Als Re-
sultat werden unterschiedlich gute Angreifer von bisherigen Maßen gleich
bewertet. Wir entwickeln den Begriff der Konsistenz eines Angreifers (con-
sistency) aus dieser Kritik heraus, welcher sich auf die innere Struktur stu¨tzt.
In dieser Arbeit werden Kriterien fu¨r Verkettbarkeitsmaße entwickelt und
diskutiert und ein neues Maß (Expected Distance Unlinkability Measure)
vorgestellt, welches den zu erwartenden Fehler des Angreifers zur Bewertung
verwendet. Der erwartete Fehler ist die, durch die Angreifer-bestimmten
Wahrscheinlichkeiten (externe Struktur) gewichtete, Summe der Distanzen
(innere Struktur) aller Hypothesen von einer gegebenen Referenzhypothese.
1U¨bers. Unlinkability
2oder Quasi-Metrik
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Wir unterscheiden die zwei Analysearten Black Box und White Box. In der
Black Box Analyse ist die korrekte Hypothese, welche mit der Realita¨t korre-
liert, unbekannt, weshalb sinnvollerweise die vom Angreifer ho¨chstbewertete
Hypothese als Referenz genommen. In der White Box Analyse wird die kor-
rekte Hypothese als Referenz verwendet. In beiden Fa¨llen korreliert der da-
rauf berechnete erwartete Fehler des Angreifers mit dem von uns eingefu¨hrten
Konsistenzbegriff.
Die Verwendung von Verkettbarkeitsmaßen an realen Beispielen ist im
Allgemeinen schwierig aufgrund der Kardinalita¨t des Hypothesenraums und
der Summe die u¨ber diesem Raum gebildet werden muß. Wir stellen in dieser
Arbeit erste Ansa¨tze vor mit der die Komplexita¨t der Berechnung fu¨r ein-
fache Angreifer deutlich reduziert werden kann. Diese soweit zu entwickeln,
daß Verkettbarkeitsmaße in realistischen Szenarien mit beliebigen Angreifern
durchgefu¨hrt werden ko¨nnen ist Teil zuku¨nftiger Forschung.
Unverkettbarkeit setzt Anonymita¨t voraus. In fru¨heren Arbeiten haben
wir Protokolle entwickelt die kontrolliert widerrufbar-anonyme Zertifizierung
unter der besonderen Pra¨misse der Trennung von Zertifizierungs-3 und Wider-
rufsstelle4 vorgestellt. Eine Zertifizierungsstelle hat die Aufgabe die Au-
thentizita¨t und Authorisierung eines Antragsstellers zu pru¨fen und ist au-
thorisiert anonyme Zertifikate auszustellen ohne diese allerdings spa¨ter dem
Antragssteller zuordnen zu ko¨nnen. Die Widerrufsstelle ist authorisiert diese
Verbindung herzustellen und damit die Anonymita¨t des Antragsstellers auf-
zuheben. Das Ziel ist unverkettbare Kommunikation auch gegenu¨ber der
Zertifizierungsstelle.
In dieser Arbeit erweitern wir ein bestehende Protokoll Zertifizierungs-
Protokoll. In einer vollsta¨ndigen Analyse wird anschließend gezeigt wie die
Sicherheit der Revozierung gegen Berechnungsaufwand in Verschiedenen Pro-
tokollabschnitten abgewogen werden kann. Am Beispiel der Fahrzeugkom-
munikation wird aufgezeigt, dass dadurch eine ausreichend kurze Verifika-
tionszeit wa¨hrend des Kommunikationsvorgangs bei ausreichender Sicherheit
erreicht werden kann.
Erst durch Protokolle wie das hier vorgestellte ist es mo¨glich Unver-
kettbarkeit zu implementieren, die starke Anonymita¨t und ha¨ufige Zerti-
fikatswechsel voraussetzt. Nicht nur im behandelten Szenario ist eine Vielzahl
von auswertbaren Informationen enthalten die letztendlich Objekte verket-
tbar machen.
Protokollentwickler beno¨tigen pra¨zise Maße zur Entwicklung von pri-
vatheitserhaltenden Systemen. Der hier verfolgte Ansatz, ein Maß anhand
von festen Kriterien zu entwickeln tra¨gt dem Rechnung. Die aufgezeigten
3Certification Authority
4Revocation Authority
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Probleme bestehender Maße werden diskutiert und durch die Entdeckung
der inneren Struktur des Hypothesenraums erkla¨rt. Die von uns vorgestellte
Expected Distance Unlinkability Measure vermeidet die Probleme bestehen-
der Maße. Zudem liefert unser Ansatz die erste Diskussion der Umsetzbarkeit
der bisherigen Maße, die in Zukunft weiter gefu¨hrt werden muss um quanti-
tative Abscha¨tzungen von Verkettbarkeit realistisch zu implementieren.
v
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1
Introduction
With the raising use of computer and network technology in daily life, one
security goal is becoming more and more important, while being increasingly
difficult to achieve: privacy. While technology progressively supports our
daily life, the individual loses more and more control over its personal data.
Some security technologies, e. g., surveillance measures, potentially compro-
mise privacy as a side-effect. In a computer-aided life, every action leaves
a mark, denoted as sample, in the data-sphere. Linked samples, denoted as
trace, provide an increasingly complete image of the individual. This work
is motivated by the wish to empower individuals to know and control the
amount of personal information they necessarily emit.
There are many informal — and nowadays even judicial — definitions of
privacy. The first example is “the right to be left alone.” [70]. Another one
is the “informationelle Selbstbestimmung”1 that became law in Germany in
1983. The common factor of these definitions is that the individual person
shall be able to determine which of his personal information is revealed to
whom. The definitions of personal information vary in the details but in
general every information on a person or information that can be related to
a person has to be considered as personal information.
Obviously anybody should also be free to disclose his personal informa-
tion. But in order to choose disclosure freely it must be possible to keep the
information secret. While in the past it has been complicated to distribute
information it has nowadays become increasingly difficult to participate in
1informational self-determination
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
the modern communication world and control the amount or distribution of
personal information. Whereas gathering of information has been a complex
task and secrecy was the default state in the past, the situation is almost
reversed in the present.
This work contributes to privacy research, especially to the field of un-
linkability. Unlinkability describes the inability of an attacker to correctly
derive how items of interest (IOI) are related with respect with respect to
equal sender or other equalities. For an example take anonymous emails as
items of interest. Emails are anonymous if the sender of an mail cannot
be derived, even if a pseudonym is used, emails from the same sender are
still linkable. Emails are unlinkable if the attacker cannot even derive which
emails were sent by the same sender.
The problem of unlinkability is related to anonymity. While a sender
might be anonymous with respect to a message’s content, by relating mes-
sages of the same sender, an attacker gains knowledge from multiple messages
which can lead to an anonymity compromise. At least, a (seemingly anony-
mous) sender is identified, with any of his messages serving as pseudonym.
The attacker can then derive behavioural patterns from linked messages and
thus uncover the identity of the sender step by step. To have perfect ano-
nymity, messages have to be unlinkable.
Our main contribution is the introduction and discussion of a new un-
linkability measure, which respects the inner structure of the unlinkability
hypotheses-space. This inner structure allows us to assess the consistency of
an attack either with respect to the real relation between items of interest, or
measure the consistency of an attacker’s world view in itself. Consistency of
an attacker is the most important out of three criteria for unlinkability mea-
sures we define in this work. Previous unlinkability measures do not consider
this consistency, but solely rely on the attacker’s opinion which resembles
what we denote the outer structure.
This work also contributes to secure revocable anonymous certification
protocols to provide unlinkable certificates. We use a mobile communica-
tions scenario — safety messages in vehicular networks — as motivating
example. It is believed that technology for vehicular communication will im-
prove safety, efficiency, and convenience of traffic in the future. By exchang-
ing safety messages that carry vehicle status information and traffic safety
warnings, future vehicles should be enabled to better support the driver and
prevent accidents. Of course, vehicular communication provides new vectors
of attack for malicious actors. Thus strong security is required. Also time
constraints are very tight which proves to be very challenging for protocol
developers.
In mobile communication the importance of unlinkability is of great im-
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portance because mobile devices are usually directly connected to a user.
Movements of a device directly translate to movements of the user. Thus, if
the device can be located and traced, the user can be traced as well.
To provide unlinkability between messages, frequent pseudonym changes
are considered necessary [22]. Certificates provide pseudonyms for vehicles.
A prerequisite for unlinkability thus is an anonymous, efficient and secure
certification protocol. Communication has to be anonymously authenticated
and communication partners have to be authorised to send messages. Further
requirements in the vehicular scenario are the ability of traffic authorities to
revoke anonymity of vehicles and isolate them from further access to the
network. In Chapter 6 we propose a protocol for certification with scalable
security parameters and a minimum of necessary authority-trust.
This work is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, the unlinkability prob-
lem is defined and introduced. In Chapter 3, the vehicular communications
scenario is introduced. A security analysis in Chapter 4 leads to a formal
model of unlinkability and anonymity problems in this scenario. In Chapter 5
unlinkability measuring is discussed and our expected distance unlinkability
measure is introduced. Chapter 6 introduces a secure revocable anonymous
certification protocol. Discussion of related work is included in the individual
chapters. This work is closed by a conclusion in Chapter 7.
3
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
4
All life is problem solving.
Karl Popper
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This work deals with unlinkability of messages in mobile environments.
In this chapter, basic definitions for the whole work are given, fundamental
terms are introduced, and basic properties of unlinkability and anonymity
are discussed.
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Unlinkability is a sub-problem of the body of problems on anonymity
and privacy. Unlinkability describes the inability of an attacker to relate
certain items of interest with respect to a common attribute. In the following
sections anonymity and unlinkability are introduced. Formalisations of the
introduced concepts are provided where needed throughout this work. Where
appropriate related terms and concepts are mentioned. The relationship
between anonymity and unlinkability is discussed briefly.
2.1 Privacy
The distinction between public and private life has already been made by
Aristotle [17]. A currently urgent need to protect this “right to be left alone”
is created by modern technology [70]. Privacy is the notion used to generally
describe this separation. Simplified it can be said that an individual that is
able to control the border between its public and private life enjoys privacy.
In reality neither the separation in public and private, nor the under-
standing of privacy are simple descisions, but are highly subjective. The
need for — and legal amount of — privacy to which an induvidual is entitled
are subject of highly controversial political and social debates and beyond the
scope of this work. But to enable the debate on privacy, sensible definitions
for amount of privacy have to be found. With respect to privacy, the objec-
tive of our work is to propose means to assess unlinkability, a subproblem of
privacy, in given scenarios.
In the following privacy-related terminology, based on [52], is introduced.
2.2 Items of Interest and Identification An-
chors
In this work the terms action, role, message, and sample are used in many
places. Considering anonymity and unlinkability, these terms describe items
of interest (IOI). Items of interest are objects that an attacker may observe
and which he tries to cluster or link to subjects as senders or receivers. Please
refer to [52] for a detailed definition.
Depending on the context items of interest often model messages, events,
or actions. If items of interest are the objects acted upon or related to actions,
subjects are actors, e. g., senders, creators, and recipients. The term identity
commonly describes either the abstract concept of uniqueness of a subject or
some data which identifies subjects in a given context.
Because of this ambiguity between abstract concept and concrete data,
this work introduces the term identification anchor. An Identification an-
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chor (IA) denotes a set of distinguishable data objects which can be mapped
onto subjects. We say that an identification anchor identifies a subject.
Identification anchors may either be identities used explicitly by a subject
or any data which is used to represent a, potentially unknown, subject. For
example an attacker who observes anonymous emails, may nonetheless relate
emails of the same sender and use any email as an identification anchor for
this unknown sender. Identification anchors allow to use concrete objects for
identification although they are not intended to function as identities.
IA are related to IOI with respect to a role which expresses the semantic
of the relationship of individual anchors and items, e. g., an IA is the sender
of an IOI. IOI are related to other IOI if they share a given mapping to the
same IA, e. g., have the same sender. Many possible maps can be defined on
IOI and IA, but one map has has to be considered special, which is herein
called true relation. The true relation is the relation that describes how IOI
are related to IOI or IA.
The distinction between IOI and IA is used in the following to distinguish
anonymity and unlinkability problems.
2.3 Anonymity
Anonymity, in general, describes that the actions of an individual cannot be
traced back to that individual. In [51], a terminology paper on the subject,
anonymity is defined as follows. “Anonymity of a subject from an attacker’s
perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently identify the subject
within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.”
An anonymity set is comprised of a set of identification anchors. The term
has been introduced by Chaum in [15]. The cardinality of an anonymity set
provides a basic anonymity metric.
In [59] Serjantov and Danezis defined a model to measure anonymity,
similar to [37], as following. Let Ψ be a set of identity anchors which represent
subjects. Let R = {sender, receiver, none} be a set of roles a subject can have
with regard to a message (an item of interest) m ∈M . Let further be r ∈ R
be the role of a user u ∈ Ψ with respect to a message m. The objective of an
anonymity-attacker is to determine for a given role r, which u ∈ Ψ has this
role with respect to m.
We follow this model and define anonymity problem to later distinguish
between anonymity and unlinkability problems. An anonymity problem is
a problem that comprises a set of IA and a set of IOI. The problem for an
attacker is to find the match between IOI and IA that represents reality with
respect to a given role. An attacker searches a map fsender : M → Ψ that
relates every message to the sender of this message.
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Definition 2.1 (Anonymity Problem)
An anonymity problem denotes the problem of finding a function f : IOI→ IA
that maps every item of interest (IOI) onto the one identification anchor (IA)
and is isomorphic to the true relation.
Anonymity problems provide different levels of complexity to solve with
respect to the number of IOI and IA as well as the attackers context. As
anonymity is the inability of an attacker to distinguish which of all possible
maps between IOI and IA is the true relation, an estimation of this inability
of attackers provides a measure for anonymity.
The separation of items in two classes is the main feature that distin-
guishes anonymity from unlinkability (as defined below). Other models for
anonymity also emphasise this distinction of IA and IOI, e. g., the PROB-
Channel for modelling time delays in Mix Networks [65].
The definition of the sets IOI and IA depends on the modelled scenario.
The terminology is based on the “classical” scenario containing a set of mes-
sages, a set of potential senders, and an attacker interested to infer which
message has been sent by which sender. However, other scenarios can be mod-
elled as well, such as relationships between messages and receivers, senders
and receivers, anonymous certificates and certificate holders, entries in two
distinct databases, and others. In other works (e. g., [45]) this latter sce-
nario has been denoted as an unlinkability problem. We refrain from this
terminology here for the sake of clarity.
In the following sections we distinguish further attributes of anonymity
and anonymity problems. These attributes have been used in different works
on anonymity, and as they can be transferred to unlinkability, it is useful to
discuss them in this work.
2.3.1 Perfect/Conditional Anonymity
The term perfect anonymity has been used in [62], but has not been suffi-
ciently defined. In the context of anonymity, the notion perfect describes a
situation where an attacker has no means whatsoever to derive any knowledge
on the subject(s) related to actions (IOI).
In terms of anonymity sets, perfect anonymity means that the anonymity
set of each IOI is the whole set of identification anchors, without the attacker
being able to distinguish between elements of the anonymity set. Considering
results from [45], perfect anonymity implies that the anonymity set for all
IOI is equal.
By conditional anonymity we refer to a form of anonymity which is un-
veiled — by design — within a defined context. Unless defined conditions
are met anonymity is perfect, otherwise anonymity is revoked. The term
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revocable anonymity is used synonymously for anonymity schemes that con-
tain a revocation operation. The objective of revocable anonymity is to
achieve perfect anonymity with the exception of authorised entities which,
under defined circumstances, are able to break anonymity. An example for
conditioned anonymity revocation is provided in Chapter 6.
2.3.2 Local/Dispersed Anonymity
A concept that has not been discussed in the context of unlinkability, but is
already used ambiguously in the context of anonymity, is the notion of local
anonymity. In [46] the term local anonymity network is used for the opposite
of a dispersed anonymity network. The distinction is one of control. Local
anonymity defines anonymity networks that exclusively rely on the “local
administrative domain”, meaning that they reside within a domain controlled
by the anonymity subject itself. Dispersed anonymity describes networks
that rely also on “external administrative domains”. Administrative domains
denote spheres of influence. The local administrative domain describes the
domain connected to the current point of view.
We are not using this concept in this work. The reason for that is, that
most anonymity-preserving protocols explicitly are designed to spread ano-
nymity measures over as many administrative domains, especially as possible
to disguise any relation of IOI to any administrative domain. This obviously
increases the anonymity set related to given IOI, which otherwise would only
consist of those subject local to a given domain. There might be scenarios
where it is sufficient to only provide anonymity within a local domain, but
this would also need for the local administrative domain to be completely
trustworthy with respect to anonymity. This would lead to the adminstra-
tors of that domain becoming a single point of failure, which we explicitly
try to avoid in the methods proposed in this work.
2.3.3 Individual/Global Anonymity
In [66] the notion of locality is used to distinguish different anonymity mea-
sures. The term global anonymity is used for models that give a global
(average) metric on the anonymity of a scenario. The term local anonymity
is used to describe models that assess the anonymity for an individual subject
in a given scenario.
Because of the latent ambiguity in the usage of local anonymity the notion
of individual anonymity has been introduced in [51]. In this work the latter
understanding of local anonymity is used.
9
CHAPTER 2. FUNDAMENTAL DEFINITIONS AND MODELS
2.4 Pseudonym
According to Pfitzmann and Hansen, “A pseudonym is an identifier of a
subject other than one of the subject’s real names” [51]. Every pseudonym
is an identification anchor as well as “real names” are.
Pseudonyms are subject-identifiers that are often used within a distinct
context. The process of generating pseudonyms is crucial for anonymity
preservation, because at the point of pseudonym generation multiple iden-
tification anchors of a subject may be put in relation to each other. It
becomes even more crucial if a subject has to authenticate to be entitled
to receive pseudonyms. For example if a subject has to prove control of an
email-account before being granted an pseudonym in a web-forum.
The process of generating secure, i. e., authentic pseudonyms, is herein
referred to as certification. The relation between pseudonyms and subjects is
a surjective map. Pseudonyms are a classical solution to provide anonymity, if
neither the relation between pseudonym and subject nor the relation between
different pseudonyms is revealed to an attacker.
By changing pseudonyms between contexts, the subject can make it im-
possible to link between identities in different context spheres. A simple
example is the usage of different email addresses as pseudonyms to provide
unlinkability of business and private communication. Other context classes
could be temporally, spatially or content related [27][22].
2.5 Anonymity Revocation
Anonymity has its drawbacks. An example is given by the well known
blackmail-case in [69] or the vehicular communication scenario as described
in Section 3. In some scenarios it should be possible to revoke anonymity
under certain circumstances. Revocation means, that the relation between a
pseudonym and a subject is revealed. In terms of anonymity this is similar
to conditional anonymity as described in Section 2.3.1. Using conditional
anonymity means, of course, that privacy is endangered if the entities, that
are authorized for anonymity revocation, turn into attackers.
Revocation is useful in scenarios where misuse may lead to grave danger
and where the authorised entities are trusted not to misuse the power of
revocation. The vehicular communication scenario described in Section 3
provides our motivation for this type of anonymity. But other applications
like e-cash [69] motivate revocable anonymity as well. In Chapter 6, protocols
for generation of certificates with revocable anonymity are discussed.
We informally define revocation of anonymity, as follows.
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Revocation of anonymity is the authorised recovery of the relation
between a subject and the pseudonyms used by this subject.
Obviously revocation should only be possible for authorized entities under
determined circumstances. The term authority view denotes the knowledge,
e. g., data learned during a certification process, of entities authorised to re-
voke anonymity. In the following, we will abbreviate revocation of anonymity
as revocation if the meaning is unambiguous within its context.
In [62], a useful distinction of based on the direction of anonymity revo-
cation is made. We use this terminology in the remainder of this work.
We translate Type-I anonymity revocation denotes the derivation of pseudonyms
from subject identities.
Definition 2.2 (Type-I Anonymity Revocation)
The mapping of a subject onto corresponding identification anchors (pseudonyms).
Type-II Anonymity Revocation denotes the other direction of revocation,
where the subjects identification anchor is derived from a pseudonym.
Definition 2.3 (Type-II Anonymity Revocation)
The mapping of a subject onto corresponding pseudonyms.
Using the terminology of IA and IOI, both revocation is always mappings
between identification anchors, i. e., between an IA directly related to a
subject and pseudonymous IA. It is useful to distinguish those types because
often one type is required while the other is prohibited. For an example see
Chapter 3 on a vehicular communications scenario.)
2.6 Isolation
After anonymity revocation, the next escalation of misuse protection mea-
sures is the isolation of the subject from the system. In computer networks
this would mean to prevent further access to the network by malicious de-
vices. Isolation is the action of preventing a node from affecting other nodes
or the network. As the examples in this work do not have secrecy as security
objectivesl, isolation has only to prevent manipulation of the internal state
of nodes through network communication, but no eavesdropping. Whether
isolation is used as some kind of punishment or purely for protection is up
to the system.
The damages a malicious nodes may inflict, while it is not isolated, are
the costs of slow isolation. We cannot estimate these costs outside a specific
scenario, but may assume that these cost are related to the time while a
malicious node is not isolated. We denote by isolation time the time between
recognition of malicious behaviour and isolation becoming effective. We use
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this to estimate the efficiency of isolation and the most interesting parameter
of an isolation scheme is the upper bound of its isolation time, which we
denote maximum isolation time:
Definition 2.4 (Maximum Isolation Time [23])
The upper bound of the length of the time interval between recognition of an
attacker and its effective isolation from the network is denoted as maximum
isolation time.
The isolation time starts with the actual detection of an attack. It ends
at the point where the subject is effectively isolated. Recognising an attack
means recognising its effects, which means that beforehand no attack has
been recognised by the system. Thus the point of recognition is the moment
when an attack becomes imminent to the system, which makes it a natural
measure point.
2.7 Unlinkability
In the extremal case every subject may enjoy perfect anonymity, e. g., by
using a different pseudonym for every action or better, no identification at
all. From the anonymity point of view this subject enjoys perfect privacy.
However an attacker might still be able to relate different actions of a sub-
ject. The attacker may even do so without using identification anchors (IA).
Some data related to individual actions might link actions of a subject with
each other. Furthermore, behavioural statistics or usage patterns may reveal
further information on the relation between individual IOIs.
The notion used to describe that an attacker can not (correctly) relate
IOI is unlinkability [51, 63, 25].
“Unlinkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g., sub-
jects, messages, actions, ...) from an attacker’s perspective means
that within the system (comprising these and possibly other items),
the attacker cannot [...] distinguish whether these IOIs are related
or not.” [51]
Taking the viewpoint of an attacker, unlinkability is the inability to find
a clustering of a set of IOI that corresponds to the true relation between
IOI. Relation in this sense normally denotes related with respect to sender
equivalence, but in general other relations can be considered as well. Sender-
equivalence denotes a relation where IOI are in the same equivalence class if
they originated from the same subject1.
1Or if they originate from a subject using the same identification anchor.
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The notion of the unlinkability problem is used herein to explicitly denote
the problem of finding an equivalence relation over the set of IOI that corre-
lates to reality. Equivalence relations are represented by a partition pi from
the set of all partitions ΠM of the set M of IOI.
Definition 2.5 (Unlinkability Problem)
An unlinkability problem denotes the problem of finding a partition pi from
the set of all partitions ΠM of a set M that is isomorph to the true relation.
The opposite of unlinkability is linkability, which is also sometimes men-
tioned in this work. Linkability describes the ability of an attacker to cor-
rectly relate IOI to each other. Similar to anonymity, unlinkability can be
distinguished as perfect/conditional or global/individual.
The main topic of this work is measuring unlinkability. In Chapter 5 an
unlinkability measure is proposed that provides a quantification of unlinka-
bility.
2.8 Anonymity vs. Unlinkability
In the following we shown that anonymity problems are sub-problems of
unlinkability. This means that every anonymity problem can be modelled as
an unlinkability problem with additional context information.
By definition of unlinkability problems, an unlinkability-attacker is not
interested in, nor wants to, identify subjects. Its objective is to discover the
equivalence relation on messages, which correctly relates messages according
to the sender. An anonymity-attacker wants to know who is the sender/re-
ceiver of a particular message. The question of an unlinkability-attacker is
which messages are in the same equivalence class. In most examples, as in
the vehicular scenario used herein, the equivalence class will be a same-sender
relation.
Unlinkability is stronger in terms of privacy than anonymity. Every an-
onymity problem can be mapped onto an unlinkability problem but not the
other way round. In Appendix A we show how such a mapping can be
constructed using hint-classes for unlinkability problems.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have explained basic concepts and terminology of unlink-
ability and anonymity. While anonymity conceptually prevents an attacker
from relating items of interest to identification anchors, unlinkability directly
considers relations between of items of interest.
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Anonymity and unlinkability are terms that are often used ambiguously.
Unlinkability is the broader notion — encapsulating anonymity. The def-
inition of these two concepts as problems allows us to clearly distinguish
anonymity and unlinkability.
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This chapter introduces the vehicular communication scenario which serves
as a motivating example in this work. Vehicular communication provides an
interesting field for privacy research, because of the strong relation between
users and devices. Another interesting point is the ubiquity of vehicle usage
which provides a large footprint for any developments.
Vehicular communication is currently a thriving field for research, ap-
plications from traffic safety over toll collection to amenity services are be-
ing developed. Aside from critical privacy protection, the scenario’s tight
constraints require new and advanced solutions ranging from networking
to cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, vehicular communication is still
an emerging field, where research can directly influence the development of
technology without being blocked by existing standards.
Vehicular communication describes wireless communication between ve-
hicles (Car-2-Car or C2C communication). C2C communication often also is
called inter-vehicle communication (IVC). Communication between vehicles
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Figure 3.1: Vehicular Communication (derived from [49])
and the road infrastructure, denoted as Car-2-Infrastructure or C2I communi-
cation. In general, communication between vehicles and either infrastructure
or vehicles is abbreviated as C2X.
For the remainder of this chapter, possible applications, security objec-
tives and assumptions for the vehicular scenario are described.
3.1 Applications
In this section, example applications for C2X technologies are discussed. The
purpose of this section is to motivate security objectives and assumptions.
Many applications have been envisioned for future vehicular networks.
Comprehensive information can be found, e. g., in [14], [48], and [33]. Fig-
ure 3.1 shows some possible communication channels in vehicular communi-
cation. The image includes a central authority that could advice emergency
vehicles or broadcast information through satelites. Vehicles may commu-
nicate with other vehicles, active traffic signs or via static antennae and
backbone networks with central authorities and information sources.
Applications are generally classified into safety and non-safety applica-
tions. The class safety application contains applications that “reduce traf-
fic accidents and to improve general public safety” [14], such as electronic
brake lights, collision avoidance, congestion information, priority vehicles,
and smart traffic lights. A non-safety application is an application that is
not inherently safety-related, i. e., failures of these applications do not di-
rectly threaten life or health. Another common distinction is based on the
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applications’ field, e. g., traffic related communication, vehicle maintenance,
travel information, or entertainment. The solutions in this work are focussed
on traffic-safety applications.
Safety applications often demand very efficient and very secure commu-
nication For example, latency requirements of 0.1 seconds, non-interactive
one-way communication combined with an absolute need for trustworthiness
of received information are constraints of the electronic brake light. The term
trustworthiness here describes that the contents of a message must correctly
describe reality.
Many applications explicitly require information on the sender’s position
and movement. This information has to be considered private because it is
related to the driver’s movement, even outside of the context of the traffic
scenario. Applications that do not explicitly reveal positional information do,
nonetheless, emit radio messages that can be related to the emitters position.
Another problem that directly hinders the introduction of vehicular com-
munication into the real world is the penetration rate. Many, especially
C2C-applications, can only be effective if a sufficient rate of vehicles has
these applications installed. In [39] the required penetration rates for the
success of certain applications are provided.
3.2 Traffic Scenarios
In this section, variants of traffic scenarios are introduced. In the microscopic
traffic simulation tool Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO)1, six parame-
ters are used to define vehicles: acceleration, deceleration, length of vehicle,
maximum speed and the driver’s imperfection. We have used only one type
of vehicle in our preliminary simulations.
A scenario is partially defined by streams of vehicles comprised by tra-
jectory pattern, vehicle emission frequency, number of emitting vehicles and
stream timing. Vehicle streams are timed in a way, that the middle of streams
meet in the middle of the paths. Varied frequency and number of vehicles
should be used independently in multiple experiments. The trajectory pat-
terns described below, based on a grid like road-map, are considered in this
work. These basic trajectory patterns represent all possible crossings of two
traffic streams.
A crossing of two trajectories is, similar to a mix proxy, a point where
traces can be confused. Single crossings of two trajectories are the min-
imum building blocks of which larger scenarios can be constructed. (See
Figure 3.2.) Theses basic traffic scenarios are standard situations where un-
linkability of different emission protocols can be analysed. We distinguish
1http://sumo.sourceforge.net/
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Figure 3.2: Types of paths in the Simulation.
different scenarios by their trajectory pattern: crossing paths, parallel paths,
opposite-direction paths, and orthogonal paths. These Trajectory patterns
for the general case have been discussed in greater detail in [53].
Crossing-Paths (see Figure 3.2(a)) describe a scenario of two paths shar-
ing a certain segment of the road network and separating into opposite di-
rections. The idea is to mingle two streams for a short part of the itinerary.
The three attributes that describe scenarios are length of the start-, shared-,
and end-segment as well as direction. Length may be expressed as absolute
or relative length.
The same-end and same-start trajectories, in Figures 3.2(b) and 3.2(f),
describe trajectory pairs that start or end in the same point. They can
be seen as crossing-paths scenarios with zero-length end or start segments.
Parallel-Paths (see Figure 3.2(c) and Figure 3.2(g)) share the whole segment.
Orthogonal-Paths (see Figure 3.2(d)) are paths that meet in only one point,
i. e., at a crossing. Opposite-Direction (see Figure 3.2(e) and Figure 3.2(g))
scenarios describe that paths are defined in opposite directions at the shared
segment.
More complex shapes — multiple streams, looping streams, and others
— can be modelled by combining these basic types. The objective here is to
reduce the complexity of an analysis by reducing the complexity of scenarios.
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3.3 Communication Primitives
In this section, basic primitives of vehicular communication are introduced as
a foundation for a common nomenclature and understanding. In the following
the individual players and devices are introduced, the basic communication
structure is explained, and the security infrastructure is described.
The central device in vehicular communication is called the on-board
unit (OBU), which is connected to the vehicles’ internal communication
system and processes all inter-vehicle communication. An OBU fulfills all
operations related to vehicular communication. Inside the OBU, all crypto-
graphic keys, state information and protocol logic is stored. OBU offer only
low computing power for obvious economical reasons. It is assumed that an
OBU is tamper-proof and inseparable from the vehicle. Thus the terms ve-
hicle and OBU can be used interchangeably in the vehicular communication
scenario.
OBU can be distinguished from road side units (RSU) which denote any
communication device with static position that is part of the infrastructure.
RSU may be connected to a high-bandwidth communication backbone.
The anchor for authentication of an OBU is the OBU-certificate. In this
work it is assumed that any OBU can be authenticated by way of an OBU-
certificate, which is bound to the vehicle and granted and signed by a traffic
authority (TA) on registration of the vehicle. The TA is assumed to be
the single authorised entity that commands and controls all traffic related
operations. An OBU-certificate fulfils the function to an electronic license
plate.
3.3.1 Authorities
In this work we assume that there exist at least the following functional
entities. The vehicles appear in the functions of emitters of messages in
vehicular communication, as well as requesters of Inter Vehicle Communi-
cation certificates. IVC certificates are used to authenticate vehicles during
communication and to prove that the vehicle is authorised by the TA. IVC
certificates may only be provided to OBU that have authenticated themselves
against an authority and are authorised to take part in IVC. IVC certificates
are assumed to be short lived and are granted by a certification authority
(CA). The CA grants IVC certificates on behalf of the TA.
In case a vehicle misuses its privileges, its authorisation has to be revoked
and the identity of the vehicle and its owner have to be derived for prose-
cution; thus the anonymity of the vehicle is revoked (see Section 2.5) and
the vehicle has to be isolated (see Section 2.6). It is assumed that a Certif-
icate Revocation List (CRL) of OBU certificates that have been revoked is
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managed by the CA.
In this scenario two levels of revocation can be distinguished. The first
level revokes the authorisation of requesters/vehicles to acquire new IVC
certificates. The second level directly revokes IVC certificates and thus has
to be broadcasted to all concerned vehicles. The second level of revocation
is only used if a current attack has to be stopped immediately, meaning that
all vehicles must be prevented from accepting message of a rogue vehicle (see
below).
The usage of CRL for IVC certificates is otherwise discouraged, because
this considerably increases the time and memory complexity for all vehicu-
lar communications. Optimisation by regional and time-limited certificate
revocation lists should be applied.
Long term isolation of vehicles is done by the first type of CRL. This type
of CRL does not critically influence the efficiency of vehicular communication
because it is only distributed to the certification authorities. It is assumed
that CA have sufficient computing power and bandwidth.
3.4 Security Objectives
The main objective of vehicular communication is to increase traffic safety.
Vehicular communication is envisioned to directly influence the actions of
drivers or even vehicles. Further, vehicles are related to persons. The driver
generally is held responsible for any actions of the vehicle and all information
on the vehicle is directly related to the driver or the owner of the vehicle. Be-
cause erroneous data may have grave consequences in the vehicular scenario,
and because of the personal information involved, security is paramount in
vehicular communication.
Security objectives have been discussed in almost every paper on vehicu-
lar communication. Exemplary security objectives can be found in [33],[49],
and [48]. In 2007 the Car 2 Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) men-
tioned correctness, trustworthiness, privacy of participants, and robustness of
the whole system as major (security) objectives [1]. The adversary considered
normally is passive and listening globally to inter-vehicle communication.[20]
The structure that is used in the following has first been used by us in [23].
The following objectives describe the focus of this work towards secure
vehicular communication.
Authenticity and Isolation. The risk of misuse of a safety message sys-
tem can be assessed as high due to the serious damage that might be inflicted
by attacks. Therefore the first directive for any C2C-communication scheme
is that every safety message has to be authenticated.
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Trust is understood as a transitive relation that between natural persons
that is only relayed onto devices [32]. The correctness of messages is rooted
in the trust in the manufacturer’s ability to produce a working car. Anyone
relying on the correctness of a message may want to verify that the vehicle is
indeed a vehicle, produced by a trusted manufacturer. Furthermore it is to
be ensured that the vehicle is not tampered. The usual way of implementing
this is by certificates and authentication.
As vehicles and OBU may break and malfunction nonetheless, misbehav-
ing OBU must be isolated from the communication network.
We assume that under normal circumstances vehicles are emitting only
information that is correctly describing reality. But obviously vehicles have
to expect messages that carry information which is not correct. One can
distinguish two causes for messages that are not correct: malfunction or
malignancy. As the cause cannot be deducted from the message itself we
summarise vehicles that emit such messages under one term. A vehicle that
emits messages with illicit content or content that does not reflect the reality
correctly is a called rogue vehicle.
Within the scope of this work it is not important whether a vehicle acts
maliciously or is simply malfunctioning. To prevent damage to vehicles and
humans, faulty information has to be prevented from interfering with vehicles
operation.
Maximum Isolation Time. As mentioned above, if a vehicle has been
identified as rogue vehicle it has to be isolated from the network. Isolation
is the ultima ratio of the network to prevent accidents resulting from wrong
information. Isolation of a vehicle normally should be initiated by traffic au-
thorities, or even through voting processes among vehicles. In most existing
societies it will probably be mandatory by law to inform the owner of an
isolated vehicle.
There should also be a defined maximum isolation time, as introduced in
Section 2.5. Two systems can be compared based on their maximum isolation
time. A system with smaller isolation time will usually be considered more
secure than the one with a larger time.
Non-Interactivity and Low Overhead. Because of the high velocity of
vehicles and thus short duration within which communication between two
vehicles is possible, the communication has to be non-interactive and the
message overhead has to be very low. Non-interactivity means that data is
transferred without handshake protocols or other challenge-response schemes.
The urgency of safety messages implies that authentication must be instant
without additional communication. The size of messages has been estimated
21
CHAPTER 3. VEHICULAR COMMUNICATION SCENARIO
to be around 200 bytes [67].
Anonymity and Unlinkability. Safety messages include data that erodes
privacy of vehicle owners or drivers. Most relevant is the danger of tracking a
vehicle through positional information and linkable pseudonyms. Thus, while
preserving the security goals mentioned above, a scheme has to provide pri-
vacy for vehicles and their drivers. More precisely, it must be provided that
drivers and vehicles can neither be traced by an observer nor, that unau-
thorised attackers may acquire the relation between messages and vehicle.
Moreover, to prevent misuse, a driver should not be linkable to a vehicle and
the messages it sends by a single authority.
Revocable Anonymity. Prerequisite to isolation is the revocation of an-
onymity. In case of emergencies and investigations of malicious or criminal
behaviour of single subjects, legal authorities must be able to link messages
to an OBU and the OBU to the vehicle owner.
3.5 Conclusion
Security in vehicular communication is a field of conflicting objectives. While
traffic safety recommends high level authentication and the means to find and
prosecute misbehaviour, strict time-constraints are set for communication
processes. For privacy reasons, on the other hand, it is recommended to emit
as little information as possible to the public and to restrict the potential
misuse by other participants or even authorities.
Vehicular communication provides an excellent example for privacy tech-
nologies. Vehicular scenarios contain personalised objects (OBUs) whose
behaviour can directly be related to the driver. Furthermore many applica-
tions in vehicular communications need explicit positional information, which
generally is very sensitive information if it can be related to a person. Thus,
providing privacy is critical for vehicular communication scenarios.
Vehicular communication scenarios are particularly well suited as an ex-
ample for unlinkability research because they provide a field with messages
that are related to spatial and temporal positions. The messages thus are
samples of vehicles’ trajectories. Because of the constrained movement of
vehicles and available context information, a broad spectrum of different
attackers and movement scenarios can be used for analysis. For a start, ve-
hicular movement is restricted to some physical constraints, e. g., spatial
restrictions (roads), or maximum velocity. One may very well assume that
vehicles stay on the road, keep roughly to speed regulations or show more
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specific behaviour. The examples used in Chapter 5 make use of velocity
statistics to relate vehicular messages.
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Security is mostly a supersti-
tion. It does not exist in na-
ture, nor do the children of
men as a whole experience it.
Avoiding danger is no safer
in the long run than outright
exposure. Life is either a dar-
ing adventure,
or nothing.
Helen Keller 4
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This chapter provides a graph model for anonymity and unlinkability
problems in certification structure. The modes is used to represent the two
types of relationships that comprise anonymity and unlinkability problems,
i. e., from IA to IOI between IOI. Based on the model an attacker classifi-
cation is derived to distinguish attackers based on objectives and resources.
The model is based on a certification structure as it could be used in a ve-
hicular scenario similar to the one described in the previous chapter. The
model is realised linkability graphs that also visualise the relation between
anonymity and unlinkability problems.
4.1 Linkability Model
In this section we provide a model of linkability for the communication sce-
nario as described in Chapter 3. This section extends the linkability model
as introduced by the author in [24]. The main characteristic of the vehicular
scenario is that pseudonymously authenticated messages are broadcast on
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a public medium. Pseudonyms are provided through a PKI-like structure,
manifested through certification authorities (CA).
This work distinguishes identity authorities from certification authorities
(CA). An identity authority manages the relations between identities and
devices. In the vehicular example the identity authority is synonymous with
the traffic authority (TA), which controls the relations between vehicle owners
and their vehicles. A CA grants certificates to vehicles, represented by their
on-board units (OBU), and thus manages the relation between vehicle and
certificates.
The authority knowledge in a vehicular scenario can be modelled as k-
partite graph of disjunct sets. Vertexes represent sets of items of inter-
est (IOI): subjects s ∈ S, devices d ∈ D, certificates c ∈ C, and messages
m ∈M . Anonymity problems are setup by a pair of sets, where one set rep-
resents identification anchors and the other items of interest. Unlinkability
problems are comprised by a single sets. The set of subjects can be taken
as identification anchors (IA), while the set of messages naturally provides
items of interest. Vehicles and certificates are either used as items of interest
or identification anchors, depending on the attacker’s objective.
Edges in the graph represent relations between elements in a given knowl-
edge sphere. A knowledge sphere contains every information on relations be-
tween IOI known to some given entity. In terms of this model a knowledge
sphere is described by sets of edges on which the entity has information, e. g.,
the identity authority observes some event which provides information on a
certain subject being related to some device. Edges are distinguished into
horizontal and vertical relations. By horizontal relation we denote relations
between different sets, e. g., between certificates and messages. Relations
within a set are denoted vertical relation, i. e., relations between messages.
According to common notations of related items, we will denote an edge
between two items a and b as a ∼ b (see [63]).
The graph representation allows formalisation of the knowledge of an
onlooker, e. g., an attacker, about the relations between items of interest.
Edges in the graph may be weighted to reflect the belief in the correctness
of that relation.
26
4.1. LINKABILITY MODEL
4.1.1 Horizontal Linkability Graph
A horizontal linkability graph [24], describing possible relations between dif-
ferent sets of items of interest is constructed as:
Gh = (Vh, Eh,Ph)
Vh = S ∪D ∪ C ∪M
Eh ⊆ (S ×D) ∪ (D × C) ∪ (C ×M)
Ph : Eh → [0, 1],
(4.1)
where Gh is a graph consisting of vertexes Vh, edges Eh, and a weighting
function Ph. Gh is, in this scenario, a reduced 4-partite graph. A horizontal
graph only has edges between vertex sets. The subset S ×D of Eh describes
the relations between owners and vehicles (devices) D. Similarly, the edge
subsets D × C and C ×M denote the relations between vehicles and cer-
tificates, as well as between certificates and vehicles. Other relations may
be modelled by introducing dummy element in the sets in between, e. g., to
model information on a relation S ×M on introduces a temporary dummy
element each in D and C.
o1
v1
c1
m1
m2
c2
m3v2
c3
m4
o2 v3 c4 m5
Figure 4.1: Horizontal Linkability Graph
Edge weights are used to express an attacker’s belief in two items being
related. An edge-weight Ph of zero denotes that the edge’s endpoints are not
related. We will use the notions of edge has weight zero and edge does not
exist synonymously with edge is not in graph. A horizontal linkability graph
consist of one or more trees whose roots are the elements of S. In Figure 4.1
an example graph is shown.
One may observe that Gh represents distinct layers of anonymity prob-
lems, e. g., anonymity with IA subjects and IOI vehicles, between IA vehicles
and IOI certificates, as well as between IA vehicles and IOI messages. Every
choice of two sets of vertexes, one representing IA and the other IOI, poses
a distinct anonymity problem.
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4.1.2 Vertical Linkability Graph
A vertical linkability graph [24] represents relations between IOI of the same
set. A vertical linkability graph is a collection of cliques, because it represents
an equivalence relation, which is transitive. A vertical graph is constructed
as follows:
Gv = (Vv, Ev,Pv)
Vv = S ∪D ∪ C ∪M
Ev ⊆ (S × S) ∪ (D ×D) ∪ (C × C) ∪ (M ×M)
Pv : Ev → [0, 1].
(4.2)
Each set of nodes in Gv provides a separate unlinkability problem, e. g.,
(un-)linkability of vehicles with respect to equal subjects. The most interest-
ing unlinkability problem in a vehicular scenario probably is the unlinkability
of messages M , as messages represent spatial points from which trajectories
of vehicles can be derived.
o1
v1
c1
m1
m2
c2
m3v2
c3
m4
o2 v3 c4 m5
Figure 4.2: Vertical Linkability Graph
An example vertical linkability graph, using the same vertexes as in the
previous example, is shown in Figure 4.2. Each clique represents an equiva-
lence class of IOI. In this example, equivalence denotes that IOI are related
to the same owner.
4.1.3 Linkability Graph
Horizontal and vertical graphs provide a representation that shows the rela-
tion between anonymity and unlinkability. The connection between Gh and
Gv is the node set, which contains the same elements, i. e., subjects, vehi-
cles, certificates, and messages. One may observe the duality between both
graph types: Given Eh and Ph the corresponding Ev and Pv can be inferred.
Obviously the other direction needs additional information on the relation
between vertex sets.
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As Vh = Vv the notation can be simplified by using V := Vh as vertex
set. As the domains of Ph and Pv are disjoint, we can combine them to
simplify the notation using P : Eh ∪Ev → [0, 1]. These observations allow for
a combined graph that includes vertical and horizontal relations:
G = (V , E ,P)
V = S ∪D ∪ C ∪M
E ⊆ Eh ∪ Ev
P : E → [0, 1].
(4.3)
The combined graph G allows representation of the complete knowledge of
an attacker using knowledge from the domain of horizontal relations Eh and
from the domain of vertical relations Ev.
In graph G, we divide horizontal relations into authority knowledge con-
sisting of (S ×D) ∪ (D × C), and public knowledge consisting of (C ×M).
Authority knowledge denotes information on relations between subjects and
vehicles, or vehicles and certificates. Authority knowledge can be further sub-
divided into knowledge of the identity authority domain S ×D and knowl-
edge from the certification authority domain D × C. Public knowledge de-
notes relations that are obvious to anybody seeing the items of interest. In
the scenario described in Section 3 and used in Chapter 6, relationship be-
tween certificates and messages are publicly readable in the messages.
Information on vertical relations is mostly based on context information.
By context information we denote any knowledge on the relation between
IOI derived from external evidence. External evidence is all information not
directly derived from the registration, certification, or communication pro-
cess. This includes probabilistic information on vehicular behaviour, which
can be exploited by statistical inference.
4.1.4 Using Linkability Graphs
A linkability graph can be used to represent the true relation as well as the
world view of different attackers. We denote by reality graph (G, V,E, P )
the linkability graph corresponding to the true relation. This means that iff
two items of interest a and b are related in the real world, there exists an
edge (a, b) in the reality graph with P(a, b) = 1. If a and b are not related
then P(a, b) = 0 in the reality graph, sometimes denoted as not existent. An
example reality graph for two vehicle owners is depicted in Figure 4.3. It can
be noted that the reality graph is a forest of trees with the owners being the
roots of trees.
This model provides a notation to express a scenario as it is seen by an
observer. We can express the knowledge of an attacker A as the weighted
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o1
v1
c1
m1
m2
c2
m3v2
c3
m4
o2 v3 c4 m5
Figure 4.3: Example reality graph: o1, o2 denote vehicle owner identities,
v1, . . . , v3 denote vehicle identities, c1, . . . , c4 vehicle communication certifi-
cates (IVC), and m1, . . . ,m5 denote positional messages. Continuous lines
denote edges in the reality graph. Dotted lines connect related messages.
graph GA = (V , E ,PA). The belief of attacker A on whether or not two
items of interest are related is expressed by the weights PA : E → [0, 1]. A
similar notion of probability is also used in [63, 25] to define the degree of
unlinkability. This is discussed further in Chapter 5.
An alternative way to use this model is to create attack trees for de-
fined scenarios: a security analyst is able to derive an attack tree if he uses
complexity measures as edge weights. These weights then are used to find
a minimum spanning tree. This threat model provides an estimation of the
(complexity) costs for the modelled attacker in relation to the attacker’s
success.
4.2 Attacker Classification
Protection mechanisms for secrecy and authenticity depend on secrecy of
single keys. Anonymity and unlinkability depends on secrecy of relationships.
While the secrecy of keys is controlled by the holder of the keys, secrecy of
relationships depends on the inability of attackers to observe communication
channels, e. g., read address information in messages. Therefore a worst
case attacker in the vehicular scenario with complete knowledge makes little
sense. In Chapter 6 protocols are introduced that prevent single authorities
from having complete knowledge, reducing the strength of this former worst
case attacker. No security analysis is complete without at least noticing the
existence of different types of attackers, which is provided in this section.
Attackers can be distinguished by their objectives and resources at their
disposal. In unlinkability attacks, the resources of an attacker are the items
of interest and any contextual information usable to relate items of interest.
30
4.2. ATTACKER CLASSIFICATION
Authority from 2{IA,CA}
Activity from {active, passive}
Space is r-global, r ∈ [0, 1]
Objective from {M →M ,
C →M ,
V →M ,
O →M ,
M → ΠM}
Table 4.1: Attacker Classification (excerpt)
Obviously this includes the quality of information as well as the amount of
information. The objective of an attacker is to correctly link items of interest.
Similar to the unlinkability model in Section 4.1, we distinguish resources
of an attacker into information known by authorities, attacker activity, and
observation space. Literature knows different classes of ressources that might
be applied in combination, e. g., Aijaz et al. [4] distinguish attackers by
quality of access to vehicles’ on-board units. The objective of an attack is to
discover the trajectory of a vehicle in terms of the sequence of positional mes-
sages. A trajectory T is a sequence of positions in space-time corresponding
to positional messages from M . For simplicity we denote T ⊆M .
Attacker objectives can be distinguished by the vertex-set that is used for
identification, i. e., the set used as identification anchors in a given scenario.
This might be either a message certificate, vehicle identity, or owner identity.
Messages can be used as identity anchors if we agree on using e. g., the
temporal first message in an trajectory as makeshift identity. Certificates,
vehicles, or owner ID obviously are IA only for specific (sub-)trajectories,
e. g., an IA representing a certain vehicle is related to the trajectory of that
vehicle which is a sub-trajectory of the owner/driver.
This classification of attackers is used here as a working hypotheses. For
different purposes it might be useful to adapt the classification. This example
classification is summarized in Table 4.1.
The authority class describes whether an attacker has knowledge that
could only be known to a identity and/or certification authority — or not.
We represent this by 2{IA,CA}, which denotes the power set of both types of
authority knowledge. This classification becomes interesting if privacy pro-
tection in the presence of untrustworthy authorities or malicious employees
is an objective (see Chapter 6).
The activity class describes whether the attacker is limited to passive sniff-
ing or whether he can actively intercept, initiate, or modify communications.
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An active attacker tries to change the behaviour of communication partners;
for example, he may be able to provoke a higher frequency of heartbeat mes-
sages, which increases the number of samples for traffic analysis. This in
turn might increase the possibility that vehicles can be tracked. (See [57] for
an analysis of unlinkability related to emission frequency.)
The spatial class describes the relative amount of items of interest that
can be observed by an attacker. In this example the r-global ratio describes
the relative size of the area in which an attacker is able to observe messages.
This example is directly related to the analysis undertaken in [12]. Therein
success of an attacker has been examined in relation to strength of an attacker
in terms of the number of observed zones. Please note that our notion of
“observed” differs essentially from the notion “observed area” as used in
[12].
The objective class describes the goal of an attacker. All attackers try
to recover the trajectory of an vehicle identified either by a message, a com-
munications certificate, a vehicle identification or an owner’s identity. For
simplicity reasons, we omitted unlikely objectives in Table 4.1, e. g., parti-
tioning of certificates or vehicles.
An attacker class can now be defined by choosing an element of each
class. Disregarding the continuous ratio of the space-class, this attacker
model defines 40 distinct attacker classes. This classification is used as a
reference in the following unlinkability analysis.
4.3 Unlinkability Analysis
The model and attacker classification described above allows description of
unlinkability problems. Using this model we are able to express uncertain
attackers knowledge and calculate the plausibility of unknown relations.
The following example is focused on pseudonym changes, a technique that
has been discussed widely in vehicular communication (e. g., [22]).
Imagine an attacker who has access to a database containing relations
between certificates and vehicles, i. e., an attacker in the CA-class. Compare
this attacker to an attacker without this or any authority knowledge. The
first attacker is able to relate messages m1 and m3 using this knowledge from
the database. The second attacker may only gather information on relations
between messages from repeated use of single certificates1. However, he has
no information on relations between vehicles and certificates. In Figure 4.4,
the additional authority knowledge of the first attacker is depicted by dotted
lines. The second attacker is hindered by certificate changes, while the first
1The attacker may obviously also derive information from the messages’ content.
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v1
c1
m1
m2
c2
m3
v2 c3 m4
Figure 4.4: Example linkage graph: Adversary with CA-knowledge (dotted
lines) vs. adversary without CA-knowledge, owner identities omitted.
v1
c1
m1
c2
m2
c3
m3
v2
c4
m4 m5 m6
Figure 4.5: Example of pseudonym change interval. Vehicle v1 changes the
pseudonym with every message. Vehicle v2 does not change the pseudonym.
v2 can be tracked without knowledge of v2 ∼ c4.
attacker is not. If seen in linkability graph representation, it becomes obvious
that there exists no path between messages related to different certificates in
the second attacker’s graph.
In the following, scenarios with different pseudonym-change intervals are
examined. Herein the interval is expressed as the maximum number of mes-
sages nC sent using a single certificate. Other definitions for pseudonym
change intervals are discussed in the literature, see [57], [27].
Assume, vehicle v has sent the messages Mv ⊆ M . Thus the maximum
value for nC to be considered in analysis is |Mv|. In the example depicted
in Figure 4.5 vehicle v1 changes its pseudonym with every message (nC = 1)
while v2 uses its pseudonym for (at least) three messages (nC ≥ 3).
Let vehicle v be the requester of certificates c1, . . . , cn. Then v has used
each certificate ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n to sign messages mi,1, . . . ,mi,ki , ki ≤ nC and
1 ≤ i ≤ n. If an attacker wants to know whether two different messages
mi,k and mj,l are sent by the same vehicle he has to see whether there is a
path from mi,k to mj,k or use other evidence from context information. The
relation between mi,k and ci is known to any receiver of the message. The
events “observation of ci ∼ v” and “observation of v ∼ cj” are independent,
therefore we can interpret P as probability distribution and multiply along
the path:
PA(mi ∼ mj) = PA(V ∼ Ci) · PA(V ∼ Cj), (4.4)
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where PA denotes the attacker’s probability of messages mi and mj being
related. Observe that this is not the same as the context information men-
tioned above. Context information would provide further evidence towards
or against this relation.
From the attackers belief, the certainty of an attacker that a set of mes-
sages M was sent by vehicle v can be calculated. The set of possible relations
between messages {(m,m′) ∈ M ×M |m 6= m′} is not a set of independent
events, thus we cannot apply the product rule here. In [30] the minimum of
all evidence supporting a hypotheses (e. g., “mi ∼ mj are in G”) is used for
the basic weighting function PA(T ) of equivalence cluster
2,
PA(T ) = min{PA(mi ∼ mi+1)|1 ≤ i < |T |},
T =< m1, . . . ,m|T | > .
(4.5)
Which states that the probability of the sequence T is the minimum the
probabilities of adjacent messages in that sequence.
Further combination of equivalence classes and following normalization
yields a probability density function for equivalence relations. This probabil-
ity density can be used for calculation of the degree of anonymity as described
in [63].
4.4 Conclusion
This linkability model provides a structured approach to anonymity and un-
linkability problems in a credential-based scenario. By using this graph nota-
tion attackers can be described with respect to their resources and objectives.
Effects of information disclosure become obvious in the weighted graph.
Furthermore this model graphically shows the strong dependencies be-
tween anonymity and unlinkability. Generally we can assume that if one can
be broken by an attacker, the other one is broken too.
2cluster, i. e., subsets of M
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Errors using inadequate data
are much less than those us-
ing no data at all.
Charles Babbage
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This chapter introduces a global unlinkability measure, and contributes
to the struggle for a formal definition of unlinkability.
When mobile devices travel and communicate they leave a trace of emit-
ted messages in their wake. The number and distribution of messages is com-
manded by device movement and communication protocols. An attacker who
is able to correctly link messages can trace the movement of devices. An at-
tacker may derive information on the relations between messages from many
sources. Road-maps, traffic patterns, constraints on vehicular movement, in-
formation leaked from the certification process, radio-frequency fingerprint-
ing, CCTV observation — any information that restricts the hypothesis space
may be useful to an attacker. These sources of information are summarised
under the term context information.
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Unlinkability analysis may have different objectives. Protocol designers
who develop Privacy Enhancing Technologies need to analyse the quality of
their methods. Users may want to know the amount of privacy they enjoy in
a certain situation, some of which are unlinkability-related. Customers may
need to weight quality of service against privacy level against price.
Designers of privacy preserving communication protocols need tools to as-
sess the quality of their protocols. The topic of this chapter is the assessment
of the amount or quality of unlinkability. Unlinkability can be understood
as the inability of an attacker to track moving devices from the messages
emitted by them.
An unlinkability measure is a quantitative assessment of unlinkability for
a given scenario. A scenario is defined by message emissions and contents,
attacker models and the context information available to attackers. In this
chapter a measure is introduced that assesses unlinkability depending on a
specific attacker and a given message set in a defined scenario. We use the
scenarios described in Section 3.
Input variables which influence the unlinkability measure are the at-
tributes and distribution of items of interest and the type and amount of
context information that is available to an attacker. The attributes of items
of interest and their distribution depend on the used communication proto-
cols, e. g., message emission protocols or certification protocols (see Chap-
ter 6). The context information depends on the resources available to an
attacker.
Considering the different situations under which an analysis can be un-
dertaken, different levels of knowledge on the side of the analyst must be
considered. In this work white-box and black-box analysis are considered.
In an white-box analysis details of the attacker and the vehicular scenario
(especially the true sender-relation) are known to an analyst (but still not to
the attacker). The analyst uses the measure to compare the attacker with
the real situation. In a black-box analysis only information known to the
attacker is available to estimate the quality of an attack. White-box analysis
describes, for example, the situation of a protocol designer who simulates and
analyses communication protocols. Black-box analysis may be undertaken
by an attacker to assess the quality of his attack.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.1, fundamental terms
such as unlinkability measures, items of interest, attackers, and unlinkability-
analysis are introduced. The notion of consistency motivates most of the
concepts discussed in this thesis and is introduced in Section 5.2. In Sec-
tion 5.3, the model of inner and outer structure is introduced, which is used
to criticise related measures in Section 5.4. A new expected distance un-
linkability measure is proposed in Section 5.5. The practical measurement is
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finally discussed in Section 5.6 and Section 5.7. The chapter is closed by a
conclusion in Section 5.8.
5.1 Basics and Notation
In this section, basic notations are introduced. It can be used as a reference
for symbols and notation in the sections that follow afterwards.
5.1.1 Abstraction of Vehicular Messages
An item of interest is an element m from a set of IOI denoted M . M does not
necessarily contain every existing IOI, but only the IOI known to an attacker.
In this work, a global passive adversary (see Section 4.2) who observes all
emitted messages in a vehicular scenario is taken as example adversary. Thus
the set IOI will often be called set of messages and an individual IOI is often
denoted message. If the need arises to distinguish between emitted and
observed messages, this will be noted explicitly.
Each message/IOI represents a sample point in spatial, temporal and
other spaces often represented as attributes of the message. Without loss
of generality, only two attributes, temporal position (or emission time) and
spatial position, are used as an example in this chapter.
In Figure 5.1, two different illustrations of the vehicular message scenario
are provided. Figure 5.1(a) shows traces of vehicles with the spatial points
where messages have been emitted marked by coloured circles. The image
shows the vehicles’ itineraries on a road network which restricts the move-
ment of the emitting vehicles. The temporal information obviously cannot
be shown here. In Figure 5.1(b), the temporal and spatial information of
position samples is represented as position in a 3-dimensional plot. The tra-
jectories, and thus the relation between sample points, have been omitted as
well as the road network. While the attacker probably has knowledge of the
road network, the relation between the itineraries is not previously known.
The latter image depicts the situation of an attacker where a subset of po-
sition samples within a spatial and temporal interval is received and has to
be clustered to reveal the trajectories of individual vehicles.
5.1.2 Sample Points
Temporal positions are denoted as t ∈ T , where T denotes the space of time,
e. g., T = R+0. The mapping t : M → T is used for explicitly denoting
the point in time t(m) related to a given message/sample point m ∈M .
Likewise, spatial positions are denoted a ∈ A, where A denotes an arbitrary
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(a) Communicating vehicles leave traces of position messages
while navigating through the traffic. Attackers are interested
in linking position samples to discover the paths of single
vehicles.
(b) An example set of anonymous, position samples in spa-
tial space (x and y) and temporal space (t) from multi-
ple (here 4) sources (vehicles).
Figure 5.1: Vehicular communication generates anonymous samples in time
and space that attackers can use to trace vehicles.
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spatial space. Again, a : M → A denotes the position a(m) in relation to a
message m. In practise spatial and temporal information is either observed
by the attacker or explcitly encoded in the message.
In this work directed graphs are used to model road-map networks. This
approach does not restrict generality, as other spaces, such as spherical
coordinates commonly used in GPS-navigation, work similarly. The road-
network is modelled as a graph G = (V,E), where V denotes junctions, and
E ⊆ V × V denotes roads, i. e., directed connections between junctions.
Additionally, the length of roads may be given by additional edge-weight-
functions.
An attacker tries to correctly link sample points with respect to some
unknown attribute, e. g., the real sender. Linking sample points means to
determine a subset of elements of M . The positions encoded in the messages
of a subset can be interpreted as samples on a trajectory, e. g., the trajectory
of an vehicle in space and time. For simplicity τ is used for two different
notations of “trajectory”. First as a mapping from time to space τ : T → A
and second for a subset of sample points τ ⊆M . This can be considered valid
in the example scenario, as trajectories of vehicles are derived from subsets
of the message set M .
5.1.3 Partitions and Hypotheses
Determining all trajectories within M amounts to determine an equivalence
relation on M . An equivalence relation on a set M is isomorphic to a set
partition pi on M , consisting of clusters τ , which represent trajectories. The
relation symbol m ∼pi m′ denotes that two messages m,m′ are equivalent
with respect to the equivalence relation defined by pi.
We denote the set of all partitions on M by ΠM . The objective of an
global attacker is to find the partition of M that is isomorph to the true
relation, i. e., corresponds to the reality. Thus every partition on M is a
hypothesis, and ΠM is sometimes called hypotheses space.
As usual, all clusters of a partition are pairwise disjoint and the union of
all clusters of a partition is M . The number of clusters in a partition pi, i. e.,
the cardinality of pi, is denoted as |pi|, where pi = {M1, . . . ,Mn}. The notion
m ∼pi m′ is equivalent to stating that m,m′ “are related” under hypothesis
pi. Usually this notion means sender-equivalence, i. e., m and m′ “have the
same sender”. Relation between IOI is denoted as
m ∼pi m′ :⇐⇒ ∃i : m ∈Mi ∧m′ ∈Mi
m pi m′ :⇐⇒ ∀i : m ∈Mi ⇒ m′ /∈Mi,
(5.1)
where Mi ∈ pi.
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The process of partitioning a set into disjoint subsets, i. e., clusters, is known
as clustering in literature. The quality of clustering algorithms can be mea-
sured. Those measures provides no complete estimation of the unlinkability
situation, because it evaluates only one candidate partition.
Besides the common set notation for partitions, we use an alternative
“cluster notation” to define clusterings of M . In set notation one set partition
is given as a disjoint set of subsets ofM . For example {{m1,m2,m3} , {m4,m5} , {m6}}
provides a set partition of M = {m1, . . . ,m6}. In cluster notation a sequence
of set partition identifiers is used. The i-th element in a cluster notation se-
quence identifies the cluster of the i-th element of the strictly ordered set M .
For example, the above set partition can be written as 〈1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3〉 in clus-
ter notation. This example defines an equivalence relation where m1 ∼ m3,
but m2  m5.
Without loss of generality, we assume that a total order can be imposed
on M , e. g., by an order on temporal and/or spatial spaces. The ordered set
M is denoted {m1, . . . ,mn}, where the index denotes the ordinal number.
By the total order on M we can inflict a total order on ΠM , e. g., by
using a lexicographic order on partitions in cluster-notation. Single partitions
are denoted by pi, often with an index subscript that denotes its ordinal
number ord(pii) = i in ΠM = {pi1, . . . , pik}. Note that cluster notation and
the definition of ∼pi imply that pi is invariant to the order of messages within
clusters, otherwise pi would not induce an equivalence relation, i. e., an
reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation.
In the following discussions in Sections 5.3.4 and 5.6, a toy example,
consisting of the set M of cardinality 3 and set partitions ΠM , is used:
M := {m1,m3,m3}
ΠM := {pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4, pi5}
= {〈1, 1, 1〉 , 〈1, 1, 2〉 , 〈1, 2, 1〉 , 〈1, 2, 2〉 , 〈1, 2, 3〉} ,
(5.2)
where ΠM is ordered lexicographically in cluster-notation. The single set
partitions are denoted pi1, . . . , pi5 according to the order given above.
Set partitions directly correspond to a trace of devices, e. g., vehicles.
Set partition pi1 would be interpreted as “only one vehicle has been sending
messages, it successively passed the positions given in m1,m2,m3”. Set par-
tition pi4 denotes “one vehicle has passed point m1 and a different vehicle
successively passed the positions m2 and m3”.
Note that only a very limited example can be used in this work, as the
number of set partitions |ΠM | grows exponentially in |M |. |ΠM | is given by
the Bell Number 1 B|M | of |M |. For better readability, we use B(n) to denote
1Weisstein, Eric W. ”Bell Number.” From MathWorld–A Wolfram Web Resource.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BellNumber.html
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Bn. The Bell Number of n can be calculated much faster
2 than generating
Bn elements.
One partition represents a very special hypothesis. The true hypothesis pi∗
is the one partition that corresponds to the reality, i. e., all messages m,m′
with m ∼pi m′ are sent by the same sender. The objective of an attacker is
to determine the true relation.
5.1.4 Attacker’s Assignment and Choice
In this work we assume that an attacker is generating a probability mass
assignment P : ΠM → [0, 1] with
∑
pi∈ΠM P (pi) = 1. An attacker’s assignment
represents the attacker’s global knowledge/belief about which equivalence
relation represents the true relation best.
An attacker’s probability mass assignment P induces a partial order on
ΠM . It is reasonable to assume that an attacker bases its decision on the
assigned probabilities, i. e., chooses the set partition with the highest prob-
ability mass as his hypothesis of the true partition. To make the choice
deterministic the partition’s ordinal number ord : ΠM → N is used as a sec-
ond order attribute. We define the strict attacker’s order <P as:
pii <P pij :⇐⇒ P (pii) > P (pij)∨
[P (pii) = P (pij) ∧ ord(pii) < ord(pij)] .
(5.3)
Please not that the attacker’s order reverts the order of the probability mass
assignment P .
An attacker A chooses the first set partition, i. e., the “smallest” piA from
ΠM . We denote by piA the attackers choice of attacker A. piA is chosen such
that
∀pi ∈ ΠM : piA <P pi (5.4)
An attacker’s choice piA represents the solution of attacker A for the (unlink-
ability) problem of clustering M accordingly to the unknown equivalence.
5.2 Consistency
Consistency is the main concept that distinguishes the unlinkability mea-
sure introduced in this work. An assignment’s consistency is an important
property that reflects the quality of an attacker’s choice for a given scenario.
2e. g., Dobin´ski’s formula Weisstein, Eric W. ”Dobin´ski’s Formula.” From MathWorld–
A Wolfram Web Resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/DobinskisFormula.html
1.4.2008
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Consistency is the motivation behind the distinction of inner and outer struc-
ture as introduced in Section 5.3. Consistency of an attacker denotes that
the attacker’s assignment does not, or does to a low degree, support contra-
dictory hypotheses.
Consistency may be explained by the following example. Let there be
three hypotheses pi1, pi2, and pi3, where pi1 and pi2 are very similar, while pi3
contradicts both pi1 and pi2. By contradiction we describe that hypotheses
represent very different relations. Let A and B be two attackers with prob-
ability mass assignments PA and PB, where
PA(pi) =
{
0 pi = pi3
0.5 otherwise,
PB(pi) =
{
0 pi = pi1
0.5 otherwise.
As pi1 and pi2 are very similar, it makes not a big difference whether an
attacker chooses one or the other. Now observe, as pi3 contradicts pi2, that
PB reflects a very ambiguous attacker’s choice. The attacker is not able to
find a consistent view from context information and scenario but is indecisive
between two contradicting hypotheses pi2 and pi3. In contrast, PA reflects
a consistent attacker’s view as non-zero weights are assigned to all similar
hypotheses but not to others. Obviously the quality of both assignments is
very different. The term we use to describe this difference is consistency.
The attacker’s assignment depends on probabilistic context information
that is (always) tainted with uncertainty due to coarse granularity and in-
accuracy. This uncertainty is transferred to the assignment. Assume, for
example, an attacker whose context information consists of a distribution
of vehicles’ velocities derived from previous traffic observation. Context in-
formation is granular, i. e., it is a summary of information of one specific
spatial or temporal interval. This context information also is inaccurate as
it is learned from an earlier observation. Furthermore, statistical context
information carries some uncertainty in itself.
Thus, an attacker has to take into account that his probability mass
assignment maybe flawed. Slightly different messages M or the inaccuracy
of the context information may lead to changes of the assigned probabilities.
As a result, the attacker’s order of partitions (5.3) is tainted with uncertainty
too. Thus also the attacker’s choice (5.4) is tainted with uncertainty.
An attacker’s assignment, herein, is said to be consistent, if the attacker’s
choice is robust3 against small changes in the assignment, i. e., a choice is
robust if small changes in the probability mass assignment produce only small
differences in the choice. This implies that, if the attacker’s choice changes
due to a small change in a consistent attacker’s assignment, the new choice
3Another term describing a similar property in statistics is robustness.
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is very similar to the old choice.
5.3 Inner and Outer Structure
In this section, the notions of inner and outer structure are introduced. While
outer structure describes measures imposed onto hypotheses space ΠM by the
attacker, inner structure denotes an intrinsic distance on ΠM . Inner structure
is a novel concept in unlinkability measures that has not been considered in
previous works.
The quality of clustering algorithms in a white-box analysis is often mea-
sured by notions of difference between the cluster algorithms result, herein
called the attacker’s choice piA, and the true relation pi
∗. This distance be-
tween piA and pi
∗ captures only punctual information about the quality of
the clustering algorithm, i. e., considers only two elements of the hypotheses
space. It thus does not consider the complete attacker’s view as it is rep-
resented by an attacker’s assignment. As this work is focused on situations
where an attacker’s world-view can be expressed as probability mass assign-
ment, ignorance of this information must reduce the expressiveness of the
metric.
In the remainder of this section, structures within the measured object,
namely an attacker’s probability mass assignment PA, are uncovered. The
notions of inner and outer structure are explained.
5.3.1 Outer Structure
The term outer structure denotes a measure that is externally imposed on
ΠM , e. g., by an attacker. Outer structure is, contrary to inner structure,
dependent on context information and is not an intrinsic attribute of the
hypotheses space.
Outer structure in this work is defined by PA. It provides the attacker’s
order and thus defines the attacker’s choice. PA defines a probability distri-
bution on ΠM . Outer structure generally denotes a quantification of elements
of ΠM that induces an order.
5.3.2 Inner Structure
The term inner structure captures an intrinsic notion of distance between set
partitions in ΠM . The notion of distance between two set partitions reflects
dis-similarity of two hypotheses for a given scenario. The notion of distance
should be based on the objectives of an attacker.
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m1
m2
m3
m4
m5
(a) pi17
m1
m2
m3
m4
m5
(b) pi37
m1
m2
m3
m4
m5
(c) pi29
Figure 5.2: Example set partitions pi17, pi37, pi29 from ΠM5 with
M5 = {m1, . . . ,m5} depicted as possible traces. (pi17 = 〈1, 2, 1, 1, 2〉,
pi37 = 〈1, 2, 3, 1, 2〉, pi29 = 〈1, 2, 2, 2, 1〉)
Take for example an attacker who is not interested in trajectories of de-
vices, but only in endpoints of an vehicle’s journey4. This attacker would
sensibly interpret trajectories with similar endpoints as equal. The defini-
tion of distance between set partition should reflect this interpretation of
hypotheses.
Distance between hypotheses is a (metric) function δ : ΠM ×ΠM → R+0.
Two hypotheses are considered equal if and only if the distance is zero. A
larger distance denotes that the hypotheses are less similar.
Motivation
The distance δ between two set partitions is large if they represent very
different trajectories. The distance between two set partitions is small if
they represent similar traces. In Figure 5.2 three set partitions of the same
set M = {m1, . . . ,m5} are shown as spatial traces of vehicles.
In Figure 5.2(a) an example partition pi17 = 〈1, 2, 1, 1, 2〉 is depicted. Two
trajectories, one consisting of m1,m3,m4 and the other consisting of m2,m5
are depicted. In Figure 5.2(b) the same sample points are partitioned into
pi37 = 〈1, 2, 3, 1, 2〉, which defines three trajectories. The first trajectory
consists of points m1,m4, the second of the single point m3 and the third of
m2,m5. Figure 5.2(c) again shows two trajectories that comprise partition
pi29 = 〈1, 2, 2, 2, 1〉 with clusters m1,m5 and m2,m3,m4.
Assume that an attacker is interested in tracking the trajectories of ve-
hicles. Intuitively, trajectories in Figures 5.2(a) and 5.2(b) are more similar
than 5.2(a) and 5.2(c), because at least the endpoints of the single traces are
the same in 5.2(a) and 5.2(b).
In different scenarios an attacker might only be interested in correctly
4Assume that there exists a way to distinguish “endpoints” from “normal” items of
interest.
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m ∼pij m′ m pij m′
m ∼pii m′ a b
m pii m′ c d
Table 5.1: Binary Contingency Table. The four fields contain the number
of tuples (m,m′) ∈ M ×M,m 6= m′, for which the row-condition AND the
column condition holds.
δH(pii, pij) pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5
pi1 0 1 1 1 2
pi2 1 0 1 1 1
pi3 1 1 0 1 1
pi4 1 1 1 0 1
pi5 2 1 1 1 0
Table 5.2: Partition Distance δH of example set partitions ΠM = {pi1, . . . , pi5}
defined as sum δh(pii, pij) := b+ c. (See Table 5.1)
guessing the number of vehicles. To this attacker pi17 and pi29 with trajecto-
ries of two vehicles would have an equal interpretation while pi37 with three
vehicles yields a different scenario.
A metric on a hypotheses-space has to reflect the criteria that are impor-
tant to an attacker, independent of any context information on the relation
between elements. This distance provides information on the semantic dif-
ference which can be used to estimate errors, as will be done in Section 5.5.
The notion of inner structure is fundamental for expressing structural con-
sistence, which is introduced in Section 5.2 and should be reflected by any
useful unlinkability measure.
5.3.3 Partition Distance
A simple example for a hypotheses distance is the partition distance. The
partition distance between two partitions pi and pi′ of M is the minimum
number of elements that have to be deleted from M so that both partitions,
restricted to the remaining elements, are equal. This partition distance may
be thought of as a “natural” inner structure with respect to similarity of
partitions.
Definition 5.1 (Partition Distance)
The partition distance δH(pi, pi
′) of two partitions pi, pi′ of a given set M is
the minimum number of elements that have to be deleted from M that pi and
pi′, restricted to the remaining elements, are equal.
Partition distance can be calculated by using a binary contingency table
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Figure 5.3: Heat-plot of set partition distance for partitions of M with car-
dinality 5. The axes show ordinal numbers of partitions, the colour encodes
the distance between the x and y-partition. Darker colours denote smaller
distance between partitions.
as given in Table 5.1, or by a polynomial time algorithm using minimum
assignments as described in [29]. In Table 5.2, partition distances for the
example of a 3-elemental set M is given. In Figure 5.3 a heat-plot of partition
distances for a set of cardinality 5 is given. The pattern of the plot shows
that even the simple partition distance provides a complex inner structure.
The partition distance is a metric that induces an inner structure for the
most general case where messages contain no attributes, e. g., an underlying
spatial or temporal structure. This is, of course, not the case in the vehicular
scenario where we assume that messages contain information on temporal and
spatial positions as well as possibly a movement vector.
5.3.4 Trajectory-Based Partition Distance
To incorporate information from the underlying temporal and spatial struc-
ture of the sample space, partition distances are insufficient. In this section,
a partition distance is introduced that inherits the metric attributes of an
underlying distance metric defined on subsets of M . A subset τ of the mes-
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sage set M is interpreted as a trajectory or path on a road map. The road
map herein is represented as directed graph.
The Euclidean distance gives the “length of the direct way” between to
points. This direct route is not necessarily a possible way in the road-map
which defines many restrictions on movements, e. g., one-way-streets, no-
right-turn-junctions and the general restriction to certain subspaces of the
plane (i. e., roads). Because of this unwanted simplification we decided on a
graph-based road model and distance measure.
In the following, a trajectory distance is introduced. Afterwards it is
shown how trajectory distance can be used to define a partition distance.
Trajectory Distance in Directed Graphs
In this section, a trajectory distance is defined for a directed-graph road-map
and message set M . Formally, a trajectory is a function τ : T → A that maps
temporal values T onto spatial positions A, i. e., trajectories are formally
considered functions that map time onto position.
The trajectory distance is defined as average distance between points of
two continuous trajectories (taken from [68]):
D(τ1, τ2) =
ts+|T |∫
ts
d(τ1(t), τ2(t))dt
|T | , (5.5)
where τ1, τ2 represent trajectories. The function d : A2 → R+0 represents the
spatial distance between two points as defined below. T is the length of the
considered time-interval, and ts is its start.
Trajectory distance D is based on a point distance d. As mentioned in
Section 5.1 items of interest resemble points in space and time. In this section,
spatial positions are represented in a directed road-map graph G = (V,E, o)
with V being the vertices of the graph, E ⊆ V 2 being the directed edges
of that graph and o : E → R+0 defining the length of edges. The spatial
point a ∈ E × R+0, related to message m is given by the tuple (e, o), where
e denotes the edge where the point is situated and o denotes the offset from
the beginning of the edge. The distance d is defined as the length of the
shortest path between two points a, a′, situated on edges e, e′ accordingly.
The functions to and from map edges onto their target- or source-node.
The shortest path between a and a′ is the shortest path between the vertexes
to(e) and from(e′) plus the remaining offsets on e and e′. The shortest path
sp is defined as the sequence of edges which has the smallest sum of edge
weights. The distance between a and a′ is thus the remaining length of e,
plus the length of sp(to(e), from(e′)), plus the offset o′ of a′ on e′, denoted
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d(a, a′) := o′ − o+
{
0 e = e′ ∧ o ≤ o′
o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′))|| otherwise, (5.6)
where e, e′ ∈ E denote the edges where a, a′ ∈ M are situated, o, o′ ∈ R+0
denote the corresponding offset of a from the start of edge e, e′, and o(e) the
length of edge e. The function d distinguishes the cases where a′ from a are
on the same directed edge and a′ lies in the edge’s direction from a (first
case) and thus a′ can be reached from a without crossing any vertices. The
second case describes any other situation where at least one vertex has to be
crossed.
It is assumed that all edge lengths o(e) are non-negative and that the
triangle-inequality holds for the length of the shortest path sp in the directed
graph G. Obviously this distance is a quasi-metric (i. e., it is not symmetric)
because of the underlying non-symmetric paths in directed graphs.
Metric Attributes of Spatial Distance
In this section, we show that d defined in (5.6) is a quasi-metric. This is
done by successively showing that d is non-negative, that identical samples
are indiscernible by d, and that the triangle-inequality holds for d. In the
following we use sample positions a = (e, o), a′ = (e′, o′), and a′′ = (e′′, o′′).
Non-Negativity. Non-negativity of d obviously follows non-negativity of
edge weights o(e). Every offset o of every a = (o, e) is non-negative and
o < o(e). Thus d(a, a′) ≥ 0 for every a and a′ on the road map.
Identity of Indiscernibles. We have d(a, a′) = 0 ⇐⇒ a = a′, if the road-
map graph has no negative edge length and all point offsets o are well formed,
i. e., not larger than the corresponding edge length.
Identity m = m′ of two points is defined as equivalence of edges e = e′
and offset o = o′.
Lemma 5.1 (Identity of Indiscernibles of d)
For non-negative edge-weights o(e) the point distance d(a, a′) is zero if and
only if a = a′.
Proof 5.1 (d(a, a′) = 0 ⇐⇒ a = a′)
The contra-positive of the implication d(a, a′) = 0⇒ a = a′ is given by
d(a, a′) 6= 0⇐ o 6= o′ ∨ e 6= e′. First the implication is shown for e 6= e′ and
then for o 6= o′.
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For e 6= e′ we can conclude that
e 6= e′ ⇒ d(a, a′) = o′ − o+ o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′))||
o<o(e)⇒ d(a, a′) 6= 0,
since ||sp|| is always greater than or equal to zero.
For the second condition o 6= o′ we have to consider the two cases of d
separately. The first case o < o′ considers the situation that the shortest path
from a to a′ never traverses any vertex. We thus have
o < o′ ∧ e = e′ ⇒ o′ − o > 0
⇒ d(a, a′) 6= 0.
The second case o > o′ considers the case where at least one vertex has to
be traversed on the shortest path. Therefore we have
o > o′ ∧ e = e′ o<o(e)⇒ o′ − o+ o(e) > 0
⇒ d(a, a′) 6= 0.
The other direction d(a, a′) = 0 ⇐ a = a′ is a metric property which must
hold for d(a, a′) by definition. This concludes the proof.
Triangle-Inequality Triangle-inequality states that a metric measures the
shortest path between two points. If an intermediary point is inserted in a
path, then the sum of the distances between start and intermediary point
plus intermediary point to end can be not smaller than the original distance.
Lemma 5.2 (Triangle-Inequality for d(a, a′))
For all points a, a′, and a′′ we have d(a, a′′) ≤ d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′) for a non-
negative sample point distance d as defined in (5.6).
Proof 5.2
To show that the triangle-inequality d(a, a′′) ≤ d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′) holds for
d, one can distinguish four cases of relations between the edges e, e′, e′′. In
general, this proof runs along the same lines as standard proofs for triangle-
inequality of shortest-path distance in graphs. If the intermediary point a′
is on the shortest path from a to a′′ then the right and left hand side of the
inequality are equal. If the intermediary is not on the shortest path, then
the right hand side is larger.
Let a, a′′ ∈ A be sample points called start- and end-point. Let a′ ∈ A
be another point called intermediary point.
The proof distinguishes first whether the intermediary point a′ is on the
same edge as any or both of the endpoints a, a′′ or not. Then four cases of
edge equalities have to be considered:
49
CHAPTER 5. UNLINKABILITY MEASURE
(a) e = e′ 6= e′′
(b) e 6= e′ = e′′
(c) e 6= e′ 6= e′′
(d) e = e′ = e′′
First, consider the case that the intermediary point a′ is on the shortest
path from a to a′′. Then, in case (d) o ≤ o′ ≤ o′′, case (c) e′ ∈ sp(to(e), from(e′′)),
case (b) o′ ≤ o′′, and case (a) o ≤ o′.
As a′ is on the shortest path, then it cuts the path on an edge. For e = e′
the length o′ − o before a′ is part of the path, otherwise the whole length o′
on the edge e′ is on the path. For e′ = e′′ the length o′′ − o′ is on the path
after a′, otherwise it is o(e′)− o′.
For case (a) and a′ on the shortest path from a to a′′ the triangle inequality
holds as follows
d(a, a′′)
def.
= o′′ − o+ o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′′))||
= o′ − o+ o′′ − o′ + o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′′))||
e=e′
= d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′).
The proof for case (b) runs along the same lines and case (d) is a trivial
combination of both.
Case (c) takes advantage of the definition of the length of the shortest path
which is the sum of the length-attribute of the edges in the path. Equality
then is derived from the definition of d as
d(a, a′′)
def.
= o′′ − o+ o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′′))||
= o′′ − o+ o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′))||
+o(e′) + ||sp(to(e′), from(e′′))||
= o′ − o+ o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′))||
+o′′ − o′ + o(e′) + ||sp(to(e′), from(e′′))||
def.
= d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′).
Thus, if a′ is on the shortest path from a to a′′, the triangle-inequality holds
for d.
Now consider cases (a), (b), (c), and (d) with a′ not being on the shortest
path from a to a′′. The triangle inequality again follows from the definition
of d.
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(a) e = e′, if o′ ≥ o then a′ is on the shortest path from a to a′′. If o′ ≤ o
then, due to the direction of the edge e, it is not on the shortest path.
The combined path, using a′, is longer than the direct path because
the direct path is a part of the combined path.
d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′)
def.
= o′ − a+ o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′))||
+ o′′ − o′ + o(e′) + ||sp(to(e′), from(e′′)||
e=e′
= o′ − o′ + o(e) + |sp(to(e), from(e))||
+ o′′ − a+ o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e′′))||
def.
= o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e))||+ d(a, a′′)
≥ d(a, a′′)
From non-negativity of ||sp|| and edge length o(e), it follows that the
direct distance d(a, a′′) is at most as long as the combined distance
d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′).
(b) The proof for case (b) runs along parallel lines to (a) but uses the con-
dition e′ = e′′. It turns out that
d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′) = o(e′′) + |sp(to(e′′), from(e′′)|+ d(a, a′′)
≥ d(a, a′′).
(c) To show that the triangle inequality holds in the case that a′ is not
on the shortest path from a to a′′ we only have to consider the path
sp(to(e), from(e′′)) as every itinerary has to pass to(e) as the first vertex
and from(e′′) as the last vertex of the road map. Thus the problem is
reduced to the question of whether the triangle-inequality holds for sp
in directed graphs, which was postulated at the beginning.
Thus in case (c), if a′ is not on the shortest path, the triangle-inequality
holds for d.
(d) To show that the triangle inequality holds in case that e = e′ = e′′ and
a′ not on the shortest path from a to a′′, five possible permutations
of a, a′, a′′ have to be considered with respect to their respective off-
sets o, o′, o′′ on edge e. The permutations to be considered here are
(a, a′′, a′), (a′, a, a′′), (a′, a′′, a), (a′′, a, a′), and (a′′, a′, a).
The argument is, again, that every direct path is included in the com-
bined path, and that the combination is at least as long as the direct
51
CHAPTER 5. UNLINKABILITY MEASURE
path. The proof for the first of the above permutations of a, a′, a′′ is
d(a, a′) + d(a′, a′′)
def.
= o′ − o
+ o′′ − o′ + o(e′) + ||sp(to(e′), from(e′′)||
def.
= d(a, a′′) + o(e) + ||sp(to(e), from(e)||
≥ d(a, a′′).
The other permutations follow along the same reasoning and are omit-
ted here. Thus, given that ||sp|| and o(e) are non-negative, the triangle
inequality holds for case (d).
As the triangle-inequality holds for every case it is proven that it holds
for d(a, a′).
Symmetric Spatial Distance
Spatial distance in directed graphs is a very natural distance in the vehicular
scenario but provides no symmetry. As symmetry is an important feature
needed for the unlinkability measure provided in Section 5.5, the directed
graph model has to be relaxed.
There are plenty of ways to create symmetry but considering that it is
sensible to respect road features like one-way roads, it is useful to keep as
many attributes of the road map as possible. We define the point distance
of two points a, a′ as minimum of the distance from a to a′ and the reverse
direction a′ to a:
dsym(a, a
′) := min(d(a, a′), d(a′, a)). (5.7)
The minimum of d(a, a′) and d(a′, a) provides a symmetric distance dsym but
keeps directions of edges. In the following, we use this distance if symmetry
is required.
Trajectory-Based Partition Distance
Trajectory or path distances, as defined in Section 5.3.4, can be used to de-
fine a distance on partitions. The notion of distance caries the notion of the
minimum effort that is necessary to transform one state into another state.
Similarly we herein define trajectory-based distance between partitions rela-
tive to the minimum amount of changes necessary to transform one partition
into another.
A partition consists of clusters (subsets of M), thus a transformation
from one partition to another means transforming every cluster of the first
partition into a cluster of the second partition. This can be modelled by the
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well known assignment problem. In this section, we define partition distance
by way of a minimum assignment of trajectories between two partitions.
pi1
a
b
c
τ1,1
d
e
τ1,2
pi2
a
c
τ2,1
d
b
e
τ2,2
D = 1
D = 1
(a) Df1(< 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 >) = 2,
where f1({a, b, c}) 7→ {a, c}
and f1({d, e}) 7→ {b, d, e}
pi1
a
b
c
τ1,1
d
e
τ1,2
pi2
a
c
τ2,1
d
b
e
τ2,2
D = 4
D = 4
(b) Df2(< 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 >) = 8,
where f2({a, b, c}) 7→ {b, d, e}
and f1({d, e}) 7→ {a, c}
Figure 5.4: Example for minimum assignment for distance between partition
pi1 and pi2.
Observe the example in Figure 5.4 which shows the two assignments
f1, f2 : pi1 → pi2 that map all elements (cluster) in pi1 onto elements in
pi2. Further be D a distance function
5 of subsets of M = {a, b, c, d, e}. The
distances in Figure 5.4(a) are smaller than those in Figure 5.4(b), because
e. g., partition τ1,1 contains two elements a andc which are also contained
in τ2,1, but not in τ2,2. Assignment f1 is a more direct way to transform
pi1 into pi2 and should be chosen if the minimum effort is to be expressed.
Assignment f1 is said to be the minimum assignment in this example.
A minimum assignment is a one-on-one mapping of elements of one set
onto elements of another set that is minimum with respect to some cost
function. A minimum assignment can be found in polynomial time. [40] In
general it is the problem of finding a bijective map between two sets which
is minimal with respect to costs defined for each pair. For simplicity reasons
assume that min.assignd : pi → pi′ is a solution6 to the assignment problem
of assigning pi to pi′ weighted by d.
Assume there is a distance function D : T× T→ R+0 for trajectories
(e. g., Equation (5.5)) and a solution min.assignD to the assignment prob-
lem, as described above. This function can be used to construct a distance
function δT : ΠM × ΠM → R+0 between set partitions,
δT(pi, pi
′) := Df (pi) where f = min.assignD. (5.8)
5We chose the edit distance in this example for simplicity.
6For the examples used in this work we used an implementation of the Hungarian
Algorithm, see Appendix B.
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The distance Df is defined as edit distance to reflect the amount of work to
change partition pi into partition pi′,
Df (pi) :=
∑
τ∈pi
D(τ, f(τ)). (5.9)
The map f : pi → pi′ has to be bijective. In the case that |pi| 6= |pi′|, the smaller
partition is “filled up” with empty sets. Assume without loss of generality
that |pi| < |pi′|. Then pi is substituted by a new partition pi′′ = pi ∪ pi∅ with
|pi∅| = |pi′| − |pi| and ∀τ ∈ pi∅ : τ = ∅.
Metric Attributes of the Trajectory-Based Partition Distance
In the following, it is shown that the metric attributes, (non-negativity, iden-
tity of indiscernibles, symmetry. and triangle inequality) are inherited from
the trajectory distance D as defined by Equation (5.9).
Non-Negativity. Trivially, every sum of non-negative values D is itself
non-negative. Thus δT is non-negative if D is non-negative.
Identity of Indiscernibles. Given that D is non-negative, identity of
indiscernibles is inherited by δT.
Lemma 5.3 (Identity of Indiscernibles in δT)
If D is non-negative and D(τ, τ ′) = 0 ⇐⇒ τ = τ ′,
then we have δT(pi, pi
′) = 0 ⇐⇒ pi = pi′.
Proof 5.3
The identity of indiscernibles of δT follows if every (non-negative) trajectory
distance D(τ, f(τ)) for every trajectory-pair in a minimal assignment f is
zero.
δT(pi, pi
′) = 0
def.⇐⇒ ∃f.
∑
τ∈pi
D(τ, f(τ)) = 0
D ≥ 0⇐⇒ ∃f.∀τ ∈ pi : D(τ, f(τ)) = 0
D identity⇐⇒ ∃f.∀τ ∈ pi : τ = f(τ)
⇐⇒ pi = pi′.
If δT is zero, then, because of non-negativity of D, there must be a bi-
jection f for which D(τ, f(τ)) is also zero for every τ ∈ pi. Because identity
of indiscernibles holds for D, abbreviated by D identity above, τ = f(τ) is
valid for every τ ∈ pi. As every cluster in pi is equal to its image in pi′ both
partitions are equal.
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Symmetry Given that D is symmetric, then δT is also symmetric:
Lemma 5.4 (Symmetry of δT)
If for all τ, τ ′ ∈ T : D(τ, τ ′) = D(τ ′, τ),
then for all pi, pi′ ∈ ΠM : δT(pi, pi′) = δT(pi′, pi).
Proof 5.4
To show that δT inherits symmetry, the inverse map f
− to f is used, which
is a minimum assignment if f is a minimum assignment.
δT(pi, pi
′)
def.
=
∑
τ∈pi
D(τ, f(τ))
D symmetric
=
∑
τ∈pi
D(f(τ), τ)
=
∑
τ∈pi
D(f(τ), f−(f(τ)))
f(τ)=τ ′
=
∑
τ ′∈pi′
D(τ ′, f−(τ ′))
= δT(pi
′, pi).
As D is symmetric, denoted Dsymmetric, D(τ, f(τ)) equals D(f(τ), τ).
The inverse images exists and is bijective because f is bijective and τ = f−(f(τ)).
Thus for every τ ′ ∈ pi′ there exists τ ∈ pi with f−(τ ′) = τ . As f is a minimum
assignment f− also is a minimum assignment and∑
τ ′∈pi′ D(τ
′, f−(τ ′)) is equal to δT(pi′, pi).
Thus, symmetry of δT follows from symmetry of the trajectory distance D.
Triangle-Inequality The inheritance of the triangle-inequality from D to
δT, again, needs non-negativity of D.
Lemma 5.5 (Triangle-Inequality of δT)
If the triangle-inequality of D holds for all τ, τ ′, τ ′′ ∈ T,
then for all pi, pi′pi′′ ∈ ΠM : δT(pi, pi′′) ≤ δT(pi, pi′) + δT(pi′, pi′′).
Proof 5.5
We show that δT fulfils the triangle-inequality, because it is valid for every
addend in δT. If D is non-negative, then, if the triangle-inequality holds for
every part of the sum, it holds for the whole sum.
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δT(pi, pi
′) + δT(pi′, pi′′)
def.
=
∑
τ∈pi
D(τ, f(τ)) +
∑
τ ′∈pi′
D(τ ′, f ′(τ ′))
=
∑
τ∈pi
[D(τ, f(τ)) +D(f(τ), f ′(f(τ)))︸ ︷︷ ︸]
≥ D(τ, f ′(f(τ)))
≥ δT(pi, pi′′).
It has been shown that any metric attribute that holds for the underlying
trajectory distance measure D holds for δT, as long as D is non-negative.
5.4 Related Work
This work is part of a growing number of initiatives to quantify privacy. The
main focus in the community is on anonymity metrics; only relatively few
works concentrate on unlinkability of either databases and messages. As we
have shown in Chapter 2, anonymity and unlinkability are strongly related.
In this section we provide an overview on existing metrics for anonymity and
unlinkability.
The main motivation for this work on unlinkability measures is based on
the criticism that current measures ignore the inner structure of hypotheses
space. This is discussed in Section 5.4.3.
5.4.1 Anonymity Measures
Most privacy research has focused on the notion of anonymity. As anonym-
ity and unlinkability are tightly related, one can not develop unlinkability
measures without relating to the work done in anonymity beforehand.
Anonymity, as defined in Section 2.3, is concerned with the relations
between two distinct classes of elements, e. g., the class of subjects or subject
identifiers and a class of items of interest. Proxy-based anonymity mixes are
the technique most widely discussed for anonymity preservation. Therefore,
most works on anonymity measures focus on analysis of mix networks.
The discussion on anonymity metrics is mostly attack-driven. A measure
is used for a period of time, until an attack is found that works although
the known measure deduced high anonymity. A comprehensive collection of
anonymity measures and attacks is provided in [34].
The development of anonymity measures probably was started by the
introduction of anonymity sets by Chaum [15]. An anonymity set consists
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of subjects that are possibly related to an action. The cardinality of this
anonymity set is a basic and descriptive measure for individual anonymity.
In 2002, Serjantov and Danezis [59] showed that a uniform probability
distribution, as implied by anonymity sets7, is not sufficient to describe an-
onymity scenarios in general. They introduced the anonymity probability
distribution and measured the effective size of an anonymity set using Shan-
non’s entropy [60]. This work was shortly followed by the introduction of the
degree of anonymity by Dı´az et al. . [19].
In a criticism of these global anonymity measures To´th, Horna´k, and
Vajda [66] introduced a local anonymity measure8. The sender unlinkability
is given by an upper bound of all probabilities Pβk,SI of senders SI being
related to IOI βk.
Other anonymity measures are based on success probabilities of an at-
tacker or the amount of ressources necessary for an attacker to succeed. As
an example, in [36] success probabilities for disclosure attacks are provided
from given message emission rate distributions. In [3] the expected number
of observations needed by an attacker to successfully relate communication
endpoints is measured in relation to the number of participants in the sce-
nario.
The anonymity measures discussed above focused on anonymity from
the perspective of single subjects or single actions. Edman, Sivrikaya, and
Yener [21] introduced a combinatorial approach to measure a global system’s
anonymity level. They defined a global degree of anonymity derived from
the number of plausible perfect matchings between subjects and items of
interest. Plausible edges between subjects and IOI are modelled by an n ×
n (0, 1)-adjacency matrix A. The global degree of anonymity is given by
log(per(A))/log(n!), where per(A) is the permanent of A.
Edman et al. [21] used their measure on graphs consisting of vertices
that represent messages entering and leaving a mix network. The problem
observed is exactly the anonymity problem as in Definition 2.1. Gierlichs,
Troncoso, Diaz, and Preneel [28] introduce equivalence classes of messages.
Instead of observing message entry or exit points they observe only the ano-
nymity set of senders or receivers. The main idea is that an attacker is most
often more interested in the question of which subject communicates with
which other subject, instead of the usual question on mix networks on the
relation between entry and exit events (messages). This combinatorial trick
reduces the number of hypotheses that have to be considered.
7An anonymity set has no probability assignment which, if one element has to be
chosen, for practical reasons means that each element has to be considered as equal likely.
8In [51] this type of anonymity measure is denoted as individual anonymity to distin-
guish it from the definition of local anonymity as defined in [46]
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5.4.2 Database Privacy
The term unlinkability is used in the context of databases to describe the
inability of an attacker to correctly derive relations between entries in differ-
ent, but related databases. For an example, consider a database of medical
records that is used in different contexts. In every context some values are
blacked out or generalised. The objective is to provide needed information in
the context, but provide anonymity of the subjects. Furthermore, we want
to prevent that entries from one context can be related to entries from an-
other context, which would reveal more information and brings the danger
of individuals being identifiable. Considering our formal distinction between
anonymity and unlinkability problems, database unlinkability is an anonym-
ity problem, not an unlinkability problem.
Although named k-unlinkability , the concept introduced by Malin in [45]
corresponds better to the notion of anonymity as used in this work. Given
a bipartite graph representing two partially cloaked tables of data “trails”
associated by being derived from the same source, k-unlinkability describes
that each table can be mapped to at least k entries in the other table.
The notion of the anonymity set is related to k-anonymity, where k
describes the minimum number of indistinguishable records in a database.
Machanavajjhala et al. [44] describe a homogeneity attack and a context in-
formation attack that break k-anonymity. They introduce l-diversity, which
denotes that a database contains records in a way that every selection of
records “contains at least ` well represented values”. This term well repre-
sented implies that an attacker with access to the database cannot reduce the
selection in a way that it contains less than ` different values, e. g., identities.
Again, `-diversity is criticised by Li et al. [41] because it is susceptible
to a skewness or similarity attack condition. Therein t-closeness is defined
that describes the similarity of prior and posterior knowledge of an attacker
who gets hold of the (generalised) database.
5.4.3 Unlinkability Measures
In the following, we will discuss example unlinkability measures and explain
shortcomings of entropy-based measures.
Holczer and Buttyan [12] use a link-wise attacker’s success ratio to mea-
sure unlinkability. Their objective is to analyse the number of pseudonym
changes needed for unlinkability of messages in vehicular communication.
Their work is based on the Mix Zones Model by Beresford and Stajano [6][8]
(see Section 5.4.5).
An attacker’s success ratio in correctly guessing single links is taken as
measure for unlinkability. The attacker uses context knowledge in the form
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of a correlation matrix to estimate probabilities of single links, and makes
a greedy guess. The correlation matrix is generated from the real vehicle
movements in a mix zone. The ratio of correct guesses is taken as global
unlinkability measure for a given scenario.
Success ratios condense repeated experiments to a ratio of success and
failure. Such measures obviously do not reflect the consistency of an assign-
ment but only the similarity of the attacker’s choice to the true hypothesis.
Furthermore, measures of this class can only be used for a white-box analysis
where the analyst knows the real relation.
Sampigethaya et al. [57] introduce another unlinkability measure based
on the success of an attacker. Therein unlinkability is measured as the ex-
pected time a vehicle can be followed by way of its messages. The expectation
is calculated from traffic density and a vehicle movement model. Their mea-
sure is used to support the usage of a random silence interval to keep the
time of the next message emission by an vehicle unpredictable.
Steinbrecher and Ko¨psell [63] defined the degree of unlinkability as the
quotient of the Shannon-entropy [60] of the posterior and prior knowledge
of an attacker. There, posterior knowledge describes the knowledge that an
attacker gains by adding context information to his prior knowledge. Prior
knowledge denotes the knowledge of an attacker without context information,
i. e., prior knowledge is a uniform distribution. This measure is derived from
the degree of anonymity [19] and was defined first in [63]. However, for its
superior clarity we will use the definition in [25].
Shannon’s entropy H and the degree of unlinkability D are defined as:
H(P ) := −
∑
pi∈ΠM
P (pi) log2(P (pi)), (5.10)
D(P ) := H(P )
Hmax
, (5.11)
where P denotes a probability distribution, or posterior knowledge, of the
finite random variable which is the hypotheses space ΠM . Hmax = log2(|ΠM |)
denotes the maximum entropy, which is, provided the attacker has no prior
knowledge, achieved by the uniform distribution on the domain. |ΠM | is the
cardinality of ΠM , which is the Bell Number of the cardinality of M .
In [50] Pashalidis uses a subset of all possible binary relations on M to
provide the elements of an unlinkability hypotheses space. This definition is
generally broader than considering only equivalence relations. It stands to
debate whether this level of abstraction is useful here as this model includes
hypotheses that are not solutions to linkability problems, e. g., if the implied
relation is not an equivalence relation. Similarly an attacker’s probability
mass assignment on the hypotheses space is assessed by calculating entropy
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P : ΠM → [0, 1] pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5 H D
PA 0.60 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.15 1.70 0.73
PB 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.60 1.70 0.73
PC 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PD 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 2.32 1.00
PE 0.40 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.39 1.84 0.79
PF 0.05 0.39 0.11 0.05 0.40 1.84 0.79
Table 5.3: Example probability mass assignments of attackers
A,B,C,D,E, F together with Shannon entropy H and degree of un-
linkability D.
or normalised entropy9.
In the following section it will be shown by example situations that the de-
gree of unlinkability — or basically any measure ignoring the inner structure
of the hypothesis space — fails to discern fundamentally different situations.
Structural Consistence and the Degree of Unlinkability
In this section, we show that the known measure degree of unlinkability fails
to distinguish attackers’ assignments that are nonetheless different with re-
spect to unlinkability. We argue that this disqualifies the degree of unlinka-
bility as an unlinkability measure.
In the following, the toy example (5.2) from Section 5.1 is used with
the partition distance given in Table 5.2 from Section 5.3.3. Although this
example is very simple it already shows the problems of unlinkability mea-
sures based solely on outer structure. We use the partition distance in our
discussion for simplicity.
In Table 5.3, six example probability mass assignments PA, PB, PC , PD,
PE, and PF are shown. For later recognition of the distributions, small bar-
plots depicting scaled probability values are drawn. On the right-hand side
of the table, Shannon-entropy H and degree of unlinkability D for the as-
signments are given. Note that degrees of unlinkability for PA and PB, as
well as the values for PE and PF , are equal while the degree for PC is mini-
mum and for PD is maximum. Equal degree values mean that both attacker
assignments provide similar quality, i. e., both assignments leave equal un-
linkability. The maximum/minimum degree of unlinkability is interpreted as
maximum/minimum unlinkable scenario.
Comparing probability assignments PE and PF in Table 5.3, one may
recognise that they are merely assign the same probabilities to different par-
9The terminology used is opaqueness and degree of opaqueness.
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titions. Entropy, and thus the degree of unlinkability, is invariant to permu-
tations. The reason why this does not reflect the quality of this assignment
is that inner structure of the hypotheses space is not considered by H or D.
The most likely hypotheses of attacker E are pi1 and pi5 whose partition
distance is, according to Table 5.2, two, which is the maximum distance
possible in this hypotheses space, thus pi1 and pi5 are very dissimilar. The
most likely hypotheses for attacker F are pi2 and pi5, whose partition distance
is only one, the smallest partition distance for non-equal partitions. In both
cases the difference between the first and second partition in attacker’s order
is small. This means that a small shift of probability mass from the first
to the second partition results in a different attacker’s choice. Considering
consistency, it can be said that PE is less consistent than PF because a similar
small change to both assignments has, in the worst case, a stronger impact
on the attacker’s choice of E than on F ’s choice, but still the degree of
unlinkability is equal.
A meaningful measure of unlinkability should reflect consistency within
the assignment of an attacker. The degree of unlinkability fails here because
it does not use the inner structure of the support of the probability mass
function, i.e. the distances between partitions.
Attacker assignments PA and PB from Table 5.3 are, again, permutations
of equal probability masses. Both have one singular peak, assigned to hy-
pothesis pi1, respectively pi5. In terms of partition distance, pi5 is generally
closer to all other partitions than pi1. This is a slight advantage of PB be-
cause two set partitions with small distance are supportive hypotheses for
each other. Set partitions with large distance, on the other hand, contra-
dict each other. Thus, pi1 is relatively unsupported by other hypotheses —
compared to pi5.
Depending on their assigned probability mass, hypotheses in support or
contradiction of the attacker’s choice determine the consistency of the whole
assignment. It should be obvious that entropy-based measures do not con-
sider consistency.
What is reflected well by entropy-based measures is the uncertainty within
an attacker’s assignment. The two extreme assignments, the degenerate dis-
tribution PC and the uniform distribution PD, can clearly be distinguished
by the degree of unlinkability.
PC describes the situation where the attacker has maximum belief in one
particular partition being the true relation. This distribution is the best case
for an attacker: it denotes the situation where he has no uncertainty left,
although the attacker’s choice might still be wrong. PD, on the contrary,
models the situation of maximum uncertainty, where the attacker has no
context information at all.
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But if attacker D considers the inner structure example in Table 5.2, he
could recognise one distinguished distance value. The distance between pi1
and pi5 is two, while all other distances have value one. The interpretation
of this scenario is that pi1 and pi5 contradict each other more than any other
pair of partitions.
Assume an attacker chooses any of pi2, pi3, and pi4, and compare this
scenario to a second attacker choosing pi1 or pi5. The first attacker would
have chosen a hypothesis that is very similar to every other hypotheses. If
his choice where wrong he would have made an error of one in the worst case.
The maximum error of the second attacker would be two. Given, that from
a point of view of the attacker, every hypothesis is equally likely, the second
choice has the possibility of a higher error and thus has to be considered
inferior to the first choice.
This implies that the choice of an attacker should not rely solely on outer
structure. We introduce such an attacker in Section 5.7.3. Furthermore we
can state that the uniform distribution, from external structure alone, is not
the case where an attacker is completely indifferent of which partition to
chose but still can make an improved choice.
The entropy-based measure of unlinkability — as the entropy itself — has
not been developed to reflect the inner structure. Entropy and derived mea-
sures can only reflect the outer structure. It stands to debate how exactly
to weight consistency against certainty. An optimum unlinkability measure
probably should reflect both attributes. In Section 5.5 we introduce a mea-
sure that uses both the internal structure of the partitions and the probability
assignment of the attacker in a single measure of unlinkability.
Quality Measures for Clustering Techniques
An unlinkability attacker basically tries to find the optimum clustering of a
set. Clustering techniques have been studied for a long time and are still
a main topic of scientific research. Nonetheless, the connection between the
field of privacy and the field of clustering has seldom been directly mentioned.
The quality of a clustering is often measured in two distinct ways that
can be directly related to the white-box analysis and black-box analysis from
Section 5.7. Cluster quality evaluation by internal criteria uses no informa-
tion available to the clustering algorithm. External criteria use additional,
external information, not available to the clustering algorithm to assess the
quality of clustering results. One external criterion normally is similarity of
the attacker’s choice to the true hypothesis. An introduction to clustering
and cluster quality metrics can be found in [38] and [31].
In the context of inner and outer structure as defined in Section 5.3,
above cluster quality measures are based on inner structure, but consider
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only the distance between two hypotheses space as the result of a clustering
algorithm is a single hypothesis. This hypothesis is then compared to results
from previous experiments or, if known, the true hypothesis. Considering
the development of attacker algorithms, this method suffices to develop clus-
tering algorithms. But given the scenario with knowledge of the attacker’s
assignment, valuable information is discarded.
5.4.4 Notes on Entropy-based Anonymity Metrics
In the previous section, examples have been shown where unlinkability mea-
sures that solely rely on outer structure fail to discern different attackers. As
the degree of unlinkability is directly derived from the degree of anonymity,
it has to be discussed why the degree of anonymity does not fail in the same
way to measure anonymity.
The difference between the degree of unlinkability [63, 25] and the degree of
anonymity [19] is the domain of the attacker’s assignment. The assignment’s
domain in unlinkability is the set of all set partitions. Set partitions are not
atomic but are themselves collections of subsets of items of interest. The
domain of attacker probability assignments in anonymity problems is a set
of identification anchors. Identities normally have no inner structure and
generally are atomic. The “natural” distance for identities is equality of
identity but there is normally no useful10 metric besides this.
Thus, our argument from the previous Section 5.4.3 cannot be applied
to the degree of anonymity. Without inner structure, consistency of an
attacker’s assignment, as discussed in Section 5.2, becomes unimportant.
Without inner structure, entropy based measures do not neglect important
information.
5.4.5 Location Privacy
A different approach for analysing privacy in mobile communication scenarios
is expressed by the notion location privacy. Location privacy is achieved if the
location of a subject cannot be derived by an attacker. In mobility scenarios
the objective in location privacy is very closely related to unlinkability. Lo-
cation privacy can be achieved by preventing any location information from
being known to an attacker, or by achieving anonymity and unlinkability.
In their work on location privacy, Beresford and Stajano [8, 6, 7] devel-
oped the Mix Zones Model. A Mix Zone is an area that is not observed by
10When semantic interpretation is concerned there is always space for debate, but at
this point we may safely assume that there is no interpretation that defines a notion for
“almost the same person”. Two IA trivially either reference the same individual or two
distinct subjects.
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the attacker. The attacker is only able to observe entry- and exit-events at
a zone’s border. Zone border and time are modelled as discrete spaces. An
attacker has to find the optimum perfect matching between entries and exits
given a correlation matrix11. The correlations are derived from observation
of movements through the zone some time before the actual attack. A corre-
lation matrix contains values that describe probabilities for times needed for
traveling through the zone and probable exit-events given the entry-event.
An attacker’s probability distribution over the set of perfect matchings is cal-
culated and Shannon’s entropy is proposed as a global anonymity measure.
Furthermore, in [8], a notion of individual anonymity is sketched as the
uncertainty of an attacker to find a distinct exit-event to a given entry-
event. In other words: to track a single movement through the zone. Again,
uncertainty is measured as entropy over the probability distribution over the
possible exits.
5.5 Measuring Unlinkability
In this section, we describe an alternative unlinkability measure that assesses
the quality of an attacker’s probability mass assignment, called expected dis-
tance unlinkability measure. Unlike the degree of unlinkability, this measure
considers consistency. Basically, the expected distance unlinkability measure
is an expectation of the error an attacker makes.
In the following, criteria for unlinkability metrics are defined, the expected
distance unlinkability measure is introduced, and its properties are discussed.
5.5.1 Criteria for Unlinkability Measures
In this section we define criteria which should be satisfied by measures12 of
unlinkability. Consistency has repeatedly been mentioned as an important
quality criterion for an attacker’s assignment. From the lessons learned in
Section 5.2 and Section 5.4.3, we derive three semantic criteria for unlinka-
bility measures.
Criterion 1: The measure quantifies the consistency of an assignment.
Criterion 2: The measure quantifies the certainty of an assignment.
11a matrix that reflects the correlation between pairs of elements, e. g., between entry-
and exit-events
12Formally, it has not been shown that the space, measured by unlinkability measures,
i. e., ΠM and PA, constitutes a σ-algebra. We are using the term measure nonetheless,
because unlinkability is similar to a volume measure, e. g., like probability.
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Criterion 3: The measure can be used to quantify the correctness of the
assignment with respect to a correct hypothesis.
Criterion 1 relates to the consistency of an attacker’s assignment with
respect to an inner structure as discussed in Section 5.2. Criterion 2 relates
to certainty of an attacker13. Criterion 3 again is useful only with respect to
some inner structure that provides a (similarity-)distance.
The need for assessing consistency is, to the best of our knowledge, a
criterion that has been missed by previous work. Thus, we deem it the
most important criterion in our work. Certainty, as an attribute of the outer
structure, has been captured by the notion of entropy and other measures.
As both criteria use different structures of the hypotheses space, a measure
of unlinkability has to combine both properties and therefore must weight
one criterion against the other. On the other hand it will always be possible
to us measure each property individually.
The third criterion is prerequisite to any white-box analysis. An unlink-
ability measure should be able to consider the correctness of the attacker’s
assignment if the real partition is known to the analyst. A simple measure
for correctness is expressed by the distance between attacker’s choice and
real partition.
The following properties should additionally be fulfilled by an unlinkabil-
ity measure.
Continuity. An unlinkability measure should be continuous with respect to
context information, items of interest, and inner and outer structure.
Small changes to the attacker’s assignment, for example, should have
only a small effect on the unlinkability measure. Likewise for message
positions, context information and the used hypotheses distance.
Symmetry. An unlinkability measure should be symmetric with respect
to the order of hypotheses which includes the order of messages and
clusters.
Bounds. An unlinkability measure should map into the positive real num-
bers R+0 and be bound by an infimum and supremum, where the infi-
mum should be 0. Bounds are required to represent the two states of
perfect unlinkability and no unlinkability. Obviously both states exist,
and it must be defined for every measurement function which of the
inputs to the function will determine these these bounds.
In the following section, the expected distance unlinkability measure is
introduced. Afterwards, our measure is analysed with respect to the criteria
listed above.
13which often is represented by entropy
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5.5.2 Expected Distance Unlinkability Measure
In this section, we define unlinkability as the expected distance from a ref-
erence hypothesis. While entropy measures the uncertainty of an attacker,
the expected distance unlinkability measure provides a notion of error of an
attacker’s assignment. The larger the expected distance, the worse is the
attacker’s assignment.
The idea is to interpret the attacker’s assignment PA : ΠA → [0, 1] as
probabilities in a stochastic experiment. Distance δpi∗ : ΠM → R+0 to a ref-
erence partition pi∗ is used as random variable. This allows calculation of an
expectation over all hypotheses to a given reference partition pi∗.
Definition 5.2 (Expected Distance Unlinkability Measure)
The Expected Distance Unlinkability Measure is defined as
EdPA,δ(pi
∗) :=
∑
pi∈ΠM
PA(pi) · δpi∗(pi),
where δpi∗(pi) := δ(pi, pi
∗) and δ : ΠM × ΠM → R+0 is a symmetric distance
function on ΠM .
By way of choosing either the real partition or the attacker’s choice as
the reference partition, white-box analysis and black-box analysis are distin-
guished. In white-box analysis the set partition related to the true sender
relation pi∗ is known to the analyst. Thus the analyst is able to estimate the
amount of error that an attacker makes with respect to attackers assignment.
In black-box analysis the reference partition is the attacker’s choice piA, e. g.,
the maximum likely partition as defined in Equation (5.4).
5.5.3 Analysis of Measure
In this section, the expected distance unlinkability measure is discussed with
respect to the criteria introduced in Section 5.5.1. The focus is on the mea-
sure’s ability to grasp the semantic notion of consistency of the attacker’s
assignment. Furthermore, the certainty criterion is discussed and it is shown
that the formal criteria, as defined above, are fulfilled. We will not discuss
the third criterion because the proposed measure is effectively an estimation
of error from a assumed solution, thus this criterion is trivially fulfilled.
Consistency
To show that the measure fulfils the consistency criterion, changes to the
unlinkability measure are observed under minimum changes of the attacker’s
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probability mass assignment. The idea is to exchange the attacker’s assign-
ment of two hypotheses and observe that the expected unlinkability measure
behaves in a sensible manner.
Let pii, pij be two hypotheses, PA be the attacker probability mass as-
signment and δ be a distance measure on the hypotheses space. Let pi∗ be
the reference hypothesis. Values PA or δpi∗ for both hypotheses can be either
in the relation less, equal, or greater. Thus we have to consider three times
three cases of relations between PA(pii), PA(pij) and δpi∗(pii), δpi∗(pij).
δpi∗(pii) ? δpi∗(pij)
< = >
PA(pii) ? PA(pij)
< fall stay raise
= stay stay stay
> raise stay fall
Table 5.4: Expected behaviour of Ed on exchange of attacker assignments
PA for hypotheses pii, pij for a given relation between values of PA and δpi∗ .
In the following, we observe changes to Ed once the assignments PA for
pii and pij are exchanged. Exchanging the assignments means to define a
changed assignment P ′A with
P ′A(pii) := PA(pij)
P ′A(pij) := PA(pii)
Exchanging two values may either reduce, increase, or maintain the consis-
tency of the assignment. This behaviour depends both on the assignments
PA and the distance between hypotheses δ. In the following, three different
cases of expected behaviour (fall, raise, or stay) of Ed are distinguished, in
Table 5.4 nine cases of different results are summarised. The case stay de-
notes situations where either one or both of the PA or the δpi∗ values for pii
and pij are equal. In the case of fall both values are in the same inequality
relation, and in the case of raise both values are of opposite inequality. In
the following, we will argue that Ed behaves as expected in all cases.
Equal Values If one or both relations are equal, i. e., PA(pii) = PA(pij)
or δpi∗(pii) = δpi∗(pij) it is expected that the consistency of the attackers as-
signment is not changed if the assignments are exchanged. Thus, if the
assignments for pii, pij are exchanged, an unlinkability measure should not
change.
Obviously, for any case where PA(pii) = PA(pij), the expected distance
unlinkability Ed is unchanged. Furthermore, the same can be said in the
case of δpi∗(pii) = δpi∗(pij).
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Both Less or Both Greater Than. Considering the case where both re-
lations show the same inequality, take for example the case of PA(pii) < PA(pij)
and δ(pii, pi
∗) < δ(pij, pi∗). Exchanging the PA assignment for pii and pij means
to change the attacker’s order in a way that hypothesis pii is now higher up
in that order. As pii is closer with respect to δ, to the reference partition
than pij, the dissimilarity of the higher ordered hypotheses is reduced. This
means the consistency of the assignment is improved.
In the expected distance unlinkability measure, two terms of the sum
are changed, namely the values for PA in two of the summands. Given the
relation between the values of δ and PA the new sum is larger for pij <P pii
as
PA(pii) · δ(pii, pi∗) + PA(pij) · δ(pij, pi∗) >
PA(pij) · δ(pii, pi∗) + PA(pii) · δ(pij, pi∗).
In the case of PA(pii) > PA(pij) and δ(pii, pi
∗) > δ(pij, pi∗) the same effect is
observed. A smaller expected distance is interpreted as lower unlinkability
which correctly reflects the higher consistency.
One Greater, The Other Lesser Than. We now consider the case
where the two relations are different inequalities, i. e., PA(pii) < PA(pij) and
δ(pii, pi
∗) > δ(pij, pi∗). Again, exchanging the PA assignment for pii and pij
means to change the attacker’s order (5.3) in a way that hypothesis pii is
now higher up in that order. As pii is further away, with respect to δ, from
the reference partition than pij this increases the dissimilarity of higher or-
der hypotheses globally. This means the consistency of the assignment is
reduced.
The effect on the expected distance unlinkability measure is that the
measure is larger after exchanging the assignments of pii and pij as with the
original attacker’s assignment. The calculation is similar as in the previous
case. For the case of PA(pii) > PA(pij) and δ(pii, pi
∗) < δ(pij, pi∗), again, the
same argument applies and similarly this behaviour is expected.
It can be concluded that the expected distance unlinkability measure ful-
fils the first criterion of reflecting the consistency of an attacker’s probability
mass assignment.
Certainty
As mentioned before, Shannon’s entropy can be considered a good measure
for certainty of an attacker’s assignment. As entropy is a property of only
the outer structure, Ed cannot reflect certainty in the same way as entropy.
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In the expected distance, the probability assignment is combined with
relative distance values δpi∗ . This means that the effect to Ed by any modi-
fication to probability assignments is biased by δpi∗ .
Consider the case that probability mass is shifted towards, with respect to
δ, the reference hypothesis. Then the unlinkability measure changes toward
“less unlinkability”, i. e., Ed grows. On the other hand, the behaviour of
entropy is not clear, meaning, that entropy may change in both directions or
even stay unchanged. Thus entropy and Ed are not correlated, which means
that Ed is not reflecting consistency in the same sense of entropy.
Certainty, if reflected by Ed, cannot be seen independent from inner
structure distance metric δ. Which is not related to entropy. Any notion of
certainty — expressed by Ed — is correlated with above notion of consis-
tency. Thus, if certainty in terms of entropy is needed, Ed is insufficient and
has to be supplemented.
Formal Criteria
The criteria consistency, certainty and correctness define semantics of un-
linkability measures. The criteria continuity, symmetry and boundedness
describe more formal properties of unlinkability measures. In the following,
it is shown that Ed has these properties.
Continuity Concerning continuity of Ed with respect to small changes of
PA and δ, addition and multiplication are continuous operations. Distance δ
and PA are non-negative, thus, small changes to PA only have little effect on
Ed. Small changes to δ also have only a small effect on ed. Thus Ed must
be continuous.
Symmetry Symmetry of Ed, with respect to the order of hypotheses, is
trivially inherited from commutativity of the addition operation.
Bounds Because of the different14 definitions for δ, values for δpi∗ generally
only have a lower bound. But because of the finite cardinality of ΠM , there
is an upper bound to Ed governed by this inner structure. PA is defined with
range [0, 1], 1 =
∑
pi∈ΠM PA(pi) and thus trivially has upper and lower bound.
Given a distance function δ, probability mass assignments Pmin, Pmax, for
minimum, respectively maximum values of Ed can be found.
14The definition of δ is chosen with respect to the objectives of the attacker.
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Minimum Trivially, an attacker assigning maximum probability to the
reference hypothesis provides a minimum for Ed. The minimum assignment
is denoted as
Pmin(pi) =
{
1, if pi = pi∗
0, if pi 6= pi∗,
As δpi∗(pi
∗) = 0, the expected distance EdPmin,δ(pi
∗) = 0. Furthermore, Pmin is
the only minimum because we have δ(pi, pi′) = 0 ⇐⇒ pi = pi′. Therefore the
minimum expected distance unlinkability is zero, as long as the underlying
inner structure provides identity of indiscernibles.
Maximum For a maximum assignment, we distinguish between black-box
analysis, where the reference partition is given by the attacker’s choice and
white-box analysis, where the reference partition is independent of the at-
tacker’s choice.
In black-box analysis, the reference partition is the attacker’s choice.
Given that the attacker’s choice is defined in Equation (5.4), the maximum
expected distance is achieved when two hypotheses pi, pi′ are chosen in a
way that δ(pi, pi′) is maximum. PA then is constructed in a way that PA(pi)
equals PA(pi
′) and PA(pi) = 0.5. Assume that, without loss of generality,
ord(pi) < ord(pi′) and thus pi becomes the attacker’s choice because of the
second criterion of the attacker’s order (5.3). The upper bound for Ed in
black-box analysis is given by
EdPmax,δ = 0.5 ∗ δ(pi, pi′)
where pi, pi′ ∈ ΠM produce maximum distance δ, i. e., δ(pi, pi′) ≥ (δ(pi′′, pi′′′))
for all (pi′′, pi′′′) in ΠM × ΠM .
Constructing an upper bound for Ed in white-box analysis runs along the
same lines as before, we choose the element with maximum distance to the
reference partition. An attacker’s assignment Pmax that produces a maximum
EdPmax,δ for a given δ in white-box analysis is
PA(pi) =
{
1, if pi = pˆi
0, if pi 6= pˆi,
where pˆi ∈ {pi ∈ ΠM : ∀pi′ ∈ ΠM : δ(pi, pi∗) ≥ δ(pi′, pi∗)} is a hypothesis with
maximum distance to pi∗.
Knowing the bounds of Ed allows calculation of a normalised expected
distance unlinkability measure. We leave this to the discussion and further
work.
70
5.6. APPROACHING EFFICIENCY
5.6 Approaching Efficiency
In this section, efficient approaches for analysis of unlinkability are discussed
using the expected distance unlinkability measure Ed. Efficient computa-
tion of Ed in realistic environments is still work in progress. The expected
distance unlinkability comprises a sum over ΠM that is not efficiently com-
putable because of the large cardinality of ΠM . Attacker probability mass
assignments also often need normalisation by summation over ΠM . This
makes a direct approach for simulating the measure infeasible. In the follow-
ing only preliminary works toward a simulative analysis can be presented.
The main contribution of this section is a complexity reduction of Ed for
an example attacker assignment. In the following, the information flow of a
simulation is introduced. Afterwards, we explain a layer model of context
information that leads to the example attacker assignment.
5.6.1 Information Flow
The difference between white-box and black-box is in the knowledge of the
real partition. Aside of this knowledge, the flow of information is the same
for both types of analysis.
Information flow in white-box analysis is depicted in Figure 5.5. De-
vices emit messages M . The real partition pi∗ is determined by an device’s
movement. An algorithm representing the attacker then generates PA which
defines the attacker’s choice piA. The analyst derives the unlinkability mea-
sure EdPA,δ from the inner structure distance δ, piA, PA, and pi
∗.
The three boxes in Figure 5.5 denote points of computational operations
in a simulation. Simulating movements of devices is out of the scope of this
work, leaving the operations of attacker and analyst for simulation. Both
operations turn out to be computationally complex for large |M |.
5.6.2 Layers of Context Information
The notion of context information has repeatedly been used in an very ab-
stract way. In this section the sources of context information are discussed
with focus on simulative analysis. Sources are classified by denoting the
building blocks of hypotheses: set partitions ΠM , sets (trajectories) 2
M , and
tuples of elements (messages) M2. These classes, denoted layers, provide a
model for the definition of attacker probability mass assignments that com-
bine information from all sources.
Context information, in general, can be modelled by measure-like plau-
sibility functions pl : D→ R+0, where the domain D consists of elements
relevant to the specific layer. Herein D on each layer is one of ΠM , 2
M ,M2.
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pi∗
Devices
MΠM
Attacker
PApiA
Analyst
δ
Ed
communication
Figure 5.5: White-box Analysis Information Flow.
Interpretation of pl is only guided by the directive that a higher value means
a higher plausibility and zero comprises the minimum value.
The partition layer is described by a partition plausibility function
pl : ΠM → R+0. Information used on this layer concerns statements or statis-
tics on the partition, e. g., an expectation of the number of devices, respec-
tively trajectories. This layer comprises the top layer. Partition plausibilities
can be transformed into probability mass assignments, e. g., by normalisa-
tion.
On the trajectory layer, context information on the plausibility of indi-
vidual trajectories is gathered and combined. A set plausibility function
pl : 2M → R+0 defines the plausibility of trajectories. Examples for informa-
tion on the set layer are plausibilities of trajectory endpoints and plausibility
of turns at junctions.
Context information on the link layer describes the plausibility of pairs
of sample points to be contained in the same trajectory. A link plausibility
function pl : M2 → R+0 considers independent information on the relation
between two distinct pairs. Dependencies to links between other messages
are not included on this layer.
The three layers are naturally ordered, with lower layers providing infor-
mation to higher layers. Being the direct prerequisite for probability mass
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P : ΠM → [0, 1]∑
pi∈ΠM
U(pi) = 1
pl : ΠM → R0+
pl : 2M → R0+
pl : M2 → R0+
partition context
set context
edge context
partition layer
trajectory layer
link layer
Figure 5.6: Layer Model
assignments, the partition layer is on top. Plausibility values from the tra-
jectory layer can be combined to provide information on the plausibility of
partitions. The link layer is on the bottom of the stack as a pair of messages
comprises the smallest set for a link. The link layer provides plausibility val-
ues that can be used on the set layer. From the bottom to the top, each layer
uses plausibility values from the lower layer, refines them and weights them
by layer specific context information. Information flows from the bottom to
the top.
Sources of context information depend only on the restrictions imposed on
an attacker. In a simulation, an attacker can be provided with movements
patterns of defined granularity and precision. In a real-life situation, an
attacker may have collected prior knowledge in the form of traffic statistics,
or educated guesses. These statistical distributions describe how devices
move through the sample space. In preliminary simulations, the distribution
of velocity has been measured and provided to the attacker.
The whole stack can be used to define an attacker’s probability mass as-
signment. Implementing an assignment already proves to be a hard problem,
because of the large number of set partitions that have to be considered at
least in the normalisation-step from partition plausibility to probability mass
assignment.
This classification of context information can be seen as an addition to the
hint given by Franz et al. [25]. Whereas they provide individual hints, our
model is more concerned with the combination of hints for implementation
in a simulation.
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5.6.3 Sum-Sum-Norm Attacker Assignment
In this section an example attacker’s probability assignment is introduced.
The approach is based on the layer model from Section 5.6.2. In this ap-
proach, we assume that the attacker has some context information on the
relation between single messages, e. g., a velocity distribution.
The sum-sum-norm attacker assignment is a very na¨ıve method of defin-
ing PA. Assuming that the attacker is able to quantify the plausibility of
two sample points being related, we model the attacker’s probability of a
partition as sum of pairwise plausibilities of samples in the same cluster of
this partition. This sum is normalised by the sum of all partitions to gain a
probability distribution.
This assignment obviously favours large trajectories, resulting in the high-
est probability mass being assigned invariably to the partition containing only
one trajectory. The Mean-Mean-Norm Attacker Assignment in Section 5.6.4
provides a more useful measure. Herein the sum-sum-norm assignment is
used to show an exemplary solution for complexity reduction.
Assume that the attacker is able to construct a link plausibility function
pl : M2 → R+0. Sample points M then form a complete undirected graph
G = (M,E, pl : E → R+0), whereM is the set of samples, E = {e ∈ 2M : |e| = 2},
and pl defining edge weights. The edge weights herein define a link plausi-
bility.
The sum of link plausibilities in a set of edges can be defined as the
plausibility of a set of edges.
Definition 5.3 (Plausibility Value of Edge Set)
The plausibility of a set E of edges is the sum of plausibility values of the
edges in this set,
pl(E) :=
∑
e∈E
pl(e),
where pl : E → R+0 is a link plausibility function.
This implicitly defines the trajectory plausibility pl : 2M → R+0 as sum
of edge plausibilities of all edges contained in a subgraph of G which contains
exactly only those sample points contained in the trajectory.
On the partition layer, the plausibility of an partition is defined as the
sum of trajectory plausibilities. For simplicity, the trajectory plausibility is
skipped and the partition plausibility defined directly from the link plausi-
bility.
The notion that a partition pi contains an edge denotes that both sample
points m,m′ forming an edge e = (m,m′) are related with respect to pi,
denoted m ∼pi m′ ⇐⇒ e ∈ pi. We further re-define E : ΠM → 2E as a
function that maps each partition to the subset of edges contained in that
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partition.
Definition 5.4 (Edges in Partition)
The set of edges of the graph G = (M,E, pl : E → R+0) contained in the
partition pi of M is defined as
E(pi) := {e ∈ E : ∀Mi ∈ pi, m ∈Mi ⇐⇒ m′ ∈Mi},
where pi = {M1, . . . ,Mn} with Mi ∩Mj = ∅ ⇐⇒ i 6= j, M =
⋃
Mi, and
e = (m,m′).
With the set of edges in a partition defined, the plausibility value of edge
sets can be applied to the set of edges in a partition. Furthermore, we can now
summarise the plausibility values of all partitions needed for normalisation.
Definition 5.5 (Plausibility Value of Partitions)
The plausibility value pl(pi) of a single partition pi is the plausibility value of
the contained set of edges,
pl(pi) := pl(E(pi)).
The plausibility value pl(ΠM) of the set of partitions over M is the sum
of plausibility values of all single partitions in ΠM ,
pl(ΠM) :=
∑
pi∈ΠM
pl(pi).
Now a probability mass assignment can be defined for an attacker based
on plausibility values for relations between samples as
PA(pi) :=
pl(pi)
pl(ΠM)
, (5.12)
with PA : ΠM → [0, 1] and
∑
pi∈ΠM PA(pi) = 1. This defines a world view of
the sum-sum-norm attacker.
Complexity Reduction
As has been mentioned repeatedly, due to the exponentially growing cardi-
nality of ΠM , even for small |M |, pl(ΠM) cannot be computed directly in an
efficient manner. In the following, Theorem 5.1 is introduced which reduces
the computational complexity of pl(ΠM).
Theorem (5.1) allows computation of pl(pi) as B(|M | − 1)pl(E). The fol-
lowing Lemma 5.6 explains the relation between B(|M |− 1) and the number
of partitions containing a specific edge15.
15It has been brought to our attention that Lemma 5.6 is a special case of Equation (5)
in [25] which has not been proven there. It should be trivial to induce this Equation (5)
from our lemma
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Lemma 5.6 (Number of Partitions Containing an Edge)
For all edges e ∈ E, the number of partitions in partition set ΠM that contain
the edge e is equivalent to the Bell-Number of the cardinality of M reduced
by one element,
|{pi ∈ ΠM : e ∈ E(pi)}| = B(|M | − 1), ∀e ∈ E (5.13)
The following proof of Lemma 5.6 is based on construction of ΠM\{m}.
For an example observe the partitions of a 3-elemental set: 〈1, 1, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 2〉,
〈1, 2, 1〉, 〈1, 2, 2〉, 〈1, 2, 3〉. Choose, without loss of generality, the edge be-
tween the first and the second element. The partitions containing this edge
are 〈1, 1, 1〉 and 〈1, 1, 2〉. The number of partitions containing this edge is
the number of partitions of a two-elemental set. The number of all partitions
containing any edge in this example edge is equal to B(2), or B(|M | − 1) in
general. The reader is encouraged to try the same with a four-elemental (or
any larger) set to get the intuition right.
Proof 5.6
It is to be shown that
|{pi ∈ ΠM : e ∈ E(pi)}| = B(|M | − 1)
for every e ∈ E.
Given, without loss of generality e = (m,m′), m,m′ ∈ M and choose m
so that
B(|M | − 1) = |ΠM\{m}|,
and define Π′ := {pi ∈ ΠM : e ∈ E(pi)}.
Now define a map f : Π′ → ΠM\{m} that maps every partition in Π′ onto
a partition without element m, f : pi 7→ pi \ {m}. Where the set-substraction
\ denotes that m is removed from the subset Mi ∈ pi. As pi ∈ ΠM obviously
f(pi) ∈ ΠM\{m}
To show the lemma it has to be shown that f is a bijection.
a) f is surjective, because
∀pi ∈ ΠM\{m}∃Mi ∈ pi : m′ ∈Mi
let M ′i = Mi ∪{m} and let pi′ = {M1, . . . ,Mi−1,M ′i ,Mi+1, . . . ,Mn} where
M1, . . . ,Mn ∈ pi. Then obviously f(pi′) = pi and surjectivity of f is shown.
b) f is injective because negation of implication leads to contradiction. As-
sume there exists pi, pi′ ∈ Π′ with f(pi) = f(pi′) and pi 6= pi′. This means
that there exists a bijective map b : f(pi)→ f(pi′) with Mi = b(M) for all
Mi ∈ f(pi).
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Especially here must be m′ ∈ Mj ∈ f(pi),Mj = b(Mj). Because all
partitions in Π′ have m,m′ in the same cluster, all clusters are disjoint
and f removes only m, m,m′ must be in the same cluster in pi and pi′. As
no other clusters are changed pi = {M1, . . . ,Mj ∪ {m}, . . . ,M|f(pi)|} = pi′
which contradicts the assumption.
As f is bijective and |Π′| = |ΠM\{m}| the lemma is proven.
Lemma 5.6 provides the cornerstone to reduce the complexity of calculat-
ing the plausibility of all set partitions (Def. 5.5) from exponential complexity
to polynomial complexity.
The following theorem on the Sum of Partition Plausibility exploits the
relation between the number of partitions containing a specific edge and the
number of occurrences of each edge in the sum of pl(ΠM). This theorem
states that each edge is contained exactly B(|M | − 1) times in the sum of
plausibilities of all partitions.
Theorem 5.1 (Sum of Partition Plausibility)
If the plausibility of a partition pl(pi) is defined as the sum of plausibilities of
all edges contained in that partition (Def. 5.5) and the plausibility of a set of
edges pl(E) is defined as the sum of all edge plausibilities as well (Def. 5.3),
then the sum of plausibilities of all partitions can be calculated as∑
pi∈ΠM
pl(pi) = B(|M | − 1) pl(E). (5.14)
The correctness of Theorem 5.1 follows from the definitions of pl and
Lemma 5.6.
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Proof 5.7
B(|M | − 1)pl(E) def= B(|M | − 1)
∑
e∈E
pl(e)
=
∑
e∈E
[|ΠM\{m}| pl(e)]
Lemma 5.6
=
∑
e∈E
[|{pi ∈ ΠM : e ∈ E(pi)}| pl(e)]
=
∑
e∈E
 ∑
pi∈ΠM :e∈E(pi)
pl(e)

=
∑
pi∈ΠM
 ∑
e∈E:e∈E(pi)
pl(e)

def
=
∑
pi∈ΠM
pl(pi)
The only new step is the reordering of sums between the fourth and fifth
line which is justified because addition is both commutative and associative.
What is done there is counting all occurrences of all edges in the plausibility
value pl for all partitions. From Lemma 5.6, we know that the number of
occurrences is equal for all edges and depends only on the cardinality of
the base set M . As
∑
pi∈ΠM
pl(Epi) can be efficiently calculated, PA(pi) can be
efficiently calculated.
5.6.4 Mean-Mean-Norm Attacker Assignment
The Sum-Sum-Norm Assignment from Section 5.6.3 can be easily improved
in terms of computational complexity, but provides a very biased attacker. A
different approach that does not favour large trajectories is to use mean values
instead where summation is used in the sum-sum-norm. In the following,
some hints towards a generalised complexity reduction are given.
Plausibilities pl for links, trajectories, and partitions and attacker’s as-
signment PA are then defined along the lines of the previous section as means
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|M | B(|M |) PA/
∑
e∈E pl(e)
2 2 1
3 5 1
2
+ 1
3
4 15 3
6
+ 1
2
+ 1
3
5 52 3
12
+ 1
10
+ 3
9
+ 3
6
+ 1
4
+ 3
3
+ 1
2
6 203 4
20
+ 6
18
+ 1
15
+ 10
12
+ 12
9
+ 4
6
+ 1
5
+ 6
4
+ 7
3
+ 1
2
7 877 1
2
+ 15
3
+ 25
4
+ 10
5
+ 6
6
+ 35
9
+ 40
12
+ 5
15
+ 30
18
+ 10
20
+ 1
21
+ 10
40
+ 15
30
Table 5.5: Mean-Mean-Norm-Quotient of PA
pl(e) given
pl(E) :=
∑
e∈E
pl(e)
|E|
pl(pi) :=
∑
E∈pi
pl(E)
|pi|
PA(pi) :=
pl(pi)∑
pi′∈ΠM
pl(pi′)
(5.15)
The complexity of direct calculation of PA again is exponential because of
the exponential summation over all elements of ΠM . We have not been able
to find a complexity reduction as for the Sum-Sum-Norm from the previous
section. In the following, preliminary work that hints toward a possible
complexity reduction is given.
Where the Sum-Sum-Norm (5.12) describes a sum of plausibility val-
ues, Mean-Mean-Norm describes a quotient of a sum of plausibility values
of edges. Evidently, it turns out that this seems, again, to be a factor to
the sum of all link-plausibilities
∑
e∈E pl(e). One can compute this factor
PA/
∑
e∈E pl(e) by counting the number of times an edge occurs within a
certain trajectory and partition size combination.
In Table 5.5 the factor PA/
∑
e∈E pl(e) is given. The numbers have been
computed by calculating the factor to each link-plausibility pl(e). For car-
dinalities of M up to 8 this factor has been equal for all link-plausibilities.
Given the symmetry of occurrence of edges in ΠM this is no surprise.
The sum of numerators in each row of Table 5.5 is B(|M | − 1), obviously
because the number of occurrences of a single edge in ΠM is the same as in
the Sum-Sum-Norm assignment. The order and occurrences of denominators
is not explicitly known, neither is the order of numerators to denominators.
The next step would be to determine the denominators to find the relation
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P : ΠM → R+0 H D pi∗ EdPx,δ(pi∗)
PA 1.70 0.73 pi1 0.55
PB 1.70 0.73 pi5 0.45
PC 0.00 0.00 pi1 0.00
PD 2.32 1.00 pi1 1.00
PE 1.84 0.79 pi1 0.99
PF 1.84 0.79 pi5 0.65
Table 5.6: Entropy H, Degree of Unlinkability D, and Expected Distance
(Ed) in Black-box Analysis.
PA/
∑
e∈E pl(e). This general structure may help to find a general formular
for reduction of complexity of computation of PA.
5.7 Discussion
In Section 5.5, the expected distance unlinkability measure Ed has been
defined. In this section we discuss Ed with respect to the example used in
the criticism of the degree of unlinkability in Section 5.4.3.
Within this section the example ΠM and example attackers A,B,C,D,E,
and F from Table 5.3 are used. A and B provide distributions with a single
peak, C,D are the degenerate/uniform distributions, and E,F are distribu-
tions consisting of two peaks.
5.7.1 Black-Box Analysis
Table 5.6 provides entropy based measures (H and D) and the corresponding
expected distance measure Ed in black-box analysis. Black-box analysis
means that the reference partition is chosen to be the attacker’s choice (5.4),
which are pi1, pi5, pi1, pi1, pi1, pi2 for attackers A,B,C,D,E, F . Recall that a
higher expected distance Ed is interpreted as higher unlinkability. In this
example we use the partition distance from Definition 5.1 for the hypotheses
distance δ.
The main difference between the expected distance Ed and the degree of
unlinkability D in Table 5.6 is that Ed distinguishes assignments that that
are not distinguished by D.
Recalling the discussion from Section 5.4.3, the difference between at-
tacker A and B is that the attacker’s choice of B is better supported by
other hypotheses than the attacker’s choice of A. PB therefore is more con-
sistent than PA, which is reflected by Ed. The same argument is valid for
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attackers E and F , where PF is considered to be more consistent than PE,
which again is reflected by Ed.
Analysing the representation of certainty by Ed is complicated — as has
been discussed in Section 5.5.3 — because every comparison is biased by
the inner structure distance metric. However, the examples presented above
indicate that Ed is not indifferent to certainty.
Informally speaking: the wider P is distributed over the hypotheses space,
the more probability mass is given to hypotheses with large distance δpi∗ . This
obviously increments the value of Ed. Compare for example the single peak
distributions PA, PB with the double-peak distributions PE and PF . The
latter distributions can be interpreted as less certain assignments, because
the probability mass is spread wider. This is reflected already by D. As
mentioned in Section 5.5.1, a single measure probably cannot perfectly reflect
certainty and consistency at the same time.
Up to now, mostly assignments with equal entropy and different Ed have
been compared. It is however not difficult to construct examples where Ed
is invariant and D varies. An example of the latter is an assignment P ′A as
given in Table 5.7 which differs from PA only in that the assignments from
pi3, pi4 are shifted onto the assignment of pi2 as given in Table 5.7. It can be
observed that after the manipulation D is lower while EdPA,δ = EdP ′A,δ.
pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5 D Ed
P ′A 0.60 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.58 0.55
Table 5.7: Example assignment P ′A with EdPA = EdP ′A but D(PA) 6= D(P ′A)
Logically, the change of certainty is not reflected because, considering this
inner structure δ, pi2, pi3, and pi4 are equidistant from the reference partition,
which is pi1 in both PA and P
′
A. Thus, concerning inner structure pi2, pi3, and
pi4 are indiscernible, and thus identical, with respect to δpi1 .
This shows, again, that every change to a distribution is measured by Ed
only with respect to δpi∗ . Meaning, only if probability mass is shifted closer
to or farther away from pi∗, in terms of inner structure, does Ed reflect a
change. Shifting mass equidistant does not change Ed, independent whether
mass is concentrated on a single hypothesis or spread over hypotheses with
equal δpi∗ .
For entropy based measures the highest unlinkability is achieved by uni-
form distributions. In Section 5.4.3 we have already discussed, that uniform
distributions are not providing the highest unlinkability if the attacker con-
siders the inner structure. The same is not true for Ed.
Using bounds from Section 5.5.3 we can calculate the maximum unlink-
ability value for attacker assignments, which is one in this example. Here
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already more than one attacker’s assignment provides Ed = 1. Due to the
ordering of ΠM assignment PD already provides maximum unlinkability. But
the canonical maximum unlinkability assignment in this scenario for black-
box analysis would be P ′D with the pairwise farthest hypotheses, here pi1, pi5
are assigned 0.5 probability mass each as given in Table 5.8.
pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5 D Ed
P ′D 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.43 1
Table 5.8: Maximum unlinkability assignment in black-box analysis P ′D.
One may observe that, again, D provides a higher value for PD than for
P ′D. This is, because by focusing probability mass on only two hypotheses in
P ′D, the attacker’s certainty, in terms of entropy, is higher than the certainty
of a uniform distribution.
From these examples we make out one situation where different probabil-
ity mass assignments are indistinguishable to Ed while being distinguished
by entropy. Assuming that inner structure is defining a sensible distance
metric the distribution of probability mass between hypotheses with equal
distance from the current attacker’s choice is unimportant to unlinkability.
Further research has to show whether this is a weakness of Ed or if this is a
genuine property of unlinkability itself.
5.7.2 White-Box Analysis
Consider now the white-box analysis, where the analyst has external knowl-
edge on which set partition corresponds to reality. Assume that a white-box
analyst will be testing privacy-enhancing measures against a variety of at-
tackers. A white-box analyst is not only interested in improving the con-
sistency of attack algorithms, but also in the correctness of attacks. Very
different expected errors would hint toward flaws in the privacy-enhancing
measures that are tested.
The expected distance unlinkability Ed in white-box analysis has slightly
different attributes compared to Ed in black-box analysis. Most remarkable
is the different upper bound which equals the largest distance between any
two hypotheses (see Section 5.5.3).
In Table 5.9, a complete compilation of expected distances Ed is given
for the considered examples. As the expected distance unlinkability measure
depends on pi∗, a white-box analyst can use the measure to determine the
expectation error of an attacker in relation to the true relation, or any as-
sumed attacker’s choice. Thus the analyst is not only able to quantify the
absolute quality of an attack, but is able to quantify the absolute success of
countermeasures against a given attacker.
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pi∗ =
P : ΠM → R+0 pi1 pi2 pi3 pi4 pi5
PA 0.55 0.95 0.85 0.95 1.45
PB 1.55 0.85 0.95 0.85 0.45
PC 0 1 1 1 2
PD 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0
PE 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.95 1.01
PF 1.35 0.61 0.89 0.95 0.65
Table 5.9: Expected Distance EdPx,δ(pi
∗) in White-box analysis, calculated
for different reference hypothesis and attacker probability distributions.
The data from Table 5.9 provides two types of information for either
analysis or attack. For the analyst it provides knowledge which scenarios
provide high unlinkability. For the attacker it provides an improved attacker’s
choice as described in Section 5.7.3.
A white-box analyst naturally calculates only one expected distance for
a given attacker’s assignment and takes measures from different attackers to
estimate the unlinkability of a scenario. In the following we describe how
Table 5.9 can be utilised in throughout analysis.
Consider for example Attacker A, whose attacker’s choice is pi1. Assume,
for example, that the real hypothesis is pi3, the attacker’s choice of A would
be have an expected error of 0.85. Attacker B would be only slightly worse,
with Ed of 0.95, although its attacker’s choice pi5 is very much the opposite
to A.
If different attacker’s provide equally wrong results, than the scenario is
not vulnerable to specific attacks. Both attacker’s choices would be wrong,
of course, but considering that their context information hinted at opposite
directions, this scenario can be considered as not being vulnerable.
A different situation would exist if the real partition would be pi1 or pi5.
Then, one of the attackers provides a sufficiently better attack, which could
hint at flaws in any privacy enhancing techniques use in this scenario. This,
in return, might help to find better techniques to provide privacy.
Thus, white-box analysis yields two types of information. First absolute
information on the unlinkability of privacy-enhancing techniques in the face
of selected attackers. Second, information on potential flaws in privacy-
enhancing techniques.
Furthermore, Table 5.9 provides information on how to improve the at-
tacker’s choice by considering the expected error. Attacker D and F provide
example cases where a different attacker’s choice would reduce the expected
distance with respect to the context information condensed in the attacker’s
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assignment.
The choice of attacker D is pi1. Making this choice, the expected error,
assuming the attacker makes a black-box estimation, is 1. But, if attacker
D chooses any of pi2, pi3, pi4 he would reduce Ed to 0.8. Attacker F could
improve his choice, in terms of Ed, from 0.65 to 0.61 by choosing pi2 instead
of pi5. An attacker can improve his choice, with respect to error estimation,
by choosing based on Ed.
In the following section, a revised attacker’s choice is introduced that uses
a modified attacker’s order.
5.7.3 Attackers Choice Revisited
Taking an attacker’s point of view, the inner structure from Section 5.3.2
introduces additional context information that can be used to improve the
attacker’s choice. The idea is that an attacker may define its attacker’s order
with respect to the expected distance Ed. By using Ed, the expected error
is minimised based on the attacker’s assignment. The attacker calculates Ed
with different set partitions for pi∗ and chooses the partition that leads to the
smallest error.
Essentially this means to define a new attacker’s order <∗P that supersedes
the partial order induced by Ed before the attacker’s order <P as defined by
(5.3). The revisited attacker’s order is defined as follows
pii <
∗
P pij :⇐⇒ EdPA,δ(pii) < EdPA,δ(pij)
∨ (EdPA,δ(pii) = EdPA,δ(pij) ∧ pii <P pij).
(5.16)
This second probability mass assignment is then used as order in the
attacker’s choice.
Effectively, the attacker has now included the inner structure in his as-
signment. The attacker’s choice, which is basically a guess based on context
information, is now modified to reduce the actual error. In terms of Ed this
automatically improves the attacker’s choice.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, the expected distance unlinkability measure has been intro-
duced. This measure is motivated by the shortcomings of existing entropy
based measures (see Section 5.4.3).
The main contribution of this work is the distinction between inner and
outer structure in global unlinkability metrics. Hypotheses in unlinkabil-
ity problems are not atomic like in hypotheses in anonymity problems. A
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hypotheses-space in unlinkability problems generally has a complicated struc-
ture that represents the objectives of the analysed attacker. Ignoring the in-
ner structure, produces metrics that do not sufficiently represent the quality
of an attacker and thus are not fit to be used as unlinkability metric.
The degree of unlinkability, discussed in Section 5.4.4, is an example of an
unlinkability measure ignoring the inner structure of the hypothesis-space.
The expected distance unlinkability measure introduced in Section 5.5 distin-
guishes situations that are not distinguished by the previous measure. Both
unlinkability measures have the disadvantage that they are not efficiently
computable in a direct way. Concerning efficiency, the expected distance
unlinkability is at least not worse than the degree of unlinkability.
Unlinkability measures, with hypotheses space ΠM , have been considered
in only few previous works. Thus it is to be expected that this chapter leaves
plenty of open questions.
The simulative analysis still provides future work. The application of Ed
to a realistic scenario is yet missing. We provided two simple attacker algo-
rithms based on a layer model of context information. We could reduce the
complexity of the Sum-Sum-Norm Assignments (Section 5.6.3) to polyno-
mial complexity. Direct implementation of Ed is expensive, but we provided
a first step towards substantial complexity reduction.
Pending computational feasibility, the expected distance can be useful as
a defining measure for the amount of unlinkability. For the development of
privacy enhancing emission protocols standard measures for unlinkability are
useful. The development of measures needs a coherent and uniform definition
of the amount of unlinkability.
Furthermore, standard scenarios and standard attackers have to be found
to provide test-cases for protocol developers. The perfect unlinkability mea-
sure would measure scenarios independent of specific attackers, similar to
measures like `-diversity. Starting from the notion of distance, standards
for inner structure should be agreed upon by the privacy community. An
urgent next step in this area would be to combine the lessons learned from
the database-privacy measures and unlinkability measures towards this goal.
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Principle 11
The protocol designer should
know which trust relations
his protocol depends on, and
why the dependence is nec-
essary. The reasons for
particular trust relations be-
ing acceptable should be ex-
plicit though they will be
founded on judgement and
policy rather than logic.
Martin Abadi and Roger
Needham in [2] 6
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In this chapter, we introduce an anonymous certification protocol with
secure anonymity revocation. We emphasize secure as attribute to hint at our
focus on protection against single points of failure in the revocation process.
This especially targets authorities which usually have unlimited power over
the relation between user and certificate, e. g., certification authorities.
We use the vehicular communications scenario described in Chapter 3 as
backdrop and general motivation. The main feature that distinguishes this
protocol from other works in vehicular communication is its focus on the
principle of separation of duty. Another focus of this work is on the tradeoff
between privacy, security, and communication overhead.
Unlinkability for certificates provides multiple problems for communica-
tion protocols. These problems range from the authenticity of data to the
question of which data is included in a certificate and which data is revealed
87
CHAPTER 6. ANONYMOUS CERTIFICATION
to certification authorities. The need for revocation adds questions about
which data is stored at the revocation authorities, of whom and how this
data is generated and by what methods a vehicle is prevented from gaining
non-revocable certificates. Some of these topics are addressed here.
The scenario considered here is determined on one side by strict time
and security constraints and on the other side by high privacy risks. [55]
Safety-related messages in the vehicular context have to be processed —
from sending to reception till reaction — within few hundred milliseconds.
Errors, e. g., injected messages by an attacker, might easily result in humans
being harmed. On the other hand there are privacy concerns. Positional
and identifying information is included in these messages and possibly open
to the public. In the overall debate, there is always a compromise between
security (e. g., by authentication) and privacy.
Specific choices for security parameters of an implementation of vehicular
communication infrastructure are subject to political decisions. The objec-
tive of our work is to provide the means to support a wide range of parameters
to allow for an optimum trade-off between privacy, security, efficiency and
costs. The addressed security objectives are discussed in Section 6.1.
One technique to provide unlinkability is to authenticate vehicles using
pseudonymous certificates that are changed frequently to prevent tracking of
vehicles citeeichler2007:strategiespseudonymchanges[13][48]. Certificates are
provided by certificate authorities which generally have complete control over
data and thus have to be trusted by all involved parties. We herein refer to
a notion of trust as given by Audun Jøsang:
“Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to depend on
something or somebody in a given situation with a feeling of
relative security, even though negative consequences are possi-
ble.” [32]
While trusted third parties often have been used as a panacea for all kinds
of security problems, they are actually not a good solution but a kludge to
solve situations where real security cannot be provided1. While trust is a
concept very common in human interaction, it cannot be considered as being
equal to security.
Certification authorities concentrate a huge amount of power: The power
to grant services (communication certificates here) and knowledge (here rela-
tions between certificates and identities). Practice, however, shows that such
parties are not necessarily trustworthy. Certification authorities can fail in
many ways: technical and administrative errors as well as non-trustworthy
1Or where secure solutions are to costly, unknown or no one cared to research for a
solution.
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employees with access to crucial information. We approach this problem by
enforcing the many-eye-principle on crucial operations that have been con-
trolled previously by single authorities. We present a solution that combines
fair blind signatures with shared secret computation.
Similar to our previous work [64] single authorities are herein considered
as potential adversaries. Privacy incidents, where authorities misused their
privileges2, have shown that this scenario is justified in practise. The objec-
tive of this is to increase trust in authorities by enforcing privacy protection
through many-eye-protected anonymity revocation.
The general objective of this part of our work is to reduce the amount of
needed trust within the whole system to the unavoidable minimum.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1, security objectives
for certification in the vehicular scenario are discussed. The certification pro-
tocol described in Section 6.3 is based on protocol concepts that are intro-
duced in Section 6.2. The protocol is then analysed with respect to security
in Section 6.4 and complexity in Section 6.5. The chapter is concluded in
Section 6.7.
6.1 Prerequisites
In this section, security objectives for revocable anonymous certification in
vehicular communication are discussed. These objectives refine the security
objectives from Chapter 3. While many problems that occur in vehicular
communication scenarios have been sufficiently tackled in the past, the prob-
lem of non-trustworthy authorities has mostly been avoided. Certification
authorities have been declared as trusted and thus failure has been declared
impossible.
In the following, our notion of authority failure is introduced. Afterwards,
we describe assumption that have to be fulfilled for the protocol to work. This
is followed by specific objectives for certification and revocation. Finally
complexity constraints for the protocol are discussed.
6.1.1 Authority Failures
We distinguish two different types of authority failures, based on certain
responsibilities of certification authorities, that shall be used in the analysis
of the protocol later. An authority failure is a situation where a (trusted)
authority fails to fulfil its duty.
2For example a big german telecommunications corporation used their superior re-
sources to spy on journalists and the directorate.
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We distinguish two different tasks for authorities. Certification author-
ities (CA) are entrusted with the power to sign or deny certificates. Re-
vocation authorities (RA) are entrusted with the power to link certificates
to identities. In standard Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)-scenarios CA and
RA are implemented as one entity.
The first type of failure considered here is the CA-failure. A CA can fail
in basically two ways. Either it fails to deny a certificate to an requester that
has no right to receive a certificate. or the CA falsely denies a certificate to
an authorised requester.
An RA-failure occurs if that the information between a certificate and
the identity of the requester is disclosed without legal reason to do so. The
failure of falsely refusing revocation is not discussed here because such a
failure is based on faulty interpretation of revocation policies, e. g., privacy
law, and is out of the scope of this work.
The main problem of RA-failures is, that the effects of revocation are
not reversible. In this aspect privacy is very similar to the security objective
of secrecy. A secret can only be considered a secret until it is disclosed for
the first time. Disclosure in this context denotes that information leaves
the sphere of influence of the bearer of the secret. Outside of this sphere of
influence, further distribution generally cannot be controlled. This attribute
provides the motivation for prevention of RA-failures.
Requesters of certificates only win from privacy protection. Given that
the requester may, at any point, choose to disclose the relation between
certificates and identity, malicious behaviour, with respect to privacy, is not
to be expected. Nonetheless, it is sensible to recognise possible erroneous
behaviour of a requester. Please refer to the security discussion in Section 6.4
where protocol specific requester-failures are discussed.
6.1.2 Security Assumptions
The protocol proposed in this chapter provides only a part of the whole
protocol stack. In this section we introduce assumptions on the security
properties of the used scenario and authorities.
We assume that all communication between requester and CA, as well
as communication between CA and RA, is encrypted and two-way authen-
ticated. Authentication between CA and RA is prerequisite to prevent that
non-authorised third parties are able to inject information into the RA’s
database.
A requester has to be authenticated and authorised before a CA grants
an Inter-Vehicle Communication certificate (IVC). Authorisation has to be
checked against an up-to-date revocation lists by the CA. The certificate
request of a vehicle that fails to correctly authenticate itself or whose autho-
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risation is revoked must be rejected. The case of a CA that fails to reject an
illegitimate certificate request is described as CA failure in Section 6.1.1.
Misuse of information by a communication-network provider, e. g., UMTS
or GSM provider, or other adversaries which overlook all network traffic is
out of scope of this work. This includes any kind of traffic analysis, high-
frequency fingerprinting, triangulation or similar techniques.
We assume further that no owner’s or vehicle’s identities or identifying
data is hidden in certificates and messages by the vehicles themselves.
The protocol introduced in Section 6.3 makes use of cryptographic func-
tions. In this chapter, it is assumed that the cryptographic algorithms used
are strong. Used hash functions are assumed to be secure in the random ora-
cle model. The reader is referred to the original works on these cryptographic
methods for further information3.
Furthermore, misbehaviour by the CA in form of denial of service is out
of the scope of this work. It is assumed that a sufficient number of CA is
available in every region at any given time.
6.1.3 Protocol Objectives
In this section objectives for certification in vehicular communication are de-
scribed. These objectives motivate the changes we introduced to the original
revocation protocol given in [62]. In the following we distinguish objectives
for certification, revocation and complexity.
Certification Objectives
Only an authorised CA must be able to sign valid certificates, and integrity
of certificates must be protected. A signing CA must be able to verify the
correctness of certain information that is included in the certificate without
seeing the whole certificate. One possibility for such data is the validity
time of a certificate. A CA must be able to verify that this data is indeed
embedded in the certificate and complies with given rules. This data must
not be removable or overruled by other data in the certificate.
The protocol must ensure that it is possible for any vehicle to verify that
no hidden identification is inserted by the CA. During certification, no infor-
mation that can be used by a CA to identify the certificate must be disclosed
to the CA. As a vehicle has to authenticate towards the CA (Section 6.1.2)
this would give the CA sufficient information to link a certificate to the vehi-
cle’s identity and thus counter our main privacy objective. More general, it
must be prevented that information sufficient to identify a certificate’s owner,
3An excellent overview on applied cryptography is given in [47].
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aside from the information within the revocation process, is disclosed to any
entity.
Explicitly, certification authorities must never be able to relate identifica-
tion of certificates to requester identification. Certificates must not contain
information which links them to other certificates of the same requester.
Revocation Objectives
The notion of revocation covers the whole process starting from the detec-
tion of malevolent messages to the revocation of an vehicle’s authorisation.
The process, as sketched in Chapter 3, includes Type-II anonymity revoca-
tion and revocation of the vehicle’s — respectively the vehicle’s owner’s —
authorisation to emit vehicular messages.
Certificate revocation often is a necessity in anonymous certification to
prevent perfect crimes [69]. This is especially true in vehicular communi-
cations [67]. Revocation in vehicular networks has been tackled in various
ways in different works [56, 23, 64]. If certification authorities are completely
trusted to not misuse their revocation powers, standard public key infras-
tructures, e. g., as described in [55], are a valid solution.
RA-Failure Prevention An RA-failures as described in Section 6.1.1, im-
plies the disclosure of information. Information disclosure, as opposed CA-
failures cannot be made undone. Therefore, it is critical to prevent them.
For this work we set the following objectives.
No single authority must be able to revoke a certificate. A certifica-
tion/revocation protocol should provide a choice of a minimum number t
of authorities that have to agree on the revocation of anonymity of a re-
quester/certificate. For any number of authorities less than t it must then
be impossible to do either Type-I or Type-II revocation (see Section 2.5).
Obviously, no onlooker must be able to revoke anonymity, meaning no
certificate or message must include sufficient information to identify the ve-
hicle.
Revocation Enforcement Revocation is prerequisite to isolation of rogue
vehicles. The main security attribute of an isolation protocol, the maximum
isolation time (see Section 2.6), depends on the complexity of the revocation
process. Thus, any revocation process should be guaranteed to succeed not
only in finite, but also short time.
The first method to revoke the authorisation of a vehicle is to limit the
validity time of certificates. Certificates should not be valid for an infinite
time interval. The main reason for this is the limited security of cryptographic
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key material. It has been prudent engineering practise to regularly change
keys, which are a crucial part of certificates.
A second reason, more specific to the vehicular scenario is to avoid the use
of certificate revocation lists (CRL). Revocation lists increase the complexity
of certificate validation. Verification is part of the strictly time-constrained
part of vehicular communication as has been described in Section 3. In
[56] it has also been discussed that timely distribution of revocation lists
in vehicular networks requires distribution through road-side infrastructure,
which may not always be available.
A certification protocol should allow for multiple means of revocation.
Revocation of certificates must be possible without distribution of certificate
revocation lists, which may be reserved for urgent cases. Revocation of au-
thorisation can be implemented at the certification authority and thus is not
as time critical, and revocation lists are reasonable here.
To ensure revocability of anonymity, each IVC certificate needs a revoca-
tion anchor. An revocation anchor is information encoded in the certificate
that allows for an authorised entity to derive the corresponding identity. As
certificates are only granted to authorised and authentic vehicles, informa-
tion gained during the certification process, denoted protocol trace, can be
linked to the identity of the vehicle and thus to the vehicle’s owner. It must
be prevented that revocation anchors can be removed from certificates.
A quorum of RA should be able to derive the vehicle’s identity from this
anchor, or conversely to recognise IVC certificates by vehicle identity. For
secure privacy protection only a sufficient quorum of RA must be able link
identity with certificates.
6.1.4 Complexity Objectives
It has been mentioned previously that the verification of IVC certificates
is very time constrained. The allowable latency for traffic-safety messages
ranges from 100 milliseconds to 1 second [14], with the most critical applica-
tions being those most strictly constrained.
Pseudonym changes are widely seen as the first and basic privacy en-
hancing method, which implies, that the certification process is executed
frequently. In the worst case, one certification process has to be undertaken
for every message sent. As certification can be undertaken independently
before current events make it necessary to send a message, it is not as time-
constrained as immediate IVC communication process. Further, certification
protocols should not use the low bandwidth and high noise channel that
probably will be used for inter-vehicle communication, but use dedicated
communication channels.
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Revocation processes are initiated if rogue vehicles are detected. Since re-
vocation ensures that attackers can be identified (and prosecuted if necessary)
the risk of an attacker can be assumed to be sufficient to reduce malicious
attacks to a minimum. Thus the major part of revocation is probably due
to vehicles with faulty sensors or OBU. Obviously there are no statistics on
systems not yet implemented. We assume that the number of vehicles whose
authorisation has to be revoked is not very large. To have some numbers
to estimate size of revocation lists and number of revocation processes, we
postulate, that no more than ten percent of all vehicles’ anonymity has to
be revoked within each year. The only limiting objective is the maximum
isolation time, given that an attacker may try a denial of service attack on
the revocation authorities, sufficient computer power has to be available at
the revocation authorities.
Considering these points, revocation is the least restricted protocol part
of the three mentioned parts. The focus of efficiency in IVC protocol designs
thus must be on the verification process. Considering that neither the road-
side infrastructure, nor the hardware inside the vehicle is currently decided
upon, any proposed protocol should be configurable with respect to complex-
ity of calculations. In Section 6.3 we propose a protocol modification that
allows to balance the complexity of different protocol parts.
6.1.5 Summary Prerequisites
Concluding this section, three classes of failures have been described based on
the entity that fails. Revocation authority (RA), certification authority (CA)
or requester. Each class of failures can be divided further. Figure 6.1 provides
an overview of the items considered herein.
In this work only unauthorised disclosure (Category 1.1) is considered
under RA-failures (Category 1). Category 1.1 is subdivided into the two
types of revocation defined in Section 2.5. Scenarios where a RA fails by
other means are not a responsibility of the protocols discussed herein and
thus not considered in the hierarchy.
CA-failures (Category 2) are subdivided into four different categories.
Categories 2.1 and 2.2 denote failures where a CA makes an erroneous de-
cision on the authorisation of the requester. Categories 2.3 and 2.4 denote
failures where the CA fails to detect misbehaviour of the requester.
A requester failure, with respect to privacy only, means that the requester
disclosed too much information. In the certification process, two failures can
be distinguished. Failing to blind information (Category 3.1) leads to, at
least, disclosure of information to the CA, i. e., the CA gains knowledge
which is sufficient to revoke the anonymity of the certificate. Including too
much information in the certificate (Category 3.2) leads to certificates that
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1 RA-failures
1. 1 unauthorised disclosure
1. 1. 1 Type-I revocation
1. 1. 2 Type-II revocation
2 CA-failures
2. 1 false deny certificate
2. 2 false grant certificate
2. 3 accept non-revocable certificate where. . .
2. 3. 1 Requester inserts fake S]′ : S]′ 6= S] in certificate
2. 3. 2 Requester uses false revocation encryption scheme (Dx, Ey)
2. 4 certificate with false validity interval
3 Requester-failure
3. 1 unblinded certification
3. 2 identifying information in certificate
3. 2. 1 unencrypted revocation anchor S]
Figure 6.1: Failure Tree Certification in Vehicular Networks.
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can be related to the vehicle (anonymity problem) or to other certificates of
the vehicle (unlinkability problem).
6.2 Protocol Concepts
During our work on SRAAC and T-SRAAC [23, 64] we introduced methods
to meet objectives similar to those discussed above. In this section, protocol
concepts are introduced that are intended to enhance privacy. All concepts
are driven by the idea to reduce the knowledge and privileges of individual
authorities.
6.2.1 Unpredictable Behaviour
Literature describes some methods to reduce linkability of position samples
from statistical inference. In [57] random silence periods and grouping of
vehicles are described and quantified using the notion of expected tracking
time. In [12] the effects of pseudonym changes are examined in terms of
attackers’ success ratio. Other concepts that have not been discussed yet
are unpredictable behavior, e. g., driving in circles or changing velocity. By
behaving contrary to the expected attackers’ behaviour, the attacker’s sta-
tistical information becomes useless to track this individual vehicle. Adding
noise to the positional data, e. g., randomising time information, can have
a similar effect. Communication protocol privacy techniques can be classi-
fied into methods that increase the overall entropy of the probabilities of the
(M2) edges and methods that hide an individual vehicle.
6.2.2 Separation of Privilege
In Section 6.1.1 we described the distinction between revocation and cer-
tification. This distinction already indicates a concept that has also been
described as separation of privilege by Papadimitratos et al. in [49]. Alter-
native names are separation of duty and separation of knowledge, which both
are correct in this context.
To implement the need-to-know principle in certification we have to sep-
arate the processes of revocation and certification. In practise, this means
that authorities that grant certificates, and authorities that are empowered
to link certificates to identities are institutionally separated.
The objective of this method is to reduce the “amount of trust” that has
to be put into a single institution. Without implementation of this principle
all power and knowledge is given to a single institution. Using separation of
duty, the public only has to entrust certification authorities (CA) with the
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verification of whether a vehicle is granted an pseudonymous certificate or
not. The CA is not able to relate that certificate to the vehicles identity.
In the example of anonymity revocation this concept can be implemented
even further. As a revocation authority (RA) is empowered to revoke ano-
nymity, and given the high misuse potential of this process, special checks
might be put in place to ensure that an RA is indeed trustworthy. Again
separation of privilege may be used to force multiple, separate entities to
collaborate during revocation processes. We refine this general concept into
the concept of Quorum-RA in Section 6.2.3.
6.2.3 Privacy Enhancing CA-Structures
In the following we describe an ideal communication structure for inter-
vehicle communication. Herein, vehicles that play the role of requesters of
certificates and senders of inter-vehicle communication messages (IVC mes-
sages) are distinguished from vehicles that are receiver of IVC messages.
Inter-vehicle communication certificates (IVC certificates) contain creden-
tials to authenticate IVC messages and are normally sent along with the
message. IVC certificates are signed by certification authorities (CA). IVC
certificates are pseudonymous and must not be linked to each other or to the
identity of the holder of the certificate. revocation authorities (RA) hold the
keys to identify vehicles given a valid IVC certificate.
Herein certification authorities are assumed to be organised hierarchically
by region as proposed in [48]. This spatial separation reduces the knowledge
(see Section 4.1) of single authorities. Observe Figure 6.2, only the CA
at the bottom are aware of the relation between different IVC certificates.
The higher layers of CA only authorise the bottom CA and do not grant IVC
certificates. Thus the CA in contact with privacy-critical information observe
only a defined spatial subspace. This concept of separation of knowledge is
one of the protocol concepts proposed in Section 6.2.2. This structure is
actually common in public key infrastructures.
Revocation authorities build a quorum that shares responsibility for re-
vocation in a defined set of certification regions. A defined subset of RA
within a quorum has to agree on revocation of a given certificate-user’s an-
onymity for revocation to become possible. This is depicted in the example
of Figure 6.2 as a connected set of RA, responsible for revocation within a
whole area, e. g., Germany.
There are different parameters that control the security and overhead of
the whole system. The partition of regions, the depth of a CA-hierachy, the
number of RA, and the number and validity time of IVC certificates held by
a single vehicle are some examples. Further parameters control attributes of
the used protocols. Security-relevant parameters will be introduced in the
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Figure 6.2: CA and RA spatial separation and separation of duty
following sections. Effects of these parameters will be discussed in Section 6.4.
In the following sections, different privacy-preserving certification struc-
tures and their effects on the unlinkability-model from Chapter 4 are dis-
cussed. This section extends our presentation in [24] and introduces addi-
tional privacy enhancing structures.
Quorum RA
In [64] we proposed a protocol that protects revocation from single points of
failure. This protocol forces certification authorities to collaborate to relate
a given certificate to a vehicle. This concept is denoted quorum-RA. Cer-
tificates and certification process must be constructed in a way that makes
revocation possible if a previously defined number of RA collaboratively re-
vokes the anonymity. This concept has been proposed as federated databases
in [27].
The general concept is visualised in Fig. 6.3. Each member of a quorum
RA is involved in the certification but only gets to know a share of the infor-
mation needed to identify the vehicle from a certificate. By acting together
(broken lines) a quorum of t = 3 of n = 5 RA can link certificate c and
vehicle v.
In terms of linkability graphs G from Section 4.1, introducing a quorum
of RA removes all (V ×C)-edges unless the attacker compromises a sufficient
number of certification authorities. Other relations in the graph would not
be concerned.
In a threat analysis, briefly, the costs for discovery of V ∼ C would
increase by the costs needed to compromise the necessary number of author-
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RA RA RA RA RA
v c
Figure 6.3: Quorum-RA Principle: The certification request is blinded. Cer-
tificate is signed blindly using magic-ink blind signatures. Revocation need
collaboration of t of n RA.
v
CA CA CA CA CA
? c
Figure 6.4: Vehicle-Selected CA: A vehicle changes not only the used certifi-
cates but as well the certification authority.
ities. These costs have to be calculated against the costs of implementing a
system with corresponding number of RA.
Vehicle-selected CA
Vehicle-selected CA is a certification structure aiming at reducing the number
of certificates that a single CA can link to the related certificate requester.
Vehicle-selected CA is the concept of letting the vehicle, as agent of its owner,
decide which CA is chosen for each independent certification. The principle
is depicted in Figure 6.4. The question mark beside the vehicle denotes the
place where the choice is made of which certification authority to use.
This principle has an effect similar to pseudonym changes, but affects cer-
tification protocols instead of message authentication protocols. Additional
to the free choice of the pseudonym to use, a vehicle gets to choose which CA
it uses. Provided a sufficient number of independent certification authorities
are available at the point of certification, a vehicle is able to control which
certificates each single CA is able to link to its identity.
Using graph terminology from Section 4.1, a passive attacker with the
knowledge of a (single) CA is able to relate only a small part of all messages
to a vehicle’s identity. In the linkability graph this means that the attacker
knows only a subset of relations V ∼ C. Thus, only part of a vehicle’s
trajectory is disclosed to any, potentially compromised, CA.
Requested certificates have to be used sensibly by vehicles, as otherwise
large parts of a trajectory would be disclosed to a single CA. Take the ex-
tremal cases as an example: first, a vehicle uses certificates granted from
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v
CA CA CA
c
Figure 6.5: Chained CA with three intermediates
different CA for each subsequent message. Secondly, a vehicle for some time
uses certificates granted by one authority and afterwards never again. The
view of a malicious CA on the first vehicle would be rather complete, with
respect to the general directions of that vehicle. It would though be rather
coarse and lack precision. For the second vehicle the malicious CA would
have a part of the vehicle’s trajectory with high precision, but no informa-
tion on the time before or after that period.
Chained CA
Chained CA is a concept that shall provide enhanced privacy by implement-
ing each certification process as chained communication over intermediate
authorities. Similar to mix networks (see [16]) a vehicle v selects a certifica-
tion path. A certificate is requested either through a series of communication
processes with the certification authorities or by an onion protocol without
interaction at every CA. This concept is depicted in Figure 6.5.
The general idea is that the vehicle authenticates itself only at the first
CA in the chain. At the last CA the certificate is completed and returned to
the requester. Each step is protected and authenticated by credentials from
the previous communication step. The objective is to prevent any CA from
observing more than two neighbours during a certification process. Therefore,
an attacker has to compromise all involved CA to map one certificate to the
corresponding vehicle identity.
In terms of an linkability graph, an attacker with authority knowledge
of a single CA knows only a single step of the certification chain. Provided
the protocol is secure this leaves the attacker with no hint as to whether a
certificate c is related to vehicle v.
The main problem of this concept lies in the design of the protocol, which
involves creation of multiple cryptographic keys for temporary authentica-
tion, anonymous network communication to prevent out-of-band identifica-
tion and various issues concerning the data included in the certificate itself.
This is the main reason why we have settled for the much simpler concepts
of hierarchical CA, separation of knowledge and quorum-CA in our solution.
This concept therefore is not used in this work.
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Hierachical CA
A hierarchical CA is related to and can be combined with the vehicle-selected
CA. Actually, the hierarchy of identity authorities and certification author-
ities used in the scenario in Chapter 3 already is an instance of this very
principle.
The idea is depicted clearly in Figure 6.2. Various layers of CA are
introduced. Only the lowest layer actually grants IVC certificates to vehicles,
the upper layers are authorisation layers that authorise the signature keys of
the lower CA. This is actually the very same as a public-key infrastructure.
In terms of linkability graphs, this scheme works like the vehicle-selected
CA from Section 6.2.3. Each CA knows only a subset of vehicle-certificate
links. In the hierarchical CA structure, the knowledge of each CA is restricted
to a defined spatial area. If no further measures are taken, each CA would
have a complete view of the movements within its area, given it can get hold
of the vehicular communication.
6.3 Certification Protocol
In this section we describe, a certification protocol using partially blinded
signatures with secure anonymity revocation, which is suitable for use in ve-
hicular communication scenarios. The protocol allows for implementation
of the privacy enhancing principles separation of duty, hierarchical CA, and
quorum-RA. Besides the implementation of these principles the design fo-
cusses on a large number of parameters that control complexity and security
of different parts of the protocol. The idea is to provide a protocol that can
be adapted to a wide range of privacy levels.
We combine blind signatures with “cut-and-choose” by Stadler, Piveteau
and Camenisch [62] with Shared RSA proposed by Boneh and Franklin [9].
Fair blind signatures provide an approach that can be easily extended to allow
for partially blinded signatures and shared key cryptography. The partially
blinding technique provides the means for verification of certain attributes of
a certificate by the CA. Shared key cryptography implements a Quorum-RA.
Revocation is ensured by forcing the requester to include data that identi-
fies a distinguished certification process into the certificate. Unlinkability of
the certificate is ensured by blinding identifying parts during the whole certi-
fication process. Authenticity is ensured by encapsulation of the whole com-
munication in an authenticated tunnel, e. g., two-way-authenticated Trans-
port Layer Secutity (TLS).
The authenticated tunnel is not described here. We assume that every
communication described in the following is authenticated and encrypted. A
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EyR(S])
PK
[t, t′]
s
encrypted revocation anchor
(readable by RA only)
pseudonym/public key
(blinded to CA)
validity time
(verified by CA)
signature (created by CA)
Figure 6.6: IVC Certificate Structure
requester has authenticated itself to the CA prior to the protocol below. The
whole communication is authentic, integrity-protected and confidential.
An IVC certificate, as depicted in Figure 6.6 consists of an encrypted
revocation anchor S], a public key PK and further attributes [t, t′] which
can be verified by the CA, as well as a cryptographic signature s over the
whole certificate. The revocation anchor is an identity anchor usable by
revocation authorities that are able to decrypt it. The public key is used
as a pseudonym for IVC. Within the remaining attributes, information like
“validity time” or distinct usage information could be encoded. Obviously
the signature can be verified using the corresponding public key of the CA
which is assumed to be known to all vehicles concerned.
6.3.1 Partially-Blinded Certification Protocol
The following certification protocol is a modification of fair blind signatures
with “cut-and-choose” as proposed in [62]. Two modifications are introduced:
First, blind signatures are turned into partially blind signatures. Second,
the protocol is extended by two security parameters that control the cut-
and-choose algorithm and the signature selection. This gives us flexibility to
fine-tune the tradeoff between security and complexity. The original protocol
does not offer this flexibility which leads to certificate verification that is too
costly for use in vehicular communication.
The idea behind partially blinded signatures is that the CA is able to ver-
ify some defined certificate parameters, e. g., the validity time interval or the
purpose of the certificate, while the vehicle still controls these parameters.
The CA has to ensure that the vehicle is not provided with an unlimited cer-
tificate and that the revocation anchor is included in the blinded certificate.
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The vehicle wants to be assured that the CA is not inserting some identify-
ing data into the certificate. (See Section 4.3 for a discussion of “identifying
data”.)
The complete protocol is shown in Figure 6.7 with the differences to the
Stadler-protocol marked by boxes. The protocol uses parameters K, k, and
l for controlling the number of certificate parts to be created, inspected and
signed. The requester generates K certificate parts by encrypting and ran-
domising the blinded part of the certificate. He then creates randomised
hashes of the randomised revocation anchor. Here randomising denotes
the concatenation/addition of random numbers to otherwise low-entropy or
known data.
The CA then chooses a subset of k certificate parts for inspection. The
random values corresponding to these parts are revealed and the CA verifies
that the parts contain the revocation anchor and that the unblinded certifi-
cate part co is valid and included in these parts. This verification technique
is called cut-and-choose4.
After successful inspection, the CA signs l of the non-inspected certificate
parts. These parts are revealed to the requester which can then calculate
and build the signed certificate from this signature. The parameter l linearly
influences the complexity of signature verification. The this parameter allows
to chose between security of the certification and the complexity of certificate
verification.
After a protocol run, the requester holds a valid certificate
c = (cb||co, s, T = {αi, vi : i ∈ S}), (6.1)
signed with the CA’s private signing key d. Where cb denotes data blinded to
the CA, co denoted data disclosed to the CA, s denotes the signature and T
a set of tuples of blinding factors αi, βi and the encrypted revocation anchor
S].
The CA itself has gained no knowledge from the process except a protocol
trace represented by the tuple
(RID, S], co, {m˜i,S, L, {(ri, ui, βi) : i /∈ S}, s˜).
Which means the CA knows the vehicles identification RID from the encap-
sulating authentication, the revocation anchor S], the content of the revealed
parts (mi, i /∈ S) and the blinded parts (mi, i ∈ S) themselves.
The elements ui : i ∈ L and the revocation anchor S] are sent securely
to the revocation authorities. Values ui are cipher-texts encrypted with the
4Literature analysing cut-and-choose is interestingly sparse, although, it might be con-
sidered the standard technique in blind signatures.
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Requester Cert. Authority
prior knowledge:
K, k security parameters
RID requester ID
cb blind data S] revocation anchor
co open data
S]←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
for i in 1, . . . , K do:
ri ∈R Z
αi, βi ∈R R
ui := EyR(cb ||αi) ||co
vi := EyR(S] || βi)
m˜i := r
e
iH(ui || vi) (modn)
{m˜i : 1 ≤ i ≤ K}−−−−−−−−−−−−→
select S ⊆ {1, . . . , K}
S←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
check if |S| = K − k
{(ri, ui, βi) : i /∈ S}−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
for i /∈ S
verify
m˜i ≡ reiH(ui||vi)(mod n)
if all are true:
select L ⊆ S , |L| = l
s˜ := (
∏
i∈ L
m˜i)
d(modn)
s˜←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
s := s˜/
∏
i∈ L
ri
signature: (cb, co, s, T ) send to RA:
T = {(αi, vi) : i ∈ L } S], {ui : i ∈ L }, RID
Figure 6.7: ”Cut-and-Choose” Fair Partially-Blind Signatures. Adapted
from [61]. Changes to the protocol marked by boxes.
public revocation key yR. Thus, no information on cb can be gained from the
values as long as the used encryption is secure.
A receiver of an inter-vehicle message signed with the private key c−1
104
6.3. CERTIFICATION PROTOCOL
corresponding to the certificate c has to verify that the certificate is valid.
He does so by verifying that
se ≡
∏
(α,v)∈T
H(EαyR(cb)||co) (modn) (6.2)
and that the validity date in co is good.
The complexity of different protocol parts depends on protocol param-
eters K, k, and l. Furthermore, security of the protocol depends on these
parameters as well. The effects on security and complexity of the described
protocol parameters are discussed in detail in Section 5.7.
6.3.2 Quorum-Protected Revocation Protocol
It might be necessary to revoke the certificates associated with a given
vehicle. Consider that vehicles might malfunction or could be used for
communication-based traffic manipulations (see Chapter 3). In such circum-
stances it must be possible to revoke the anonymity of a certificate holder to
a) prevent issuance of new certificates and b) to revoke all IVC certificates
of that vehicle.
Step a) Revocation of anonymity is possible by way of the revocation
anchor S] encrypted in vi in each certificate. This operation is denoted
Type-II Revocation in [62] and is based solely on knowledge of the private
revocation key xR. For increased privacy protection, it is suggested that
xR is shared and jointly generated by more than one revocation authority
(RA) to prevent misuse. As argued in Section 6.1, anonymity revocation
is a critical operation susceptible to single points of failure. Revocation is
disclosure of information which cannot be reversed. In the following, we will
briefly summarise the joined computation with shared keys as described in
[9].
Step b), denoted Type-I Revocation, is done by way of the stored values
S], {ui}, RID. The certificate is identifiable by way of cb encrypted in ui and
can be recovered by knowledge of the revocation key xR. We will not describe
this part here because it runs along the same lines as Step a).
Assuming there exists an algorithm for joint decryption D using a shared
private key xR ≡
∑k
i=1 xi mod ϕ(N), where the shares xi are distributed
over k revocation authorities. Then, the objective of anonymity revocation
is to identify the certification process in which a given certificate (cb, co, s, T )
was created. The members of a Quorum-RA collaborate in joint asymmet-
ric decryption DxR on the encrypted revocation anchors vi in T of a given
certificate.
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By deciphering all vi = EyR(S] || βi) in T the RA gets to know a set
rII = {DxR(vi) : (αi, vi) ∈ T } . (6.3)
If certificate is valid values cb within rII are equal. The RA decrypt vi by first
truncating co off from the end of vi, applying joint decryption and truncating
the embedded α, which is summarised above as function DxR .
The RA-quorum, knowing (S], co, {m˜i,S, {(ri, ui, βi) : i /∈ S}, s˜) from the
CA, can now find some DxR(vi) = S]||βi. S] then identifies a certification
protocol trace. In collaboration with the signing CA, this reveals the identity
of the requester.
In Appendix C protocols for distributed RSA, usable to decryptEyR(cb||α)
during a revocation process. It has been introduced by Boneh in [9].
6.4 Security Discussion
In this section, some attacks on the certification protocol described above
are discussed. In the following the three classes of attack as defined in Sec-
tion 6.1.3 are analysed. Attacks against authorisation mean that an attacker
is able to gain an IVC certificate without being entitled, or to otherwise
inject messages in the communication network that are accepted by other
participants. Attacks on privacy denote any means to gain knowledge of
the relation between certificates and vehicles without being authorised. Cir-
cumvention of revocation describes security of the protocol with respect to
preventing an authorised requester from preventing revocation.
6.4.1 Authorisation Attacks
As mentioned before, IVC certificates are needed to participate in inter-
vehicular communication insofar as messages are not accepted by vehicles if
they are not authenticated by valid credentials. This is necessary to prevent
injection of harmful IVC messages. Assuming that the signature algorithm is
used correctly, an attacker has to get hold of valid IVC certificates to inject
messages.
CA are trusted to verify the authenticity and permissions of a requester.
An untrustworthy CA is able to sign any certificate and to pass arbitrary
identifications to the RA. Thus a CA, or persons employed at the CA, are
able to create certificates that have not been requested.
Furthermore, it is possible for a certification authority to generate cer-
tificates and bind them to arbitrary, known vehicle identifiers. A CA fakes
a protocol run and sends (S], ui ∈ L,RID) with an arbitrary RID to the
revocation authorities. The CA then is able to take part in the network as if
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it is, from the revocation authorities’ point-of-view, the requester RID. This
could be used by an untrustworthy CA to falsely accuse arbitrary vehicles.
This problem is basically an information injection problem. A certifica-
tion authority is able to inject arbitrary information into the RA storage.
There are multiple ways to work around this problem: foe example, intro-
duction of a blinded identity statement in the certificate, encrypted again
with the revocation key, introduction of peer-control, or inclusion of proofs
of freshness of the data sent to the RA. Development of these protocols must
be omitted here for the sake of keeping this work focused.
If an unauthorised requester requires a certificate, he needs to show valid
credentials to the CA or to gain a valid certificate from another requester.
This means the attacker either has to collaborate with another requester or
to break the authentication scheme. We assume that the latter is not feasible
in practise.
Multiple requesters might cooperate, probably by manipulating the ve-
hicles OBU, to share certificates. Essentially, this would provide plausible
deniability for malicious inter-vehicle communication. The protocol itself
provides no protection against this. Trusted computing technology has al-
ready been discussed for use in this context, and the Trusted Platform Model
has been proposed for software protection in general [58]. Trusted computing
could well be used to prevent untrusted hard- or software to handle certifi-
cates. However, standard TPM Hardware may still be too inefficient to be
used in vehicular communication [64].
The above attacks lead to unauthorised entities being able to inject mes-
sages into the inter-vehicle communication. Without a valid certificate, an
attacker has to break the signature scheme used to sign the messages, which
is out of scope of this work.
6.4.2 Attacks on Privacy
The main distinguishing feature of our approach is the focus on privacy
of certificate-requesters. As described in Section 6.1, single authorities in
general are considered potential attackers. Obviously, external entities must
be considered as well.
A privacy attack in this context is any method for deriving information
on the relation between certificates and vehicles without being authorised to
do so. The only authorised way is through revocation authorities (RA).
Unauthorised Anonymity Revocation
Assuming that the encryption mechanism that is used to encrypt revocation
anchors is secure, it is sufficient to discuss attacks by certification authorities.
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Because, aside from RA, CA have the most information potentially usable
for anonymity revocation, thus, in the following, the case of an malicious CA
or an attacker with CA knowledge is analysed. If a certification authority
is not able to link a given certificate c = (cb, co, s, T ), T = {(a, v)} to an
vehicle’s identity, it is at least as difficult as for an external attacker.
A malevolent CA, or employee at a CA, might have implemented means
to store protocol traces and might gain access to all information disclosed to
the CA. A CA knows, for all certificates it signed, a protocol trace s consisting
of information
s = ({m˜i : 1 ≤ i ≤ K}, {(ri, ui, βi), i /∈ S}, co, S], RID),
i. e., all blinded parts of the certificate m˜i, the unblinded elements from the
verification step (ri, ui, βi), the public part of the certificate co, the related
revocation anchor S] and requester identity RID known from authentication.
Under the assumption that certificate c has been signed by a CA itself,
this CA knows that one of the stored protocol traces matches it. But assum-
ing that blinding is secure, the CA cannot directly determine which trace is
related to c. In the following, unlinkability of individual values in the trace
is discussed.
Values {(ri, ui, βi), i /∈ S} are not included in the certificates and thus
provide no information on relations between certificates. The vehicle’s iden-
tity RID is, as well, not included in the certificate. Information from {m˜i :
1 ≤ i ≤ K} has been incorporated in the certificate, but assuming that ri
has been selected uniformly at random, no relations can be drawn between
m˜i and c.
The revocation anchor S] is encrypted in each vi from c and is included
in the protocol trace. The malicious certification authority may either break
the encryption of vi, or the CA may try to encode each S] from its stored
traces using the known encryption key yR and compare the result with each vi
in the certificate. This would involve correctly guessing the value of βi which
is concatenated to S] before encryption. Assuming that the used encryption
scheme is secure, the minimal complexity is that of guessing βi or guessing
xR. Note that a CA is able to run a known plaintext attack against xR
because some βi are revealed during each certification.
Concluding that the attacks described above are not feasible with CA-
knowledge, this leaves the knowledge of the open,i. e., not blinded during
certification, certificate part co, both available to the CA in stored traces and
the certificate.
The anonymity set Ac of an certificate c with respect to a set of certifica-
tion protocol traces S consists of all possible requester identities5 contained
5Obviously there is a bijection between S and all granted certificates.
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Figure 6.8: Validity Time Granularity/Encoding Scheme
in a trace s ∈ S where the open data in that trace c′o ∈ s equals the open
data of the certificate co ∈ c,
Ac(S) := {RID : c′o ∈ s ∈ S, co ∈ c, co = c′o}.
Cardinality of Ac(S) depends on the number of traces that contain values
of c′o that are equal to co. For any given certificate c, the anonymity set
size represents an measure of the anonymity6 of the requester using this
certificate. The distribution of the anonymity-set-size of all certificates from
each requester, provides an expectation of anonymity of the system. This
distribution is commanded by the distribution of open data values in the
requested certificates.
As the requester chooses the actual value for co, the CA cannot influence
this distribution directly, e. g., for marking a certain requester by assigning
distinguishable values. Assuming that that requesters have no interest in
being distinguishable, their choice for co would be as uniform as possible.
Assuming for simplicity reasons that the number of needed certificates is
uniformly distributed over time and equal for all requesters, then the only
parameter that controls |Ac| is the granularity of the data format, i. e., the
number of different values that can be assigned within a certain period of
time.
Assuming for simplicity, that co contains only the validity dates for the
certificate. Other contents are excluded here, but influence the granularity
in a similar way. The following data model as depicted in Figure 6.8 can be
used. Under the assumption that co is represented by a fixed length data
field, the encoding restricts the notion of time to a given epoch starting
with tA and ending with tΩ. Validity time is thus represented at an interval
starting at tv with length nv∆, with ∆ being the length of a single time unit.
Denoting the number of time-points, i. e., possible values for tv, as
N = (tΩ − tA)/∆, the number of all possible time intervals is the sum of
all numbers from one to N , i. e., (N(N + 1))/2, which is in O(N2).
For an given cardinality of S, the expected size of the anonymity set
is directly related to the number of possible time intervals. From a privacy
6See Section 5.4.1 for different anonymity measures.
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point of view, it is thus useful to reduce the number of possible time intervals.
This may be done by reducing the space of either tv or nv. In the vehicular
scenario, it might be sensible to allow for only one possible interval length
nv because IVC certificates are all used in the same manner.
It is rather obvious that the identity of an vehicle is compromised if
it is the only requester of certificates with certain distinguishable co. The
optimum (global) anonymity is provided by a uniform distribution, similar
to the PROB-channel optimum distribution of delay time developed in [66].
The ability of a CA to match an observed certificate is equal, assuming
that the cryptographic concepts used are sound, to the ability of an CA to
single out a distinguishable open certificate value co. As the requester pro-
duces this date, the CA can only indirectly — by way of denying certification
— manipulate the distribution of co values. The other remaining problems
are similar to problems known from mix-networks [18] with the CA providing
a single-node mix-network.
6.4.3 Circumvent Revocation
A malicious requester may try to inject an S] into the certificate that is differ-
ent from the one provided by the CA. His objective is to obtain a certificate
that cannot be linked to the certification process. In this section we discuss
the effects of protocol parameters K, k, and l on the success probability of
such an attacker.
In the original cut-and-choose protocol [61] by Stadler, only one protocol
parameter is used. The Stadler-scheme is equal to our protocol with param-
eters K = 2k and l = K − k. The security parameters K and k control the
probability with which a cheating requester is detected in the cut-and-choose
inspection phase. In the original Stadler scheme, this probability grows ex-
ponentially with
(
2k
k
)−1 ≈ 2−2k√pik.
In the protocol variant described above, the third parameter l controls
how many certificate parts are selected into the signature. Parameter l is a
lower bound for na,the number of certification parts an attacker manipulates
in order to gain a non-revocable certificate. In Figure 6.9, the involved pa-
rameters are depicted on a scale from zero to K. One may note that there
is a gap between l and K − k which is area of indecision where certification
parts are neither inspected nor included in the certificate. In the following,
it will also be shown that the optimum for prevention of requester-cheating
is to reduce this gap to zero.
A cheating requester — the attacker — provides blinded certificate parts
m˜1, . . . , m˜k, ˜mk+1, . . . , m˜K . Instead of signing all m˜i with i /∈ S, the CA
chooses only l ≤ |S| = K − k elements and signs only them. To create an
unrevocable certificate, the attacker has correctly guess exactly those values
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Figure 6.9: Protocol parameters K, k, l, and number of faked certification
parts na. (Ordered, for simplicity reasons, on the interval [0, K].)
S] that are included in this signature. All values S] that are checked by the
CA have to be unmodified. He has to guess correctly, and chooses values in
na : l ≤ na ≤ K − l certificate parts m˜i that he modifies.
The protocol parameters in Figure 6.9 lead directly to the definition of
possible outcomes of a protocol run. The result of a requester-cheating at-
tempt may either be detection of the attempt (interval [K−k,K]), successful
reception of a faked certificate (interval [0, l]) or reception of a broken cer-
tificate (interval [0, na], excluding [0, l]). These three outcomes are produced
by the two distinguished phases, detection and signature, of the protocol.
A
B
¬B
¬A
attacker success
undecided
attacker detected
Figure 6.10: Event tree for a protocol run with cheating requester.
In Figure 6.10, the protocol’s outcome is modelled as stochastic, two-
phase experiment. Event A denotes success of an attacker in the first phase,
where a cheating requester is not detected in the k out of K “Cut-and-
Choose”-scheme. B denotes the event where an attacker guessed n ≥ l
certificate parts correctly, i. e., that the received certificate contains only
faked parts. From Figure 6.10, one can see that B or ¬B can only occur if A
has happened, because in the case of detection — event ¬A — the protocol
is stopped and no certificate is issued.
Event A ∩ B describes that a cheating requester has not been detected
(Event A) and has received a certificate that consists solely of faked m˜i
(Event B). Event A ∩ ¬B describes that a cheating requester has not been
detected but has received a certificate where faked and non-faked m˜i have
been included, which renders the certificate useless.
The probability of an attacker to successfully receive a non-revocable cer-
tificate is the product of the independent probabilities of not being detected
by the cut-and-choose detection and having the CA choose only modified m˜i
into the certificate.
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The original protocol in [61] analyses the success probability of an attacker
for the case k = dK/2e. This case provides the optimum detection rate with
l = K − k. In the following, the general case of free parameter choice is
analysed to support complexity trade-off.
Cheating Probabilities
The probability of a cheating requester being detected is denoted P (A).
The probability of a successfully faked certificate, conditioned on A, denoted
P (B|A) can be modelled by a hyper-geometric probability distribution h7,
P (A) = h(0|K,n, k) (6.4)
P (B|A) = h(l|K − k, n, l) (6.5)
Event B is conditioned on A because a cheating requester first has to
avoid detection before the certificate parts for the signature are tried.
The event that a cheating requester receives a completely faked certificate,
without being previously detected, in a single protocol run is denoted p.succ
and given by P (A∩B) By applying the definition of conditional probability
and Equations (6.4) and (6.5), we have
p.succ(K, k, n, l) :=P (A ∩B)
=P (B|A)P (A)
=
(
n
l
)(
K−k−n
l−l
)(
K−k
l
) · (n0)(K−nk−0 )(
K
k
)
=
n!(K − n)!(K − k − l)!
K!(n− l)!(K − k − n)! .
(6.6)
Best-na Attack Strategy
Remember that the value of na is determined by the attacker. Values of K,
k, and l are given by the system, i. e., the certification and revocation au-
thorities. To reflect this, it is assumed that the attacker follows an optimum
strategy. The optimum choice for na, considering p.succ, is denoted na.max
and — for given K, k and l — provided by
na.max(K, k, l) := n
′
a with p.succ(K, k, n
′
a, l) ≥ p.succ(K, k, na, l),
for all na : K − k ≥ na ≥ l.
(6.7)
7With h(k|N,M,n) = (
M
k )(
N−M
n−k )
(Nn)
, where k is the number of successes, N is the popu-
lation size, M is the number of element with the targeted property, and n is the sample
size.
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Figure 6.11: Number of surplus of modified S]: na.max(K, k, l) − l for the
optimum choice na = na.max(K, k, l) given K ∈ {20, 60, 1600, 1000}, k =
K/2.
In Figure 6.11, the difference between l and na.max for K = 80, k = K/2.
The shape becomes more precise for larger values of K as the number of
possible values for l grows. Interestingly the shape is not symmetric to any
parallel of the y-axis but resembles a slightly skewed inverse parabola.
This shape is the result of two opposed incentives. As the probability for
a valid certificate (Event B) increases with a larger choice for na an attacker
is inclined to maximise na. This on the other hand increases the probability
of detection, which provides an incentive for reducing na. In the following,
it is assumed that an attacker optimises na for the maximum probability for
success in a single certification attempt and chooses na = na.max, unless
explicitly noted otherwise.
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Attacker Success/Detection Probability
We refer to one single run of the certification protocol as round. An attacker,
who is neither detected, nor successful in a round (event in A∩ 6 B) could
try as many rounds, until he is detected (event in 6 A) or receives a valid
certificate with modified revocation anchors (event in A ∩ B). Assume that
one success is sufficient for the attacker. Likewise one detection is sufficient
to stop further attacks. The question at hand is; what is the probability
that an attacker has at least one successful round before he is detected? And
what is the probability of an attacker being detected (at least once) before
he is successful?
The probability of an attacker having exactly one success in the i-th
round, denoted p.si, is modelled by a geometric probability distribution and
calculated as follows:
p.si(i,K, k, na, l) = (P (¬B ∩ A))i−1P (B ∩ A)
= (h(0|K,na, k)(1− h(l|k, na, l)))i−1h(0|K,na, k)h(l|k, na, l)
= h(0|K,na, k)i(1− h(l|k, na, l))i−1h(l|k, na, l).
(6.8)
The other case, where a cheating requester is detected in the i-th round
without previously being successful, is denoted by the probability mass func-
tion p.di defined as:
p.di(i,K, k, n, l) = P (¬A) (P (¬B ∩ A))i−1
= P (¬A) (P (¬B|A)P (A))i−1
= (1− h(0|K,n, k)) ((1− h(l|k, n, l))h(0|K,n, k))i−1 .
(6.9)
The probability of a cheating requester to be successful before he is de-
tected up to the i-th round is the cumulative geometric probability distribu-
tion P.s. The opposite, the probability to be detected before success up to
the i-round is given by P.d. The probability that neither event has occurred,
the indecisive event, is given by the inverse probability of the sum of P.s and
P.d.
P.s(X ≤ i) =
i∑
j=1
p.si(j,K, k, n, l) (6.10)
P.d(X ≤ i) =
i∑
j=1
p.di(j,K, k, n, l) (6.11)
P.o(X ≤ i) = 1− (P.det+ P.succ) (6.12)
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This finally leads to the question that is crucial for optimisation of the
certificate validation time: How does l influence the success probability and
risk of an attacker? For what values of K, k and l does sufficient security
follow for the application? As P.s, P.d, and P.o are monotonous, the answer
is the bound of P.s, P.d, and P.o for i→∞.
Because we assume that in the undecided case A∪ 6 B the attacker tries
a new round, and because of monotony, the bounds can be interpreted as
the final probability of success, respective detection, for the cut-and-choose
scheme. With probability limi→∞ P.s the cheating requester is successful
without being previously detected. With probability limi→∞ P.d a CA detects
a cheating requester before he is successful.
lim
i→∞
P.s = lim
i→∞
i∑
j=1
p.si
= lim
i→∞
i∑
j=1
P (B ∩ A)(P (¬B ∩ A))j−1
=
P (B ∩ A)
1− P (¬B ∩ A)
=
P (B|A)P (A)
1− P (A) + P (B|A)P (A)
The limit limi→∞ P.s provides us with the information about the overall
attacker success probability that is needed to calculate the trade-off between
complexity and security in choosing K, k and n.
lim
i→∞
P.d = lim
i→∞
i∑
j=1
p.di
= lim
i→∞
i∑
j=1
P (¬A)(P ((¬B) ∩ A))j−1
=
P (¬A)
1− P (¬B ∩ A)
=
1− P (A)
1− P (A) + P (B|A)P (A)
(6.13)
The limit limi→∞ P.d provides the overall probability for the risk an at-
tacker runs of being detected before gaining a faked certificate. As before,
this allows for the protocol to be tuned to a given scenario.
115
CHAPTER 6. ANONYMOUS CERTIFICATION
One very interesting case is the probability for an attacker never being
detected and never gaining a valid certificate. This is described by the limit
limi→∞ P.0.
lim
i→∞
P.o = lim
i→∞
1− (P.d+ P.s)
= 1− P (¬A) + P (B ∩ A)
1− P (¬B ∩ A)
= 1− 1− P (A) + P (A)P (B|A)
1− P (A) + P (A)P (B|A)
= 0
(6.14)
Summarising, we define functions defined on the domains of K, k, na, and
l as the limits of P.s, P.d, and P.o w. r. t. i→∞ as follows:
P.succ(K, k, na, l) := lim
i→∞
P.s(X ≤ i) (6.15)
=
P (B|A)P (A)
1− P (A) + P (B|A)P (A) (6.16)
P.det(K, k, na, l) := lim
i→∞
P.d(X ≤ i) (6.17)
=
1− P (A)
1− P (A) + P (B|A)P (A) (6.18)
P.0(K, k, na, l) := lim
i→∞
P.o(X ≤ i) (6.19)
= 0. (6.20)
The limit above shows that the probability of an attacker being neither
detected nor successful converges to zero. The success or detection prob-
abilities depend solely on the choice of K, k, n, and l which now can be
balanced to the complexity of certification, verification and security against
certificates with faked revocation anchors.
Analysis of Success Probability
The bounds for i→∞ provide the means for finding optimal values for K, k,
and l to balance security and complexity. The value for na is determined by
the attacker, thus in the following the optimum attacker na.max is chosen.
In [61] k = K/2, l = k has been chosen, with the recommendation to
set K ≥ 20 to achieve sufficient security. These parameters are not usable
in the vehicular scenario described in Chapter 3, mostly because message
verification has to be very fast. Thus, the objective here is to reduce l while
keeping a sufficient level of security against cheating requesters.
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What is a sufficient level of security to prevent manipulation of revocation
anchors? Assuming that communication with a CA is considered authenti-
cated and integrity protected, false revocation anchors can only be explained
by very serious defects in critical components of the vehicle’s computer or ac-
tive manipulation by the owner. Thus, it can be assumed by the authorities,
that manipulations are most probably made with the intention of avoiding
prosecution. Faked revocation anchors are a serious offence and we assume
that authorities take action upon detection. Detection of a cheating requester
in the vehicular scenario should have at least the effect, that the requester’s
vehicle is denied any certificates in the future.
Keeping in mind the serious consequences of detected cheating in a cer-
tificate request, we assume that a cheating requester has completely lost the
game once he has been detected. Evading prosecution would require sufficient
measures for hiding the owner’s identity during registration of the vehicle,
with every vehicle involved in the production of a single non-revocable cer-
tificate. Considering the physical components in the cheating procedure,
we assume that attacker success probabilities below 10−5 provide sufficient
security levels. The expectation for the attacker to receive his first usable
certificate is after 105 tries. This means the attacker must also provide the
resources for that many vehicles and identities, while facing the risk of being
caught8.
Regarding above assumptions, we first examine k = K/2-schemes with
the intention of finding a minimum l that is secure. In Figur 6.12 success
probabilities and attack strategies as functions of l are plotted for two set-
tings of K. In Figure 6.13(a) and Figure 6.13(c) graphs of success probabil-
ities P.succ are shown for (a) K = 20 and (c) K = 80. The graph in (a)
reaches 10−5 only for maximum values of l. The graph in (c) is at probability
2.2610−06 for l = 4. But considering the transfer of 80 certificate parts for
each certificate, this solution seems unusable.
The curves in Figure 6.13(a) and Figure 6.13(c) are rather smooth and
strictly monotonously falling.
Success probabilities plotted as function of k are not similarly monotonous.
Observe Figure 6.13(a) parallel to Figure 6.13(b) and Figure 6.13(c) paral-
lel to Figure 6.13(d). One may recognise that the “jumps” in the success-
probability-graphs correspond to jumps in the choice of na.max plotted over
k.
If plottet over k, P.succ behaves non-monotonous as depicted in Fig-
ure 6.13(a) and Figure 6.13(c). As P.succ is, for constant na monotonous,
8It can further be assumed that authorities will realise much further that someone is
systematically gaming the system and actively begin to search for the attacker, increasing
the difficulty of escaping prosecution. A the discussion about the required security level
is beyond the scope of this work, we stop at this point.
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Figure 6.12: Logarithmic plots of P.succ(K, k, na, l) with constant k = K/2.
the local spikes in P.succ are caused by changes in na.max.
Having considered the behaviour of P.succ over k and l individually, we
now take a look at the whole picture to show the minimum of the attacker’s
success probability over the two main security parameters k and l. In Fig-
ure 6.14, the cheating requester’s success probability is plotted over k and l
for K = 20.
Figure 6.14 shows the lowest attacker success probability for parameters
k and l is along the line k + l = K. The minimum obviously is found in the
middle of that line at l = k, which coincides with the choice of values in the
protocol scheme by Stadler.
But the objective here is not to find the global maximum, but to balance
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Figure 6.13: Logarithmic plot of P.succ with l = 1, K ∈ {20, 80}, n = n −
max. The sawtooth-shape of P.succ is correlated to na.max over k.
security and complexity of certificate verification. The next step towards
this goal is finding the optimum by considering only values of k and l with
k + l = K. In Figure 6.15, graphs for K = 20 and K = 80 are depicted. For
K = 20 it is possible to reach 10−5 with approximately 5 ≤ k ≤ 15.
Considering that choices of k and l are best if k + l = K and that com-
plexity constraints at the verification we require a low value for l. Although
the certification process is not as constraint as the verification process, we
also want to achieve a reasonable low value for K, while meeting the security
requirement in terms of low P.succ.
In Figure 6.16, graphs for l ∈ {1, . . . , 5} are plotted overK ∈ {10, . . . , 180}.
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kl
P.succ
K=20, n=n.max
Figure 6.14: P.succ plotted over l and k. (1 ≤ l, k ≤ 19, n = na.max(K, k, l))
For complexity reasons, solutions have to be found within this space if they
exist at all. One may observe that the curves for l ∈ {1, 2} do not fall below
10−5 in this domain. For l = 3, sufficient security is reached with K ≥ 90,
for l = 4 it is K ≥ 45 and for l = 5 it is K ≥ 30.
Finally, a conclusion is reached as we can now examine the minimum
K (w. r. t. to l) and minimum l (w. r. t. to K) that ensure a defined
security level (aka. attacker success probability), given that l + k = K. In
Figure 6.17, we plot minimum values for parameters l and K that provide
P.succ ≤ 10−5. In Figure 6.17(a) minimum values of l for P.succ ≤ 10−5 are
plotted over K ∈ {2, . . . , 180}. Similarly in Figure 6.17(b) minimum values
of K for P.succ ≤ 10−5 are plotted over l ∈ {1, . . . , 179}. The obvious sweet
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Figure 6.15: P.succ for l = K − k, n = na.max.
spot is found in the right graph at the bottom of the plotted wedge where
both K and l have relatively small values.
In this section, a thorough analysis of the cut-and-choose algorithm has
been provided, with emphasis on unrestricted parameter choice. Obviously, a
stochastic method like cut-and-choose will always leave a chance for error, es-
pecially as resources are restricted. However, considering that both defender
and attacker have restricted resources, it is essential to weight the odds. In
the vehicular scenario, for example, we may assume that any detected cheat-
ing might trigger an examination. A considerable chance of being caught
before receiving even one certificate thus might deter sophisticated attackers
as well.
6.5 Ressource Consumption
In vehicular communication, time is essential. A traffic-warning message is
of little use if it is slower than nowadays break-lights. Requirements for
time and overhead are strict. Vehicles’ have only very limited resources for
computation. In combination, this makes the computational complexity and
memory overhead of communication protocols a crucial hindrance on the way
to implementation of vehicular communication.
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Figure 6.16: P.succ over K for l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, k = K − l.
6.5.1 Inter-Vehicle Communication Complexity
Reaction time in vehicular communication is a crucial parameter. We noted
in Section 6.1.4 that the allowable latency, depending on the application, has
to be below 100 milliseconds to 1 second. This time includes processing and
marshaling of sensor data, sender side security measures (i. e., appending
signature and credentials) as well as the receiver side un-marshaling, verifi-
cation of security measures and interpretation. This section provides a rough
analysis of the time needed to run the protocol from Section 6.3.
At the sending vehicle, the communication process consists of message
generation and message-signing with the private key c−1b . (For simplicity, it is
assumed that the blinded part of the certificate is equivalent to a public key.)
Furthermore, marshaling of the IVC message and data adds further delays
to emission. The message is then transferred, together with a certificate. A
receiver has to verify the signature of the certificate and the signature on the
message with the key cb contained in the certificate.
The computational complexity of certificate verification is linearly depen-
dent on l. The verification of a certificate consists of l hash and encryption
operations using the encryption function and keys EayR . These values have to
be combined in l−1 multiplications in Z/nZ, as given in Equation (6.2). Ver-
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Figure 6.17: Smallest l, respectively K, for P.succ ≤ 10−5. We considered
only K with 2 ≤ K ≤ 180 and l ≤ K.
ification of the message’s signature usually requires calculation of one hash
and one signature operation, depending on the specific hash and signature
algorithms used.
To consider feasibility of our scheme in reality, we examine the timing
of encryption algorithms. In the protocol, RSA is used for encryption of
revocation information. In Table 6.1, timings of 1024-bit RSA, taken from
[11], are shown. The implementation was executed on a Pentium II processor,
and timings are for handling of a single data block. Assuming that one
message contains not more than 100 bytes of payload [14], a message would
completely fit into one data block. 1024-bit, depending on the algorithm used
for IVC messages signatures, might be sufficient for the public key stored in
cb.
The modular nature of the protocol proposed in this chapter would allow
easy exchange of the encryption algorithm used for revocation anchors and
blinded certificate parts.
key generation encrypt decrypt sign verify
RSA 1024-bit 2,740.87 5.34 67.32 66.56 1.23
Table 6.1: 1024-bit modulus RSA timings on a Pentium II in Millisec-
onds [11].
Table 6.1 shows that using RSA for encryption of cb fulfils well the ob-
jective for strict time constraints during communication. During normal
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operation, encryption function EayR is often used, while the corresponding
decryption function DaxR is only used for revocation. Encryption in RSA is
much cheaper than decryption (factor ≈ 13). In Section 6.4.3 it has been
shown that even small values for l provide sufficient security. Depending on
the hashing algorithms, the proposed protocol seems usable for IVC commu-
nication.
Following [54] and [10], calculation of a message’s or certificates hash is
fast enough to be unimportant for these text sizes of ≈ 100 Byte (e. g., there
are implementations that provide RIPEMD with throughput of 82.7 Mbit/s).
For values of l = 2 the overall verification takes roughly ≤ 15 milliseconds,
which is reasonably acceptable, if aiming for an overall latency around 100
milliseconds.
6.5.2 Certification Complexity
During a single communication session between CA and requester, an arbi-
trary number of certificates may be requested — in theory. Depending on the
“refill”-strategy, certificates with either short or longer validity time nearer
or farther in the future may be requested9. In [43], two types of pseudonym
refill strategies are defined. In Strategy 1 a vehicle requests as many certifi-
cates as possible at one point in time. Contacts to the CA then are rare,
but many certificates have to be stored and the vehicle thus is authorised for
a longer period of time. In Strategy 2 certificates are only granted with a
validity time in the near future. Communication with the CA is more fre-
quently but the vehicle needs less storage, and revocation lists (if needed)
may be much smaller.
We distinguish between computational complexity at the certification au-
thorities and at the side of requesters. In vehicular scenarios, a requester
obviously has lower computational resources than a CA. The computational
resources of the CA are easily improved by further division of the space of
responsibility, by assigning multiple CA to highly frequented regions, or by
enlarging bandwidth and servers at the CA.
For maximum unlinkability of messages, each message has to be signed
with a new certficate. Although certificates can be requested in advance, the
high number of certificates needed, and the complexity of potential revocation
of a high number of certificates, most likely does not permit a supply of
certificates sufficient for the whole expected lifetime of a vehicle. (Assuming
1024-bit certificates used only once, one message per second10 and ten years
9Our protocol does not restrict the validity time. Discussion of the effects of different
policies is out of scope of this work.
10Actually position beacons might be send at higher frequency.
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lifespan ≈ 37 gigabytes memory would be needed.) The need for revocation
is more critical with a large supply of certificates. Providing a vehicle with
a lifetime supply implies huge revocation lists that must be kept (and used)
for a similarly long time. Thus, a constant stream of fresh certificates for
every vehicle would be needed.
Each certificate used has to be required beforehand. Denoting change-
frequency of certificates by fc, the time tr needed for a single certification
request defines an upper bound fc ≤ fr = 1/tr to fc. tr is governed by the
computational strength of the CA and requester, as well as the communica-
tion bandwidth between them.
Aside from other tasks, e. g., using the requested certificates, tr is deter-
mined by the following numbers.
For every new certificate, a requester has to calculate
3 · 2K random numbers,
2 · 2K RSA encryptions EayR ,
2K hashes,
2K − 1 multiplications in Z/nZ,
l − 1 multiplications in Z/nZ.
This amounts to 4K encryptions +6K random +(2K + l− 2) multiplica-
tions +2K hashes.
For every new certificate, a CA has to compute:
1 random S],
k verifications = encryptions, hashes and multiplications in Z/nZ,
l − 1 multiplications in Z/nZ,
1 exponentiation in Z/nZ.
This amounts to K ·(encryption + hash + multiplication) + exponentiation
+ random +(l − 1) multiplication.
Omitting the single exponentiation, the multiplications, and random num-
ber generation for the sake of simplicity, the determining parameter is K.
The workload for a requester is about a factor 4 higher than that of a
CA. Computations of both parties have to run sequentially, rendering tr ≈
5K × encryption.
Thus, taking the recommendations from Section 6.4.3, and choosingK = 20
and the same assumptions on the certificate size, one certification takes ≈ 27
milliseconds on the mentioned Pentium II.
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6.6 Related Work
The vehicular communications community has widely accepted privacy as one
of the main security research topics, see [1][55][20][27][39]. In the following,
important works from the body of privacy enhanced protocols are discussed,
including protocols not from the vehicular communications domain.
Anonymity-preserving certification protocols can be distinguished first by
having the ability to provide revocation of anonymity under defined circum-
stances or by being anonymous without exception. An example of the latter
case is Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) by Anna Lysyanska and Jan
Camenisch.[42] Examples of revocable anonymous protocols have been pro-
posed by the author himself in [64]. Furthermore, we are able to distinguish
between protocols by the attributes of their revocation mechanism, complex-
ity and scalability of certification, verification, and revocation, as well as
their modularity in terms of exchange of base cryptographic mechanisms.
In [23], we have already criticised the approach used by the Vehicular
Safety Consortium in 2005. [14, 67] In WAVE, anonymity revocation is done
by exhaustive search. The search space is chosen to be feasible to brute-force
the anonymity of an individual certificate, but is too costly for revocation of
a large number of certificates. This specification obviously violates the first
of Kerckhoffs’ principles [35].
In the following, we have proposed Secure Revocable Anonymous Au-
thentic Certification (SRAAC) [23] and the improved Trusted-SRAAC (T-
SRAAC) [64] using trusted computing hardware. In both works, we have
emphasised the objective of reducing the necessary trust in certification au-
thorities to handle anonymity revocation. Different from other works in this
field that either provided complete anonymous certification or left the cer-
tification authorities in possession of all information on relations between
identities and certificates, this work introduced peer-controlled revocation.
In [13] a certification scheme for vehicular communication is proposed
that is based on Baseline Pseudonyms (BP) and a group signature scheme.
Both schemes are combined in a hybrid scheme wherein each vehicle can
individually sign pseudonyms with a group signature key. Only a CA is able
to reveal a signer’s identity and create a revocation list if malicious behaviour
is detected. This complete CA-trust is the fundamental difference of our
threat model as compared to others. Direct application to only partially
trusted CA or revocation authorities is not discussed. Furthermore, BP omit
validity times, creating the need for revocation lists which contain single
entries for each revoked vehicle.
Ma, Kargl and Weber [43] propose a pseudonym-on-demand protocol to
allow for frequent pseudonym changes, with a focus on efficiency. Their paper
motivates and explains the advantages of a hierarchy of CA similar to the
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concept we have briefly introduced in Section 6.2.3. The main difference is
that their approach entrusts certification authority both with certification
and revocation powers.
In [26] a protocol is introduced that uses shared symmetric keys, provided
by road-side units (RSU), with dedicated mix-zones. The intention is to have
all vehicles use one identity while driving within this zone and thus mitigate
the ability of an attacker to trace individual vehicles. The main drawback,
compared to revocable anonymity schemes like the one introduced in this
work, is that again, either everyone or nobody is able to derive the identity
of message emitters.
Efficient protocols for revocable-anonymous certification are a prerequi-
site for pseudonym changes. Related to the usability of any certification
scheme is the question of pseudonym change strategies. In [22] simulations
of vehicle re-encounters are used to estimate the length of silence periods
during pseudonym changes.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a protocol for secure revocable anonymous certification has
been defined and analysed. The main objective of this chapter is the in-
troduction of separation of privilege and adaptability of the protocol with
respect to complexity constraints at given communication phases. Sepera-
tion of privilege reduces the amount of trust that has to be put into single
entities. Given the mandatory participation as it could be imagined for safety
communication in vehicular networks, such an approach is well motivated.
The introduced protocol is a generalised variant of the blind-signature
protocol by Stadler and Camenish [62] with additional un-blinded certificate
parts and adaptable certificate parameters. These modifications allow for
the certification authorities to verify the validity time and other critical pa-
rameters in the (otherwise blind) signed certificate. The introduced protocol
parameters allow reduction of the complexity of the certificate-verification
during communication. The latter attribute is crucial for latency-restricted
communication, for example, in the vehicular communication scenario de-
scribed in Chapter 3.
The security of the protocol has been analysed with a focus on cheating
requesters that try to manipulate the revocation anchor or open data of the
certificate. Furthermore, the anonymity of certificates with respect to the
open certificate data co has been discussed.
Considering the vehicular scenario and similar applications, both reduced
trust in single authorities, as well as techniques like requester-determined
open data and anonymity revocation seems wise. Prototypical implementa-
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tions are needed to validate that the protocols adapted complexity is usable
in vehicular communication.
128
That particular odyssey is
now over. My mind is now
at rest.
Andrew Wiles
7
Conclusion
Privacy is a growing area of research, connected to a wide field of related
knowledge. This work contributes to the relatively young field of unlinka-
bility measures. Unlinkability herein is understood as the inability of an at-
tacker to correctly solve an unlinkability problem. Unlinkability problems are
general anonymity problems, thus every anonymity problem can be mapped
onto an unlinkability problem. While anonymity problems concern mappings
from a set of identification anchors (IA) to a set of items of interest (IOI),
unlinkability problems concern partitions of a set of IOI. The focus of this
work is quantification of the amount of unlinkability, i. e., quantification of
the inability of an attacker to correctly determine the true relation between
IOI. (See Chapter 2)
The vehicular communication scenario presented in Chapter 3 is used
as a motivating example. The emphasis was put on restricted resources,
tight latency, and security requirements. In Chapter 4, a graph-model of
unlinkability and anonymity problems, based on certification infrastructures
as used in the scenario, was introduced.
In Chapter 5, a new unlinkability measure has been motivated and ex-
plained. The proposed expected distance unlinkability measure captures a
notion of consistency of an attacker’s probability mass assignment. It has
been shown by example that previously-known entropy-based measures, e. g.,
the degree of unlinkability, do not sufficiently discriminate between different
attacker’s assignments.
Unlinkability measures are the subject of ongoing research. A final an-
swer how unlinkability can be measured efficiently and expressive being still
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outstanding. The main contribution of this work is to introduce the notion
of inner structure of unlinkability hypotheses and consistency of attacker
assignments. Aside from providing motivation for the expected distance un-
linkability, these notions provide criteria that can be applied to unlinkability
measures in general. The understanding developed in this process about that
and why the same inner structure is not applicable to anonymity problems
improves the understanding of privacy problems in general.
Our definition of the expected distance unlinkability is based on three
criteria, derived from inner and outer structure. These criteria can be con-
sidered, as well as the resulting measure, to be a step towards a quantitative
understanding of unlinkability. Previous discussions about anonymity met-
rics have often been focused on attacks which were not recognised by known
measures, the criteria-based approach positively defines attack-quality.
Due to exponential cardinality of the unlinkability hypotheses space, our
measure provides only a theoretical notion of the amount of unlinkability.
However, the aforementioned entropy-based measures also have the same
problem. In practise, neither measure is computable for reasonably large
sets of IOI and non-trivial attacker assignments. Considering that the com-
plexity is caused by the cardinality of the hypotheses space, heuristics are
needed to approximate the measure. In this work, it has been shown by
example how properties of set partitions can be exploited to calculate sums
over the hypotheses space. Still, generalisation of this example remains work
in progress. The proposed measure could be seen as a defining measure for
establishing the semantic of unlinkability by way of unlinkability measure
criteria. It is ongoing work to apply these criteria to other related measures.
Knowing that anonymity problems are a sub-problem of unlinkability
problems, unlinkability measures must be applicable to anonymity as well.
Therefore, a relation between anonymity measures and unlinkability mea-
sures must exist. Furthermore, a single privacy scenario is often a combi-
nation of unlinkability and anonymity problems. Application of numerous
different measures is unsatisfactory, and cannot be expected from average
users for weighting different measures against each other. Thus, the aver-
age user will probably not use privacy measures because the benefit is not
made clear to him. A unification of privacy measures is needed to provide
information to users of privacy enhancing technology.
A minor contribution of this work is the certification protocol proposed
in Chapter 6 and adapted from a blind-signature protocol by Stadler and
Camenisch. The protocol is secure revocable anonymous and utilises sepera-
tion of privilege to reduce the amount of trust that has to be put into single
authorities to not misuse knowledge on relations between certificates and re-
questers. This design is motivated by the observation, that even trustworthy
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certification authorities consist of unknown individuals, and that one single
untrustworthy is sufficient to irrevocably compromise privacy.
The vehicular communication scenario used herein sets tight constraints,
especially for the complexity of certificate verification during communication.
To meet these requirements, new parameters of the protocol’s cut-and-choose
algorithm had to be introduced, and an unblinded part of the certificate had
to be included. An analysis of the generalised cut-and-choose algorithm
showed that a combination of parameters that provides sufficient security
levels does exist.
This work provided a complete analysis that allows the user to weight
complexity, and thus costs, against security. The precise choice of parame-
ters is up to the user. Although a structure of authorities has been sketched
in this work, security might be enhanced by combination of our scheme with
advanced PKI schemes, e. g., as proposed in [43]. The choice of protocol
parameters, especially with respect to reduction of network load on the ve-
hicular communication broadcast medium, and its applicability on vehicle
computers has to be researched in the future.
Privacy is currently a field of political controversy. Especially because
privacy always is a subjective choice, privacy enhancing technology has to
be ready available, usable and adaptable to the individual choice. Precise
definitions for privacy-related terms and measurements, approved by the sci-
entific community, are crucial to enable decisions. The topics in this work
— unlinkability-measures and scalable privacy protocols — are a part of
ongoing research to grasp the complex notions of privacy. This knowledge
might help to anchor privacy considerations into the design process for future
information technology.
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Mapping Anonymity onto
Unlinkability
Assume that an attacker is unable to solve anonymity problems, but owns an
oracle that perfectly solves unlinkability problems. The attacker can express
every anonymity problem by constructing the disjoint union MU := M ∪∗ U ,
where M is a set of IOI and U is a set of IA. The oracle then solves the
problem to determine the real partition from ΠMU .
Additionally the attacker may even reduce the complexity of the unlink-
ability problem by using the hint-class “breach of unlinkability” from [25].
This class describes the situation where an unlinkability-attacker gets to know
a set of elements that pairwise are in different equivalence classes. We denote
the set of set partitions ΠMU (HU) of a set M as conditioned by the hint HU .
The hint HU describes, that no two elements in of the set U are in the same
cluster. The hypotheses space then is defined in [25] by
ΠMU (HU) := {pi ∈ ΠMU : ∀{m,m′} ⊆ U ⇒ m pi m′}.
Where m pi m′ denotes that m and m′ are not in the same equivalence
class with respect to partition pi.
Knowing the subject identifiers U hint H|U |, which defines that the num-
ber of clusters is equal to |U | can be applied. This hint reflects the common
global anonymity scenario where all subject identifiers are known and each
item of interest has to be related to exactly one subject. This can be modelled
as hint “number of equivalence classes”. Combining both hints, a restricted
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unlinkability hypotheses space of set partitions can be defined as
ΠMU (HU ,H|U |) = {pi ∈ ΠMU : |pi| = |U | and ∀{m,m′} ⊆ U ⇒ m pi m′}.
(A.1)
Where |pi| denotes the number of clusters, i. e., equivalence classes, in a set
partition pi.
Even without these hints the oracle would produce the real partition. By
re-identifying the IA in MU the attacker thus is able to derive the mapping
from IOI to IA and thus has solved his original anonymity problem.
Thus, we have shown that any anonymity problem can be mapped to an
unlinkability problem. Obviously the other direction is not possible because,
as the above construction shows, the set of hypotheses in anonymity is but
a subset of the unlinkability hypotheses set.
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Example Implementation of Ed
The following source implements partition distance in R, a programming lan-
guage for statistic computing. This code does not show the implementation
of matrix.trajectory.dist which is used for computation of trajectory
distance and has to be implemented according to the scenario.
### p a r t i t i o n−d i s t a n c e
##################
## number o f e lements t h a t have to be moved to c r e a t e
## e q u a l p a r t i t i o n s .
## Based on the a l gor i thm d e s c r i b e d in G u s f i e l d 2002
d i s t . p a r t i t i o n <− function ( pa , pb) {
i f ( length ( pa ) != length (pb ) )
stop ( ” s e t p a r t i t i o n s d i f f e r in s i z e o f base s e t ” )
i f ( c lusternum ( pa ) > clusternum (pb ) ) {
## p r e v e n t s f a l s e r e s u l t
## This i s a k l u d g e
warning ( ”pb has more c l u s t e r s , pa , pb have been switched ” )
tmp <− pa
pa <− pb
pb <− tmp
}
## maximum opt imal assignment
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## uses hungarian a l gor i thm
optimal . ass ignment .max <− function (M) {
## turn ing i n t o minimizat ion problem
m <− max(M) − M
# m i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : NA means a s s i g n e d
check . s o l u t i o n <− function (m) {
j <− sapply ( 1 :nrow(m) , function ( i ){
## g e t a l r e a d y dec ided f i e l d s
j <− which( i s . na(m[ i , ] ) )
i f ( length ( j )>0)
return ( j [ 1 ] )
## check which 0 to use ( t h e r e i s a t l e a s t 1)
j <− which(m[ i , ] == 0)
## TODO check f o r more than one zero in co l ,
## which one to choose ?
j <− j [ which( sapply ( j ,
function ( j )
(any( i s . na(m[ , j ])))==FALSE ) ) ]
# f i l t e r NA−b l o c k e d j
i f ( length ( j ) <= 0)
return (NA)
else
return ( j [ which .min( sapply ( j ,
function ( j )
length (which(m[ , j ]==0)) ) ) ] )
})
return ( j )
} # end : check . s o l u t i o n
## reduce rows/ c o l s u n t i l op t imal s o l u t i o n found
r e s <− c ( )
## rowwise z e r o i n g ( k l u d g e <<− opera tor )
sapply ( 1 :nrow(m) , function ( i ) {
m[ i , ] <<− m[ i , ] − min(m[ i , ] , na .rm=TRUE)} )
r e s <− check . s o l u t i o n (m)
sapply (which( ! i s . na( r e s ) ) ,
function ( i ){
m[ i , r e s [ i ] ] <<− NA})
i f ( !any( i s . na( r e s ) ) ) {
return (sum( sapply ( 1 : length ( r e s ) ,
function ( i ) M[ i , r e s [ i ] ] ) ) )
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} else {
## column wise z e r o i n g
sapply ( 1 : ncol (m) , function ( i ) {
m[ , i ] <<− m[ , i ] − min(m[ , i ] , na .rm=TRUE)} )
r e s <− check . s o l u t i o n (m)
sapply (which( ! i s . na( r e s ) ) , function ( i ){
m[ i , r e s [ i ] ] <<− NA})
i f ( !any( i s . na( r e s ) ) ) {
return (sum( sapply ( 1 : length ( r e s ) ,
function ( i ) M[ i , r e s [ i ] ] ) ) )
} else {
stop ( ” todo : not implemented yet ” )
}
}
} # end : opt imal . assignment
## M: matrix o f numbers o f
## elements in i n t e r s e c t i o n o f c l u s t e r s
## a c l u s t e r i s e lement o f a s e t p a r t i t i o n here
M<− matrix . t r a j e c t o r y . d i s t ( pa , pb)
## return number o f e lements t h a t have to be d e l e t e d
## u n t i l bo th p a r t i t i o n s are e q u a l .
return (sum(M)−optimal . ass ignment .max(M) )
}
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Shared Revocation Keys
In the following we describe the shared RSA-key generation and joint decryp-
tion as introduced in [9]. The described procedures can be used to imple-
ment a quorum-revocation authority in the certification protocol described
in Chapter 6. The obvious advantage of this particular scheme is that the
shared keys are not generated by a single (trusted) dealer who would be —
again — the single point of failure we are avoiding here.
The described protocol is used to decrypt EyR(cb||α). For simplicity rea-
sons, we denote the ciphertext as c in this section. The decrypted plaintext
is denoted m.
Private key shares xi are calculated from the public key yR and pre-
shared key-generators p, q through three intermediate steps. First, each RA
calculates a value ϕi from its share of p and q. The first step is to calculate
ϕi =
{
nR − p1 − q1 + 1, i = 1
−pi − qi, i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
There is one distinguished “first” among the RA which has to add nR + 1 to
its value.
In the second step, ϕ is used to produce ζ using l in a secret joint compu-
tation1 without revealing the individual values of ϕ1, . . . , ϕk. Each member
1Using Benaloh’s protocol [5] as described in [9].
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of the quorum finally knows
l = ϕ mod yR
ζ = l−1 mod yR.
Now each RA generates its share of the private key xi.
xRi =
⌊−ζ · ϕi
yR
⌋
.
This allows for joint decryption of cipher text c to
m = cxR ≡ cr
∏
cxRi mod nR, (C.1)
where r is known from a first trial decryption undertaken by the first RA and
added to one of the xRi, e. g., xR1. The plaintext m includes the necessary
data to identify the certification run and, by this, the identity of the requester.
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